By Prof P R Kumaraswamy
As the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict results in more human casualties, popular anger and regional tensions, calls for a Palestinian State have been revived. Several view the ‘recognition’ of the Palestinian State as the immediate precondition for peace in the Middle East. What is new: calls, realizations or ideas?
Indeed, the idea of a separate and independent state for the Palestinians is as old as the post-war international order. On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted a partition resolution to divide and mandate Palestine into independent Arab and Jews states. While the Jewish community accepted this proposal, the Palestinians and Arab states rejected it and sought to prevent its implementation. With the British forces still in Palestine until midnight of 14/15 May 1948, the Arab options for a direct intervention were limited. Israel’s declaration of independence hours before the British departure implemented one part of the UN resolution, which the Arab states sought to throttle by invading the nascent state. The failure of this Arab strategy saw the ceasefire in July 1948 and the subsequent armistice agreements in early 1949.
Meanwhile, in early September 1948—about six weeks after the second ceasefire, which came into force on 18 July—the Palestinian leaders met in Gaza City, then under Egyptian control. After several deliberations and imitating the Israeli move, on 22 September, the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee announced the formation of an All Palestine Government and 30th elected former Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al-Husseini as its president. Palestinian independence was proclaimed the following day, and an 86-member assembly was named. Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia immediately recognized this move.
However, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which controlled the much larger West Bank, was a notable absentee. Driven by his territorial ambitions, on 1 December that year, King Abdullah—the founder of Jordan—orchestrated the Jericho Conference, and the delegates pleaded with the Jordanian ruler to save the Palestinians by taking over the West Bank. This became the pretext for the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank. These internal Arab divisions over the Arab areas of mandate Palestine made the All Palestine Government a non-starter, and Egypt brought the Gaza Strip under its military control.
Thus, in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Palestinians talked of their political rights, it merely meant the destruction of Israel and not the revocation of the West Bank from Jordan. This changed in the June War when the West Bank and other Arab territories came under Israeli control. Since then, the territorial demands of the Palestinian political rights comprised the State of Israel as well as the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The first Palestinian intifada, which broke out in December 1987, brought about a significant shift in Palestinian thinking. Meeting in Algiers in November 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) recognized the 1947 UN partition resolution—more than four decades later—and signalled its willingness to co-exist with Israel. The Algiers Declaration also declared the establishment of the State of Palestine. This historical shift also contributed to the growing ideological and political differences between the Fatah-led PLO and the nascent militant Islamic movement, Hamas.
The global South warmly welcomed the second Palestinian State, and several countries, including India, quickly recognized it. Since then, Yasser Arafat and later his successor Mahmoud Abbas were given the status of head of state. Soon, the State of Palestinian had more embassies than the State of Israel. This process intensified following the Oslo process when several Western countries recognized the Palestinian State. Despite the growing international recognition and presence, the Palestinian entity lacked the core attribute of statehood: SOVEREIGNTY.
The Oslo process was not fruitful, and Palestinian statehood remained elusive. As the five-year interim period ended in the late 1990s, Arafat threatened to declare Palestinian independence unilaterally. Even traditional friends of Arafat were not enamoured by Arafat’s threat. While committed to Palestinian statehood, they opposed any unilateral move in that direction, and Arafat was forced to backtrack. The popular disappointment over elusive statehood partly contributed to the Al-Aqsa intifada, which broke out following the failed Camp David summit between Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, mediated by President Bill Clinton. The US President’s belated efforts for the territorial contours of the two-state solution were consumed by the al-Aqsa intifada and its violence.
These challenges to Palestinian Statehood were complicated by the electoral victory of Hamas in 2006 and its military takeover of the Gaza Strip. As the international community was rallying around the two-state solution—Israel and Palestine co-existing side-by-side—the Palestinian internal divisions opened the possibility of a three-state solution—Israel co-existing with a Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip and Fatah-held West Bank.
Thus, Palestinian statehood presupposes a unity between Hamas and Fatah and the former’s acceptance of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and of the internationally recognized Palestine National Authority as the legitimate body. Even the conflict with Israel has not brought about this understanding between the two warring sides; hence, realizing Palestinian statehood will not be easy.
The author teaches contemporary Middle East in Jawaharlal Nehru University.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position or policy of Financial Express Online. Reproducing this content without permission is prohibited.