Against a widening asymmetry between India and China, the storm in the ASEAN neighbourhood, China?s domestic compulsions and India?s laggardness
India is by no means China?s ?all-weather? friend but is eagerly awaiting to extend a warm welcome to the young and dynamic Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on his first foreign visit covering Pakistan, India, Germany and Switzerland.
Premier Li, who is an economist trained at the prestigious Peking University, is visiting India against the backdrop of an unprecedented three-week face-off between the two countries in the disputed western sector. Chances are that India is no match for China?s legendary hospitality either.
Sino-Indian relations are being played against a widening asymmetry in relations where China has outpaced India (including militarily). India is pitted against the reality of a rising, shining China braving the ?China Dream?. ?India Shining? is a far cry from reality. The consolation is that Indian democracy (in whose success the West has a larger stake) is imbued with the precious ?mandate of heaven? (legitimacy) elusive to China?s Communist Party.
The bravado of Indian democracy aside, the reality is that the border issue with China will neither be resolved soon (a terrain that complicates cartography) nor be wished away. Thus, Sino-Indian relations have to be charted and envisioned in the larger context, looking beyond the parameters of the proposed Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA). This involves taking note of the tremors in the ASEAN neighbourhood, China?s domestic compulsions and, finally, India addressing its own laggardness before crying wolf.
First, the ASEAN neighbourhood. A cursory and random skimming of news dailies across ASEAN is a relatively simple way to understand the dilemma of China?s rise. No questions here, China?s diplomatic ?charm offensive? and economic gridlock from Myanmar to Japan is all too well-known. But the underlying currents are hard to miss.
The Daily Inquirer (the Philippines) says ?Philippines won?t give up its claims to South China sea territories? (April 27, 2013). It is common knowledge that the Philippines periodically scoffs at China (which calls the Philippines a ?troublemaker in the region?). Chinese structures on Mischief Reef (in 1995) to the current scenario of two Chinese Maritime Surveillance (CMS) vessels stationed in Scarborough Shoal (both claimed by the Philippines as well) is proof that the storm will not die down soon. China?s punitive measures such as stopping fruit exports from the Philippines at China?s Customs (in 2012) has not been successful. President Benigno ?Noynoy? Aquino (who has endeared himself as ?Pnoy?; Filipinos call themselves ?Pinoy?) has embraced a pro-active diplomacy anchored in regional allies with ally United States in the shadow. With President Aquino?s triumphant showing at the mid-term legislative polls (May 2013), this line of foreign policy is likely get a further shot in the arm.
Take Vietnam (China is Vietnam?s largest trade partner). Vietnam?s Nhan Dan (The People, ?The voice of the Party, State and the People of Vietnam?) is currently talking Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung?s visit to Russia and Belarus, on the footsteps of President Xi Jinping?s successful trip to Russia earlier this year (March 2013), where President Xi signed agreements left, right and centre.
President Xi?s goodies from Russia (the world?s largest oil producer) were predictable. This included an agreement for Russian state-owned Rosneft to triple its oil sales to China over the next 25 years in lieu of a $2 billion loan, another $2 billion loan to Russian mining company En+ Group as well as agreement with Russian gas giant Gazprom to supply China with 38 billion cubic meters of gas from 2018.
Prime Minister Dung?s visit should be seen in the light of a whopping $2 billion order that Vietnam made from Russia in 2009 for six ultra-quiet Kilo-class submarines. According to academic Ian Storey, this would give Vietnam ?a quantum leap in anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare capabilities?, deterrence given the deadlock of China and Vietnam over Paracel and Spratly Islands. The Vietnam-Russia Joint Communique (2013) indicates ?construction of the first nuclear power plant? (Nihn Thuan I) and ?further collaboration in national defence and security?.
Nhan Dan has indicated that truce lies far producing ?eighteen maps, including four ancient ones testifying Vietnamese sovereignty with respect to Paracel and Spratly archipelagos?. US naval ships are docking in Danang, highlighting that where Vietnam is concerned?economic engagement and strategic national interests run along two different tracks.
To China?s chagrin, the ?outpost of tyranny?, Myanmar, is fast changing hue.
Thus far, Myanmar is China?s ?strongest and most consistent ally? sharing a 2,200-km border with established pauk phaw (brotherly) relations. China has been courting Myanmar in perusal of its ?two-ocean strategy?. According to sinologists Li Chenyang and Lye Liang Fook, China wants to shift from a ?one-ocean state to a more stable two-ocean state? (Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean) to enhance its security. With Myanmar providing access to the Indian Ocean, China may overcome its so-called ?Malacca Dilemma? (overwhelming dependence on the Malacca Strait).
Moreover, a large ethnic Chinese population (between 2.3 million to 3 million including illegal migrants; 4% of the population) live on the northern border and towns of Myanmar. According to journalist Larry Jagan, in Mongla and Muse (border towns), Chinese calligraphy and currency rules the roost.
China has heavily invested heavily in the ?Yunnan International Passage?. Academic Fan Hongwei typifies it as ?three vertical lines?, ?three horizontal lines?, of which three road lines reach the Myanmar border. Of the ?nine passages?, two passages, Kunming-Ruili-Yangon and Kunming-Tengchong-Myanmar-India are updated versions of Burma Road and Stilwell Road. There is also China?s $2.5 oil and gas pipeline originating at Kyauk Phyu port (Rakhine state) terminating in Kunming (capital of Yunnan) with a possible extension to Chongqing (municipality).
China has clearly stolen a march over India. Much is made of India?s investment in roads, factories, Sittwe Port (nearing completion in 2013) and the Trilateral Highway (slated for completion in 2016) but this is possibly a fraction of China?s investment in Myanmar.
However, the irony lies in that Myanmar has a mind of its own, and how. Myanmar?s state-owned The New Light of Myanmar indicates that it is on the cusp of a historic turning point, what with President Thein Sein?s slated visit to America (the first in 47 years) coinciding with Premier Li?s visit to India.
Sino-Japanese and Sino-Korean relations need no elaboration?China and Japan embroiled in a fierce dispute over Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands. Japan?s The Daily Yomiuri recently voiced, ?Claim in Chinese newspaper over Okinawa sovereignty megalomanic? (May 11, 2013); in South Korea, US Naval Ship USS Nimitz is for drills.
Second, China?s domestic compulsions. China?s relations with ASEAN (except for Cambodia, which, as ASEAN chair, decided not to internationalise the South China Sea dispute in 2012) is lingering at an all-time low. At a time of China?s ebullient rise, there is scepticism about Chinese ?expansionism?. On the contrary, the wheels of Chinese foreign policy may not be as well-greased as we think.
President Xi Jinping is China?s ?paramount leader? who. according to Yun Sun (visiting fellow at Brookings), commands an ?unparalleled position?. China?s ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) is low in party hierarchy. In fact, the Communist Party?s foreign ministry, the Central International Department (CID), ranks higher than the MFA. (Seasoned diplomat Dai Bingguo, China?s Special Representative on Sino-Indian border talks, hailed from the CID.)
China?s seven-member Standing Committee of the Politburo sits atop the decision-making, advised by an ad hoc, informal group called the National Security Leading Small Group (NSLSG). The NSLSG is manned by key government and party personnel but has limited role in policy implementation.
Yun Sun and Kenneth Lieberthal (Brookings Institution) have indicated the ?lack of coordination between the foreign ministry-military?. China?s military is often its ?own Kingdom? that resorts to ?bureaucratic tricks? (to expand its budget). The storm in the South China Sea and Ladakh (Aksai Chin) may be nothing short of this. This points to the compulsions and dangers in China?s inner wheels. The J-20 incident in 2011 (J-20 is a stealth fighter) is considered a classic example. The J-20 test coincided with US Defence Secretary Robert Gates visit to China. Ex-President Hu Jintao did not seem to know of the testing?Gates was famously quoted by the New York Times as saying ?The civilian leadership seemed surprised by the test?.
China?s blinkered foreign policy of the past is being addressed to?evident in the new foreign policy team. Yang Jiechi, a seasoned ?Americanist?, has been elevated to State Councillor; foreign minister Wang Yi (who served in Japan and was director of the Taiwan Affairs Office) is an ?Asianist?; and the new Ambassador to United States, Cui Tiankai, is an American expert. Lest India be self-congratulatory, China is looking beyond the Himalayas, counter-balancing the American ?pivot? to smoothening ties across ASEAN, particularly Japan.
Third, in tandem with Sino-Indian relations guided by ?economics first? and security considerations, a few lessons from China. China?s Confucian Institutes match a British Council, an Alliance Francaise in scope but India?s ?soft power? is hardly to be seen, much less felt. Within its frontiers, China is backing the Prosper the Borders to Enrich Local People (PBELP), operational since 2000 in 135 border cities, strong cue to empower India?s Border Roads Organisation (BRO), particularly in the Northeast.
India?s ?lack of strategic culture? that ?hobbles its ambitions? as called out recently by The Economist (March 30, 2013) is more than reflected in its laggard, feeble, disjointed flip-flops which will cause harm in the short and long run.
The author is a Singapore-based sinologist and is currently visiting fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi. Views are personal