By Amit Cowshish,
Regardless of how and when Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine ends, the consequential predicament India finds itself in is only going to intensify. As the military operations continue unabated, causing death and destruction in Ukraine, repeated abstentions by India from voting in the United Nations on motions against the invasion isn’t going to go down well with Ukraine and its large support base.
Rectitude demands that India joins the overwhelming majority of countries in condemning the naked aggression and calling for cession of relentless military operations in, and withdrawal of Russian troops from, Ukraine. It also demands that India abides by the sanctions imposed on Russia by the US, its NATO allies, and some other countries. But pragmatism, arising from the Indian military’s dependence on Russia, dictates otherwise.
So far there has been an uneasy recognition of India’s dilemma by the world powers, but this may not last. Some time back, US President Joe Biden had said that among the QUAD countries only India was ‘somewhat shaky’ in acting against the cold-war ally Russia. Shortly thereafter he tellingly expressed the hope that India will soon be in sync with the US on the situation in Ukraine. The underlying message is clear.
Thanks to more than half-a-century of close defence cooperation between India and Russia (earlier the USSR), starting with the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed in August 1971 to bolster strategic cooperation between the two countries, India is heavily dependent on Russia. In a broad sense, there are three distinct dimensions of this dependence.
First, more than 60 per cent of the equipment, weapon systems, and platforms Indian armed forces use are of Russian origin. The Indian Army’s (IA) inventory of 3,000-odd T72M and T90S Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and 2,000-odd BMPs (Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty) Infantry Combat Vehicles are manufactured in India with the help of Russian technology and technical support. Several missile systems and specialised ammunition too are manufactured or imported from Russia.
The Indian Navy’s (IN) flagship INS Vikramaditya is a modified Kiev-class aircraft carrier whose embarked aircraft complement mainly comprises Russian Mikoyan MiG-29K multi-role fighters. A large proportion of frigates, destroyers, helicopters, missiles, and armaments in its inventory too are of Russian origin. This is also the case with the fighter squadrons, transport fleet, and rotary wing platforms operated by the Indian Air Force (IAF).
The supersonic cruise missile BrahMos that can be launched from submarines, surface warships, aircraft or land-based platforms is manufactured in India by BrahMos Aerospace, which is a joint venture between Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya and India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
Directly imported, but mostly license-built in India by the Defence Public Sector Undertakings with transfer of technology from the Russian Original Equipment Manufacturers, production and operational serviceability of these equipment, weapon systems and platforms are contingent on regular technical support and supply of spares, components, and sub-systems by Russia.
Second, although there has been a considerable increase in India’s import of arms in recent years from countries like the US, France and Israel, Russia continues to be the largest supplier of arms. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report of March 2022, US and France accounted for 39 per cent of India’s imports in 2017-21, but Russia was ahead of them with a share of 46 per cent of India’s imports.
This equation cannot change any time soon as some major contracts between India and Russia are currently under execution. These include contracts for five Almaz-Antey S-400 Triumf air defence missile systems, four Admiral Grigorovich Project 1135.6M frigates, licenced-production of 601,427 Kalashnikov AK-203 assault rifles in India, and a 10-year lease of ‘Akula’ (Schuka-B)-class nuclear powered submarine (SSN) for the IN. Besides these, there are possibly some other ongoing contracts for assorted launchers, missiles, man-portable air-defence systems, rockets, and 125 mm APFSD ammunition T-90 MBTs.
Third, discussions have been underway with Russia for procurement of some major items like 464 Russian T-90MS MBTs for the IA and 12 Sukhoi Su-30MKI for the IAF to replace the ones lost in accidents. These are to be built by the state-owned Armoured Vehicles Nigam Limited that came into existence following corporatisation of the Ordnance Factory Board and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited respectively. Some other procurement proposals may also be under consideration.
President Joe Biden’s expectation that India will soon be in ‘sync’ with the US -and most other countries- on the Ukrainian issue must be viewed in the background of this three-dimensional dependence of the Indian armed forces on Russia.
It is not possible to immediately indigenise, or find alternative sources of supply for, everything that is imported from Russia to sustain the in-service equipment. While the Indian armed forces may be able to cope with temporary disruption in supply through cannibalisation of parts from analogous platforms or local jugaad, permanent cessation of supply from Russia will have a debilitating impact on combat capabilities of the armed forces.
This only means that the existing contracts under which technical support, including spares and sub-assemblies, is obtained by India from Russia cannot be cancelled. In fact, it will be virtually impossible not to sign new contracts on expiry of the existing ones to ensure continuous technical support in future.
This reasoning also applies to major contracts that are under execution like the one for the S-400 Triumf air defence missile system. Cancellation of these contracts would almost certainly lead to legal disputes, prolong India’s operational voids, and leave India with no choice but to buy costlier equipment from the non-Russian sources which, given the complexity of the procurement procedures, may take a long time.
Meanwhile, the vulnerability of India’s security architecture vis-à-vis India’s traditional adversaries could increase, not least because of Russia aligning itself more closely with the China-Pakistan nexus.
The only area in which India could possibly hold its hand is limited to the deals that are still at the discussion stage. The requirement of additional tanks and combat aircraft, for example, can be met by fast tracking the programmes for manufacturing them in India through the Strategic Partnership Model or, if the need brooks no delay, through outright purchase from foreign manufacturers.
There is a possibility that Russia may not be able to honour the existing contracts because of the impact of the Ukrainian invasion on its own military industrial complex. In such a situation India could possibly cancel the affected contracts without any legal consequences, but this will neither appease the countries aligned against Russia nor the Indian armed forces in sustaining the operational availability of the in-service equipment.
India is truly in a pickle.
(The author is Former Financial Advisor (Acquisition), Ministry of Defence. Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position or policy of Financial Express Online. Reproducing this content without permission is prohibited).