As I stepped out of my office opposite Chhatrapati Sivaji Terminus (CST) in Mumbai on the night of 26/11/2008, ten terrorists from Lashkar-e-Taiba stepped out from a rubber dinghy at Colaba beach about 2 km away, armed with assault rifles, grenades and GPS devices, completing their 550 nautical mile sea voyage from Karachi. By the time the first shots were fired at CST, my train had pulled out.

In the next 50 hours, the Army of the Pure killed 166 and wounded 304 people at five locations in Mumbai. By the time commandoes secured the Taj Mahal Hotel, Oberoi-Trident, Chabad House, Leopold Cafe and CST three days later, Lashkar-e-Taiba had arrived: Not just in India?s financial capital, but on the wider global stage as well. The terrorist spectacular drove fear into people?s minds, fired a warning shot to the world and brought South Asia?s nuclear rivals close to war?besides tremendously boosting the morale of Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Stephen Tankel?s scholarly work Storming The World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba is a gripping tale of the dreaded terrorist group Lashkar, which had very humble beginnings as just another Pakistani jihadi outfit bred in the badlands of Afghanistan. Written in a methodical, rather mathematical manner, Storming The World Stage impresses with storytelling devoid of hyperbole, metaphors and other devices employed by the less gifted. For anyone curious about the emergence, growth and future of Lashkar, this book is a must-read.

Tankel starts off with the scenario which led to the birth of Lashkar. Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi, a Pakistani follower of the Ahl-e-Hadith creed of Sunni Islam fought the Afghan jihad, and later joined Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal in Pakistan to build what later became Lashkar. Among different brands of Sunni Islam which preached jihad, Lashkar stood apart. Whereas other Ahl-e-Hadith followers preached jihad as a collective duty?meaning there is no individual responsibility to wage war?Lashkar and its parent Jamaat-ud Dawa wanted every Muslim to join. However, this philosophy?extremist even by extremist standards?did not attract many, and Lashkar remained a minority in AfPak?s jihadi terrains.

According to Tankel, Pakistan has been nurturing terrorists for its proxy wars in Kashmir and Afghanistan for long. Militant Islam was encouraged to unite its fractious society and present itself as Islam?s vanguard. The monster finally turned on Frankenstein, training its guns at the Pakistani state. The vanguard mirage vanished much earlier, with the loss of East Pakistan.

However, India remained an existential threat. The practice of training terrorists at camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) before ?launching? them across the border had been on since the 1980s. A rigged election in Kashmir and the frustration among the masses helped Pakistan, led by its spy agency Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to sow the seeds of disruption. Since then, it has used proxies like Hizb-ul Mujahideen and Harkat-ul Ansar to bleed India, writes Tankel.

However, Kashmir wasn?t the only theatre of holy war. Afghanistan was the other. ISI grew in stature during the Soviet-Afghan war, when it deployed militants en masse to evict godless communists from Muslim land. After the Taliban?s triumph, Mullah Omar took the reins in Kandahar and Osama bin Laden gave him company. For Pakistan, promoting Taliban was the best way to counter India in Afghanistan. After breeding several proxies for decades, ISI finally homed in on Lashkar. Since its support base was small, ISI assumed, partially correctly, that Lashkar would be pliable. The group started recruiting, training and deploying terrorists in Kashmir.

ISI, however, miscalculated that Lashkar would be perpetually pliable. Even as ISI was handholding Lashkar, its parent JuD was steadily building a social outreach programme?building schools, hospitals, mosques and conducting relief work unmatched by the state. Over its history, Lashkar-JuD became Janus-faced?a welfare provider in Pakistan, a dreaded terrorist organisation outside. Unlike many other jihadi outfits which turned on the Pakistani state or fought in Afghanistan, Lashkar?s priorities were clear: the near-jihad in Kashmir.

After 9/11, Pakistan came under intense pressure to pull the plug on Taliban and al Qaeda. Just a year earlier, Lashkar had shot to limelight with the audacious attack on India?s Red Fort. After 9/11, Pakistan half-heartedly followed US orders, getting aid in return. Al-Qaeda was chased out, but many Taliban received safe harbour in Pakistan. Pakistan attempted a double game separating the ?good jihadis? from the ?bad?: those fighting in Indian-administered Kashmir?read Lashkar?were the good ones, while those fighting in Afghanistan or leading an insurgency in Pakistan were bad. Pakistan?s Pervez Musharraf regime forbade Lashkar (and others) from fighting in Afghanistan, while continuing to promote its cross-border exploits in Kashmir.

According to Storming The World Stage, this was a turning point, opening up cracks in the jihadi community, with some members directed their firepower at the state, leading to a crackdown. However, Lashkar and JuD, which were in ISI?s good books, were safe. Lashkar leadership felt it expedient to align with state interests to maintain its infrastructure and further its jihadi agenda.

Terrorists from Lashkar and Jaish-e-Mohammad had attacked the Indian Parliament a month after 9/11, leading to Lashkar?s ban in Pakistan. The Kaluchak massacre followed, straining India-Pak ties. However, Lashkar continued to have a free run through JuD. The assassination attempts on Musharraf and the London underground bombings forced Pakistan to turn the screws on all militant groups, including Lashkar. Still, law enforcement turned a blind eye to Lashkar, which continued with its Kashmir pranks.

Though Lashkar focussed on Kashmir, its ideology was pan-Islamist and some of its members started freelancing for the Afghan jihad. After the London bombings, Pakistan forced Lashkar to lie low in Kashmir, and the group started spreading its wings abroad. Some cadres engaged more deeply in Afghanistan, in the process allying with some anti-Pakistan groups. However, its diminished focus on Kashmir, where it was the premier jihadi group for long, frustrated its cadre, some of whom split and joined other groups. Lashkar?s response: Mumbai.

The Mumbai attacks elevated Lashkar to the global stage, putting it on par with al-Qaeda. The attack targeted Westerners and Jews, among others. November 26 turned out to be more successful than its masterminds expected, says Tankel, partially because the lack of an ?egress option? for the attackers meant the terrorists had to fight until death, stretching out the battle and raising the body count.

Lashkar?s growth from a tiny group to the top league of global jihadism had as much to do with state support for terrorism, as well as the group?s emphasis on social welfare. For Lashkar-JuD, dawa (preaching) and jihad (holy war) were of equal importance. According to Hafiz Saeed, ?Islam propounds both dawa and jihad. Both are equally important and inseparable. Since our life revolves around Islam, therefore both dawa and jihad are essential; we cannot prefer one over the other.?

In his concluding chapter, Tankel poses an open question: Is Lashkar the next al-Qaeda? The answer isn?t clear. However, Storming The World Stage issues a dire warning for us: After 26/11, Lashkar?s threat to India remains greater and more straightforward. ISI?s leash on Lashkar has been loosened. India must take note.