By Anita Inder Singh
Since his re-election in June, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meetings with Presidents Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as well as Quad leaders, have had mixed results for India’s global standing.
Modi’s trip to Moscow in July annoyed the US because it coincided with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Washington and his warm friendship with Putin displeased Western countries. The joint India-Russia communiqué made a concession to Russia by referring to the war “around Ukraine” rather than in Ukraine. Although India continues to import huge quantities of Russian oil, India did not gain any tangible returns in the form of the rupee-rouble trade or major investments.
India’s stock seemed high during Modi’s historic visit to Ukraine in August because New Delhi claimed that India was facilitating communication between Russia, Ukraine, and the US. But Moscow’s statement that it had received no peace messages or peace plan from New Delhi took the shine off India’s claim.
India must also contend with the facts that its rival China has had more communication with Russia and Ukraine about their war, and has greater influence over Moscow than India not just because it is buying Russian energy but also selling Russia technology which can be used for civilian and military purposes. So it is helping to keep Russia’s defence industry afloat. For, the outstanding fact is that China is united with Russia in challenging the US’ global primacy.
India’s influence as communicator on the possibilities of peace in Ukraine will be limited because the West is Ukraine’s top military partner. And, despite the incremental aid America has sent Ukraine, Washington will prevent an unconditional Russian victory because that would mean that NATO had failed to contain Russian aggression.
On the other side, Russia has no intention of giving up the Ukrainian territories it has occupied, while Ukraine will not accept any peace plan which offers it anything less. Moreover, Putin’s praise for China, India, and Brazil as “trusted partners” will not enhance their image in the West or Ukraine as impartial peacemakers. India will need stronger communication skills to cross that hurdle. Like China and Brazil, it should offer some concrete peace proposals which arouse international interest. Only then will its frequent assertion that it is on the side of peace carry weight.
Modi’s participation in the sixth Quad Leaders’ Summit in Wilmington, Delaware, on September 21 raised hopes of consolidating security cooperation among the four leading maritime democracies in the Indo-Pacific. The other Quad countries are Australia, Japan, and the US. Modi’s attendance showed how much India needs the rules-based order upheld by the US in the Indo-Pacific in order to counter China’s revisionist challenge to the existing global order. India also wants changes to the international order, but has yet to present any ideas which could counter China’s brand of revisionism, which threatens the territorial integrity of most of its neighbors.
The Quad also brings India into conflict with Russia and China, both of whom perceive the concept of the Indo-Pacific weighted against them. At the same time India, as the only non-ally in the Quad, cannot be the US’ top security priority.
India’s ties with the US have strengthened over the last decade, but Washington will not transfer sensitive military technology to a non-ally. Since launching its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has cut off arms deliveries to India and other customers. New Delhi’s friends, France, Israel, and the US, have not been able to replace Russia’s old place in India’s military imports and platforms.
As for China, Modi’s National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval, met Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi in mid-September in yet another attempt to resolve India’s four-year-old military standoff with China at the Line of Actual Control. So far, no result in India’s favour has emerged.
Meanwhile, China is Russia’s strongest economic-military partner and is therefore Moscow’s highest priority. That leaves India in a position of secondary importance to both Russia and the US.
Putin’s recent announcement that Russia would launch a nuclear attack on any NATO country that joins forces with Ukraine could turn out to be an embarrassment for India, which hopes to be on good terms with Russia, the US, and Ukraine while strengthening itself against China.
At another level, Russia’s embrace of China implies that it supports Beijing’s intention to be the leader of the developing world. This cuts across India’s similar ambition.
The expansion of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation by the end of October under the China-Russia leadership will enhance their diplomatic clout. The Ukraine war has complicated India’s management of its relationships with Russia, China, and the US without pleasing any of them.
The longer-term American wish to see Russia defeated in Ukraine does not necessarily offer India any prospect that New Delhi would find easy to accept. But India must continue to reinforce its strategic partnerships with the US and other Quad countries. The Quad gives India a wider Asian presence. However, India’s weak economic ties with most Asian countries, especially in comparison to China’s, reduce its economic and strategic presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
It would be wise for India to stop hanging on to the coat-tails of an old relationship with Russia and to cultivate stronger economic ties with Quad partners and, more generally, with the Asian countries that could offer it much more economically than Russia. Ultimately, the strength of the links between India’s economic progress and its security will decide the chances of its achieving great power.
The author is the founding professor, Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, New Delhi.
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