By By Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd)

It was expected. Post 12 January strike by American and British armed forces against Houthi rebels in Yemen, things are hotting up. In the last one week, Houthi attacked Western shipping in the Red Sea, including U.S. warships. A few of the attempted strikes could hit their targets. On 17 January, a U.S.-owned bulk carrier, the Genco Picardy, was hit. It sustained damage to its side from a Houthi drone but was able to continue its journey. The U.S. Navy and Air Force successfully thwarted most of these attacks.

Interestingly, an Indian Navy warship reached the ship shortly afterwards to assist. The U.S. is carrying out strikes on Houthi military facilities in Yemen. The cycle is likely to continue for some time.

The issues that are becoming critical are: What real effect will these air strikes have on Houthi operations? How will the Houthis respond? What broader impact will the actions have on the region?

Military Aspects

A religiously inspired militia that emerged from Yemen’s northern mountains 20 years ago is now more powerful than ever. The Houthis want war. They want confrontation with the U.S. and Israel.

The Houthis have reported that five soldiers were killed and six injured in the strikes. Collateral damage was restricted. These strikes were precise and discrete with a limited aim. The objective was not to eliminate Yemeni leaders but to target their weapons systems, which threaten shipping. The Pentagon knew that it was impossible to eliminate the Houthis by remote bombing. The mountainous desert terrain and the Houthis’ dispersed, decentralised nature ensure that only U.S. ground forces’ direct intervention could neutralise the Houthis.

The majority of the targets were not in built-up areas. No Houthi leaders or Iranian advisors were targeted. This was not about regime change. No ground forces were employed. There was no intention to oust the Houthis from their position in Yemen. 

These raids did not compromise the Houthis’ capabilities by striking dozens of radars, arms depots, command centres and missile launch stations. They have a virtually unlimited stock of light arms and access to inexpensive drones, quickly produced and supplied by Iran.

How much Houthi capabilities would have degraded is hard to quantify. Intelligence on the overall missile inventories of Houthis is limited. The air strikes are unlikely to significantly impact Houthis’ military capabilities, especially their maritime operations. The Houthis knew that the strike would be coming any time soon. They operate several mobile launchers that “shoot and scoot” back into hiding. Targeting them is no small challenge.

The Houthis are used to sustaining heavy airstrikes. They have survived eight years of intense airstrikes by the Saudis and the Emiratis aided by the Western powers, especially the   U.S., with almost 400,000 people dying. They emerged stronger than before. With this experience behind them, they would have dispersed their capabilities to safer places so they could not be easily destroyed. They know that firing from unpredictable locations and moving the weapons themselves around constantly is critical to surviving. Like Hamas, it hides military assets and fighters in civilian areas. This makes eliminating them very challenging.

They know the U.S. would not escalate because it does not want to put boots on the ground or further inflame regional tensions. The Houthis can muster about 35,000 uniformed troops at any time.

The country is large enough. The Houthi leadership is well hidden, employing remarkable operational security measures. They display a level of ideological determination and ambition almost unique among Iran’s partners in the axis of resistance.

The Houthis are savvier, more prepared, and more equipped than they are given credit for. Their recklessness and willingness to escalate in the face of a challenge is significant and often underrated. The Houthis are armed with cheap drones, which the U.S. is capable of fighting with extremely costly missiles. They might be poor, but their war is less expensive than the U.S. They want chaos, and the U.S. demands order. Order is challenging and costly.   

However, degrading the Houthis’ ability to target ships, like striking known radar systems and command and control nodes, could help reduce their ability to launch attacks. Two U.S. officials claimed that somewhere between 20 per cent to 30 per cent of the Houthis’ offensive capability was destroyed on the first night of the bombing. It is hard to believe these limited strikes would significantly reduce their capacity or will to fight.

The Houthis are vulnerable. They lack advanced intelligence and surveillance tools to provide targeting information for long-range anti-ship systems. They mainly rely on Iran for this capability. They are sensitive about specific targets, such as their leaders, drone and missile storage sites and irreplaceable helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.

Tactically, the strikes were a success because they destroyed a lot of targets and marginally impacted the Houthis’ military capacity. Strategically, the operation cannot be called a success since the Houthis have not stopped their attacks.

There is an opinion that the coalition strikes were intended to alter the Houthis’ behaviour. The strike against the Houthis was measured and calculated: careful about minimising the risk of escalation but balanced with a lot of power to show intent. There is a regional precedent for a big air strike altering behaviour. In 2018, the U.S., U.K. and France launched more than 100 aircraft and ship-based missiles against Syrian government sites in reprisal for chemical attacks against civilians in the country’s civil war. The strikes did not end the fighting, but they did help to dampen it and reduce the frequency of chemical use. 

But this hypothesis is being questioned to what extent the coalition strikes would alter the behaviour of Houthis. The Houthis have survived a Saudi-led Arab coalition bombing campaign for years. Limited attacks by the U.S. and its Western allies will not crush the Houthis, no matter how painful or surgical the operations are. It is extremely tough to politically defeat or militarily destroy a deeply rooted, capable and resilient non-state actor such as the Houthis.

The Houthis may expand their attacks to U.S. and U.K. ships and bases across the Arabian Peninsula. The Houthis, by now, have missiles and weapons and technology that make U.S. military bases in the Gulf within their reach.

To stop the Houthi missile and drone attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden would be highly resource-intensive for the military. Fusing the intelligence gathered from space-based infrared warning satellites detecting the locations of anti-ship ballistic and most cruise missile launches with many other intelligence capabilities and documenting these patterns of operations would be critical to stopping launches before they occur. Doing this live would be a considerable challenge. It would require a far more elaborate surveillance and reconnaissance system to be persistently deployed over large swathes of Yemeni coastline and inland areas than what is existing on the ground. This would need to be integrated with assets at the ready capable of time-sensitive strikes. They would need to hit the launchers before firing.

Political Gains by Houthis

Following mounting Houthi attacks, the U.S. and U.K. felt they needed to make a show of force. That is precisely what the Houthis wanted and prepared for. U.S. Strikes gave the Houthis the enemy they had long sought. Direct confrontation with the U.S. consolidates the Houthis’ power domestically and increases recruitment. It has enhanced the Houthis’ popularity in Yemen and the broader Middle East while distracting from the challenge of actually governing the northern areas of the country which the group controls. Not surprisingly, they have vowed retaliation, perhaps targeting U.S. military assets.

Air strikes and use of force overall do not make much difference in a highly complicated country like Yemen. Major Yemeni parties, including Houthis foes, would not endorse these strikes. There is a massive sentiment against outsiders in Yemen. 

The Houthis stand to gain politically from these attacks as they support a narrative: they are freedom fighters fighting Western imperialism in the Muslim world. They may be successful in banking on anti-American sentiment rife now across the region to promote themselves as real supporters of the Palestinian cause. This would reinforce their claim that they are fighting oppressive foreign enemies attacking Yemen. This will bolster the Houthis’ image among supporters. Already, the Houthis have managed to rally domestic public support in the part of Yemen they control.  

The U.S.-U.K. strikes have put Houthi opponents in a difficult position. They are hesitant to openly support Western intervention in Yemen or blame the Houthis for supporting Palestinians. There remains widespread sympathy for Gazans in Yemen, allowing Houthis to gain support in areas not under their control. The Yemeni Transitional Government issued a statement following the strikes that shows the predicament facing Houthi rivals. While blaming the Houthis’ terrorist attacks for dragging the country into a military confrontation, they also reaffirmed support for Palestinians against brutal Israeli aggression.

Muslim-majority countries were hesitant to support the coalition because of the sensitivity of the Palestinian cause. The 10-country coalition to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea announced on December 18, 2023, did not have key regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Djibouti.

Information or Psychological Operations by Houthis. The Houthis have shown a remarkable capacity to use information operations through skilful media use. Dramatic seaborne raids and the taking hostage of ships’ crews have been carefully video graphed that went viral. Turning a captured vessel into a public attraction tourist spot attracted more attention domestically and internationally.

Appeals through mosques in Yemen and cellphone text campaigns have raised donations for the Houthis by invoking Gaza’s plight. The Houthis have managed to rally domestic public support in the part of Yemen they control. 

In the next part, the effect of the strike on Arab countries, Iran and U.S. will be discussed.

The author is an Indian Army Veteran

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