Russia is hosting the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan from 22 to 24 October 2024. The Summit assumes significance because of two primary reasons: it is happening in a country which is involved in a war with the West, and second, this is the first-ever Summit of expanded BRICS, which now includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has yet to formalise its membership, but it has been participating in BRICS meetings, according to the Russian official website. Prime Minister Narendra Modi will attend the Summit. Speculations are rife over the possibility of a formal or informal Modi-Jinping meeting in Kazan. However, this has not been confirmed either by Chinese or Indian ministries.
The Financial Express Online interviewed Dr Rajan Kumar, who has written extensively on this issue. He teaches at the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. His edited book ‘Locating BRICS in the Global Order: Perspectives from the Global South’ was published by Routledge, London, in 2022.
How relevant is the BRICS in the current world order?
BRICS has become the most credible organisation of the Global South. It represents a global order in transition, a geopolitical counterweight to the West. The West is in decline, but the new world order is yet to emerge. Emerging powers are yet to replace the old world order created after the end of World War II. Therefore, there is a tussle between the privileged countries that dominate international institutions and dissatisfied states that seek to assert their newly acquired influence. In BRICS, we witness an attempt by dissatisfied states to create ‘parallel institutions.’
It is not without reason that five new states have joined the organisation, and more than 34 states have shown interest in joining it. It provides an alternative platform, a manoeuvring space to the non-Western states. It enhances their status and offers several opportunities for engagements with emerging powers. These states recognise the role of China, India, Brazil and Russia in the new world order. The West will remain important, but the world will become increasingly multipolar. Therefore, there is a beeline for the BRICS membership. What else must be said when even Turkiye, a NATO member, wants to join BRICS?
The relevance of BRICS can be gauged from the simple fact that its share in global GDP, measured in terms of purchasing power parity from 2000 to 2023, has risen from 21 to 35 per cent. In the same period, G7’s share declined from roughly 43 per cent to 30 per cent. This gap will increase further if we add the GDP of new members. Therefore, BRICS is likely to become more influential in the coming years. As the rift between the North and South and the West and East intensifies, BRICS+ will become more attractive for the middle powers which are not completely aligned to the West.
Is BRICS expansion good or bad, and how should India look at it and deal with it?
The expansion of BRICS will enhance its global influence, and it will become a more representative organisation of the Global South. However, there is a real concern that it may complicate the decision-making process. The BRICS decides by consensus. However, with more members, consensus building will become a strenuous exercise. The BRICS is not a cohesive group like G7; therefore, adding an extra member means exponential complications. As the saying goes, too many cooks spoil the broth. It should not become a dysfunctional talk-shop like NAM or G77. These organisations still exist, but they have faded into oblivion.
Therefore, the existing members should specify clear criteria and core principles for BRICS membership. Solidarity among the members is a sin qua non for the functioning of any organisation. That will get diluted if rival powers are included. India, as a founding member and a core constituent, in collaboration with old members, should categorically articulate guidelines for its membership. For instance, India should insist on the principle of a country not supporting a terrorist organisation against another member’ as a criterion for membership. Countries with active disputes should also be avoided for new membership. Again, a certain level of growth should be made necessary for membership.
At the Kazan Summit, Russia proposes a ‘partner country’ before being considered for membership. That’s a good idea.
BRICS leaders often talk about the issue of de-dollarisation. Is the emergence of BRICS currency possible?
Russia is particularly keen to push the idea of de-dollarisation. Brazilian President Lula supported the idea of a BRICS currency for trade among the BRICS members. However, it is easier said than done. There are financial and geopolitical issues. It will require close coordination between the Central Banks of each country, fiscal coordination and macro-economic convergence. At the moment, BRICS does not have that level of cooperation and coordination. Realising these complications, Russia is not pushing for a common currency, and that’s not on the agenda of the Kazan Summit.
However, BRICS has introduced a new Payment system, something akin to SWIFT, for trade among the member states. BRICS Pay, as it is called, was launched at the Kazan business forum. The idea is to develop an alternative payment system independent of Western controls. It uses blockchain technology and smart contracts and is not dependent on the SWIFT messaging system. The real impact of this initiative, however, remains to be seen.
Further, Russia has begun to trade with other countries in national currencies to reduce its reliance on the dollar. For instance, nearly 95 per cent of Russia-China trade is settled in rouble-yuan. India and Russia are also exploring the option of expanding trade in local currencies without pegging the exchange rate to the dollar.
Though unlikely to impact the dollar much in the short term, the BRICS Pay and trade in local currency are seen as attempts at de-dollarisation.
How do you see the role of BRICS in the ongoing conflicts in Russia-Ukraine, and Israel and Iran?
In either case, BRICS has not played a proactive role in pushing for a ceasefire. China and Brazil devised a peace plan for Russia-Ukraine, but that was not discussed with other members. Ukraine has also rejected such a proposal as one-sided. In contrast, BRICS states have saved Russia from global isolation. None of its members condemned Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. BRICS members did not join the Western sanctions on Russia. The West views BRICS as an organisation sympathetic to Russia. However, most of the members have maintained a neutral position and have not supplied weapons to Russia.
Similarly, BRICS has a limited role to play in the Israel-Gaza conflict. It cannot do much beyond issuing a declaratory statement on ceasefire and peace. Iran’s membership adds a new dimension to the BRICS’ stance on this conflict. BRICS members support the two-state solution.
How does India view BRICS, given its close ties with the West?
India will continue to pursue a multi-alignment policy. It has served its interests well despite occasional brickbats and complications. Given its diverse interests, India cannot put all its eggs in one basket. PM Modi’s visit to Kazan manifests New Delhi’s firm commitment to BRICS and an act of pursuing a balanced foreign policy.