By Gaurav Sen
A new phrase has recently been added to the strategic lexicon. The term ‘grey zone,’ which has come to represent the uneasy ties between various Indo-Pacific countries and China. Despite being equally baffling and unnerving, this new kind of strained interstate ties, fortunately focused on avoiding war.
In a landmark piece published in 2015, Michael Mazarr studied the concept of the grey zone. Grey-zone operations do not include initiating wars but actively work to avoid them. The concept of a ‘grey zone’ blurs the lines between the two, providing an ambiguous middle ground by simultaneously excluding conflict but not ensuring peace either. If peace is defined as ‘the absence of violence,’ the concept of a ‘grey zone’ creates a conceptual conundrum because it is neither war nor peace.
China’s foreign policy has grown increasingly assertive because of the modernization of the PLA and the expansion of its economy. The countries with which it has disputes over territory, view China’s actions throughout the grey zone as threats and dangers. The idea is the basis of Sun Tzu’s advice that ‘ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.’
Although, the So-called ‘grey zone’ operations are not a concept or strategy that China independently devised. Instead, the United States was responsible for developing and introducing grey zone operations. The US Department of Defence stated in the Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), which was released in 2010, that “the future strategic landscape will increasingly feature challenges in the ambiguous grey area that is neither fully war nor fully peace”. The term “grey zone challenges” is further described in the 2015 U.S. Special Operation Command White Paper. Notably, Japan has identified “grey zone situations” and flagged probable confrontations owing to territorial sovereignty and objectives in the Asia-Pacific area since 2013, much like the United States. In both the Defence of Japan 2014 and Japan’s 2013 National Security Strategy, the idea of “grey zones” is openly stated.
Japan previously highlighted its profound worries about the ongoing grey zone issues and the pressing risks presented by China in its Defence of Japan 2022. Taiwan’s 2021 QDR, which was released by the Ministry of Defence, openly articulates, and refers to China’s grey zone actions. The ‘grey zone’ is described in the document as “an ambiguous realm between peace and war.” By engaging in grey zone operations China hopes to discourage, dissuade, or lessen the competitive edge of competitors while pressuring Taiwan, the US, and others to act in accordance with its interests. Its goal is to show that it is militarily capable of resolving territorial conflicts like those involving the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the South China Sea, and Taiwan’s unification. Beijing has used a variety of grey zone tactics, including economic pressure, cyber (or disinformation) warfare, military training, and missile tests.
Since 2016, China’s military operations have grown progressively more assertive; it frequently uses armed forces to demonstrate its opposition to President Tsai Ing-wen’s Cross-Strait policy and Taiwan’s pro-American attitude, even though the majority of Taiwanese support President Tsai’s hardline stance towards China. A minimum of 554 People Liberation Army flights entered Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) between September 16, 2020, and August 31, 2021, according to the ROC National Defence Report 2021. China’s PLA still engages in joint air and sea missions to improve and assess its military prowess. By engaging in grey zone activities, China hopes to persuade Taiwan and the US to change their policies towards it and make it abundantly evident to the rest of the world that there are real dangers in the Taiwan Strait.
A different situation is presented by China’s policy in the Indian Ocean. Beijing has made disproportionate territorial claims in the Western Pacific, where military vehicles are used in more aggressive grey zone activities. China, on the other hand, has chosen to gradually assert its presence in the Indian Ocean.
Beijing has built bases for troops and installed military facilities on illegally claimed islands in the western Pacific, where it asserts ownership of the appropriate oceans, the seafloor, and subsoil. Even though several of these features lie outside of China’s 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) and Coast Guard warships are constantly stationed adjacent to them. These actions and China’s conduct have been labelled as hostile by the international community on numerous occasions. Furthermore, nations like Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines have frequently voiced their opposition to Beijing’s violations of their individual EEZs and overbearing maritime claims in public. However, the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean does not first seem to be as hostile. Beijing has mostly been present throughout the far-off IOR waterways with fisheries and research vessels, which China has claimed are fully inside its territorial waters and compliant with international law.
However, India is concerned about the growing number of Chinese fishing and research vessels that are navigating the Indian Ocean. The PLAN may use Chinese research vessels as its “eyes and ears.” Some researchers believe that Chinese fishing boats are PLAN “auxiliary naval forces” and constitute an integral component of China’s maritime militia, which is a part of Beijing’s maritime police system. Looking at these operations through the prism of China’s goal of becoming a major maritime power by 2049 is enlightening. China might get more insight into the remote waters of the Indian Ocean as well as experience a naval expedition using even these non-military ships, which would enable it to develop into a blue-water navy capable of imposing maritime dominance. Even though China claims that the objective of its research boats is purely scientific, several IOR littoral states believe that these vessels may be gathering information to improve Beijing’s maritime domain awareness by keeping an eye on ship activities near or inside these governments EEZs.
China’s fishing boats and research vessels do not engage in direct military activities but may lay the groundwork for future military acts. However, if China’s actions are regarded as coordinated with the ports it is purchasing in the Indian Ocean, they could have major consequences in the future. India should concentrate on developing a long-term strategy to handle this difficulty. A solution may lie in increasing maritime awareness among Quad nations. India should employ its extensive information network, which is dispersed throughout the Indian Ocean and includes data from the Fusion Centre and space-based maritime monitoring, to monitor any nefarious operations by Chinese ships.
The author is a PhD candidate at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He specializes in China’s military strategy and Indo-China rivalry in the Indian Ocean.
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