By Vaibhav Agrawal

The inception of ballistic missile defense (BMD) emerged during the 1950s, marked by the efforts of both the USA and the USSR to establish rudimentary BMD systems, yielding a blend of successes and setbacks. This evolutionary trajectory persists today, characterized by a perpetual cycle of countermeasure development that has experienced its share of highs and lows. Beyond the original players, countries including France, China, Israel, and India have also engaged in the pursuit of BMD systems, achieving differing levels of accomplishment. However, at its core, the concept remains akin to attempting the extraordinary feat of intercepting a ‘bullet with another bullet’.

The Obvious Trail

Throughout the evolution of BMD development and deployment, its advocates have grappled with these very questions. The interception of ballistic missiles presents the choice of countering them during their boost, midcourse, or terminal phases. This dynamic translates to engagements occurring within hostile territory, outer space, or friendly airspace. Potential methods of neutralization encompass kinetic impact, the deployment of directed energy weaponry, electronic countermeasures, and even the utilization of Special Forces. Each avenue boasts distinct merits and demerits, although these are beyond the scope of our current discussion.

Flaw In The Shield

During the initial decade of the 21st century, the United States embarked on a journey of research and development, giving rise to the concept of a Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV), initially denoted as MKV. This visionary creation was envisaged as the ultimate solution for intercepting and neutralizing diverse enemy missile warheads and decoys using a solitary counter-missile launch. In alignment with its nomenclature, this innovation accommodates the deployment of multiple kill vehicles from a solitary booster platform. The system encompasses a carrier platform equipped with onboard sensors and an array of compact, uncomplicated kill projectiles, each weighing around 10 pounds, capable of autonomous targeting.

A pivotal milestone arrived on December 2nd, 2008, marked by a successful MOKV test at the National Hover Test Facility, situated within Edwards Air Force Base in California. However, the project faced an interruption in April 2009, following a decision by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to terminate it. Yet, this setback was temporary, as the initiative experienced a rejuvenation in 2015, signaling an enduring commitment to the pursuit of innovative defense capabilities.

Indian Ballistic Missile Defence Program

The Indian Ballistic Missile Defence Program represents a proactive endeavor aimed at conceiving and deploying a multi-layered ballistic missile defense mechanism, designed to safeguard India against potential ballistic missile threats. Unveiled in 2000 following the Kargil War, this initiative emerged under the stewardship of the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government. Progressing through a series of tests, the program’s development journey has extended into 2006, with expectations for operational readiness within four years from that point, as conveyed by the nation’s missile development program leader.

Conceived as a response to the ballistic missile vulnerabilities posed by neighboring Pakistan and China, this program takes the form of a dual-tiered system. The architecture comprises both land and sea-based interceptor missiles, prominently the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile, dedicated to high-altitude interceptions, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile, designed for interceptions at lower altitudes. Together, this twofold defense is engineered to intercept incoming missiles originating from distances of up to 5,000 kilometers. The defensive infrastructure further integrates an interconnected array of early warning and tracking radars, complemented by command and control centers.

A significant milestone was reached in November 2006 with the successful testing of the PAD missile, followed by the AAD’s triumphant test in December 2007. With the achievement of the PAD missile’s test, India joined an exclusive league, becoming the fourth nation to effectively develop an anti-ballistic missile system, following the footsteps of the United States, Russia, and Israel. While the program has undergone numerous trials, its official commissioning remains an aspiration awaiting realization.

All you need to know about PAD

The Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) is an exo-atmospheric anti-ballistic missile designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles. It utilizes a two-stage system, incorporating a solid-fueled first stage and a liquid-fueled second stage. With a maximum interception altitude of 80 km, it features maneuvering thrusters for lateral acceleration exceeding 5 gs at 50 km altitude. Guided by an internal navigation system, it receives updates from LRTR and employs active radar homing for terminal guidance. PAD can engage 3,000 km class ballistic missiles at Mach 5 speed, effectively countering medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic threats.

Advanced Air Defence (AAD)

The Advanced Air Defence (AAD) is an anti-ballistic missile created for intercepting incoming ballistic missiles within the endo-atmosphere at a 40 km altitude. It employs a single-stage, solid-fuel design with siliconised carbon jet vanes. Similar to PAD, it uses an indigenous radio frequency seeker for guidance, backed by an inertial navigation system (INS), ground-based radar updates during mid-course, and active radar homing for terminal guidance. AAD stands at 7.5 m in height, weighs approximately 1.2 t, and boasts a diameter of under 0.5 m.

Outdated yet Required?

When discussing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), they are commonly categorized into three types: multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral. While the proposed CBMs may not strictly fall under multilateral terms, any disarmament or arms control initiatives between India and Pakistan extend beyond bilateral considerations due to the involvement of China.

While Pakistan’s security concerns are primarily India-focused, India faces significant challenges from China as well. Consequently, Indo-Pak CBMs encounter complexities, as Pakistan has acquired weapon systems entirely from China and sometimes stored them on Chinese soil.

CBMs on a bilateral level between India and Pakistan encounter several hurdles. The prevalent lack of trust stems from Pakistan’s delicate political landscape, where the military’s predominant role is justified by countering perceived survival threats from India and striving for strategic parity.

Decisions on geopolitical matters in Pakistan are largely influenced by the military, overshadowing the civilian government. This dynamic contributes to inherent political discomforts that undermine the crucial aspects of “transparency” and “verification” necessary for the success of any CBMs, particularly those between India and Pakistan.

Hence, the option of discarding Prithvi I and II for a fresh Confidence Building Measure (CBM) between India and Pakistan seems improbable. The test of Prithvi II suggests that it maintains its relevance, with India’s strategic decision-makers indicating their confidence in the continued utility of Prithvi missiles.

The Prithvi test offers insights into the launch process and the broader system for similar missiles in the future. While not directly replicating Prithvi, this experience retains value for forthcoming systems like Pralay and Prahar. Many foundational components shared among these missiles underscore this point, given the tendency for missile technologies and components to be adapted from other systems within the same developer’s portfolio – a role assumed by India’s DRDO.

Illustratively, the Pralay missile integrates technology from the exoatmospheric interceptor missile Prithvi Defense Vehicle (PDV) of the Indian Ballistic Missile Defense Programme. Additionally, it benefits from the same composite fuel developed by the High Energy Materials Research Laboratory (HEMRL), which powered the Sagarika missile (K-15) from the Indian Navy’s K Missile family.

Why MOKV Over IBMDP?

The inclusion of MOKV heralds a pivotal force enhancement for any ABM setup. By endowing a solitary interceptor missile with this technology, the interception scope expands to encompass MIRVs and even decoys.

The multi-faceted strategy eliminates the necessity for robust pre-launch intelligence, capitalizing on the ABM System’s inherent discrimination proficiency.

Encompassing all flight phases and missile ranges, the MOKV establishes a stratified ABM defense, safeguarding against ballistic threats comprehensively.

A profound reduction in interceptor inventory requisites transpires, effectively countering an advancing and increasingly potent threat landscape.

Despite encountering technical setbacks, financial limitations, and shifts in administration or regimes, research and development in ballistic missile defense technologies persist worldwide. The dissolution of the USSR marked the conclusion of the Cold War, leading to a reduction in the ballistic missile threat. However, fresh challenges have arisen, affecting not only the USA but the global landscape as well. As China vies for supremacy, and North Korea and Pakistan maintain their unpredictable nuclear stances, the issue of ballistic missile defense remains pertinent.

In this context, the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) emerges as a pivotal future-oriented component within this defense framework. At present, the USA appears to be the primary proponent of this system (although other undisclosed national initiatives might exist), potentially transforming the landscape of anti-ballistic missile systems.

The author is a passionate independent journalist with a keen focus on Space and Defense Affairs. He can be reached at vaibhavmag1@gmail.com & he tweets (@VaibhavMAG

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