Over the past decade, since the Pokhran and Chagai nuclear tests, a number of books have been written about the dangers of nuclear weapons, when left in the hands of the countries other than the P-5 (namely India and Pakistan), largely because the pundits in the West have convinced themselves that the subcontinent has always stood on the verge of a conflict. And with nuclear weapons in their possession, it was only a matter of time that India or Pakistan, would blow each other apart, if push came to shove over Kashmir. And this book is based on a similar assumption.
However, the author ? who teaches strategic studies at The US Naval War College ? has based his thesis, after immense research as one would expect from an academic, on the grounds that as Pakistan remains conventionally weaker to India and is dissatisfied with the status quo over Kashmir, it would be tempted to seek a military solution to Kashmir by resorting to a short, swift conflict where it could use nuclear weapons. And an Indian response ? as suggested by Indian leaders from time to time ? would be so devastating that Pakistan would cease to exist as a viable state. And therefore, he argues, that while nuclear weapons are regarded as a deterrent, they are in fact, a dangerous deterrent.
But then that is what the debate precisely about. Those opposing this thesis ? and most strategic affairs gurus in India at least do so ? say that, why is it that western countries regard nuclear weapons as a deterrent ? Europe for instance, has had its longest stretch of peace ever since the advent of nuclear weapons ? but on the sub-continent these are dangerous weapons, and not deterrents. Western scholars then argue that apart from the fact that they are very expensive toys ? because during the cold war, the West spent huge sums to out do the Russians ? and that India and Pakistan do not have the command structures to handle nuclear weapons. The Indian counter is that, we?ve learnt from the west and therefore we intend to have a minimum number of nuke deterrents versus a 100 or so bombs, not tens of thousands like the West ? and that we have shown restraint even at a time of serious provocation, like the Kargil conflict. In short, we know what to do.
However the author is a determined anti-proliferation missionary. He has beefed up his book with a lot of data. One such chart gives details of Indo-Pak shoot outs (mostly along the LoC that was until recently an active front line), from 1972 to 2002. This is the period that the book examines. But a closer look shows that both sides have used force before and after their going nuclear. In fact, many experts argue that while nuclear weapons put a lid on an all out war, they allow the space for short border skirmishes. And that would continue until an agreement is reached over a boundary for Kashmir. Nukes or no nukes. The author however insists otherwise. Having drawn on several paradigms ? including the Sino-Russian border conflicts leading to the Ussuri crisis of the 1960s ? to show that a then weaker China (as Pakistan is vis-?-vis India), used the cover of its neo nuclear status to seek a border settlement. Maybe. But the world has moved on, I?d say.
Dangerous Deterrent by Paul Kapur is a very well researched document, and a valuable edition to the study of India-Pakistan relations, under the shadow of nuclear weapons. But although the book is about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the answer as the author suggests, is to reduce proliferation?s dangers with diplomacy than nuclear weapons themselves. Indeed. And not by putting the nuclear genie back into the bottle.
?The reviewer isa defence analyst