Pakistan?s border with Afghanistan has always attracted men of war, a land that Kipling immortalised in his writings. More recently though, it was first Zulfikar Bhutto, then General Zia and later Benazir, that rallied its warrior tribes for operations in Afghanistan. Running north to south of Pakistan ? largely made up of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) ? this area is described by the US as the most dangerous in the world. It is central to the subject of Imitiaz Gul?s The Al Qaeda Connection: The Taliban and Terror in pakistan?s Tribal Areas offers an unparalleled insider?s account of the region and a rare list of who?s who of terror outfits based in FATA, that is now home to Al Qaeda.
The region makes up less than 4% of Pakistan?s land mass and has less than 3% of their population, and is inhabited largely by fierce tribesman, who follow a unique Pashtoon code of conduct and hospitality ? where personal honour and their word, are enough to die for. It was a key reason why Al Qaeda operatives found shelter here after they were hounded out of Afghanistan, post 9/11, as the locals never deny shelter to the wandering homeless and ask no questions.
Moreover, the Al Qaeda leadership, brought with itself, not just its version of Jihad, but also much needed money to this vast but neglected region of Pakistan. Gul should know, following his frequent visits there, in over two decades of reporting from this region.
In many ways, the clock stopped here, over a century ago; with the region ruled by laws that are complex and archaic, giving sweeping powers to the local Pakistani political agent (PA) to punish and arrest whom he pleases, under the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulations.
Thus a search for a justice system and the craving for equal citizenship, drove its people towards Islamic sharia, which is more in sync with their culture of austere Islam, than what Islamabad wishes to impose. To that extent, the Al Qaeda?s ideology appealed to these pious tribesmen, many of them having slinked past the virtually unmanned Durand Line, traditionally used by tribesmen to cross over from FATA to Afghanistan and back. Soon the Al Qaeda influence was everywhere in FATA, with even its powerful tribal chiefs wary of an Al Qaeda backlash, if they spoke about their presence.
And when the Pakistani army reluctantly launched their operations in FATA, under the US pressure in 2002, it only earned a bloody nose, as many tribal leaders, despite the army?s insistence, specially in Waziristan, refused to hand over any significant Al Qaeda or Taliban operatives in keeping with their long-standing tradition of hospitality. Some became legends and some notorious, like the infamous Baithullah Mehsud, a veteran of Guantanamo Bay camp, later accused of Benazir?s murder, and who apparently had as many as 300 high profile Pakistanis on his sights.
But by 2008, the US could wait no more, and its repeated US drone and missile strikes (from the lethal MQ-9 Reaper hunter killers) have taken their toll of Al Qaeda and Taliban commanders, as also of many innocent civilians.
Today, the region is not only a heady mix of warring tribals, the armies of Pakistan and the US, with spooks and spy masters all once again waiting to play another great game, but is also the current base of anti-India militant groups, waiting in the wings for tempers cool down; just as their ISI masters wait for the US to cut its losses and pull out of Afghanistan, before Pakistan can reclaim its obsessive strategic depth in Afghanistan.
To understand the complex weave that makes up this region, Imtiaz Gul has thus come up with a timely and important work of reference, giving us a must-be-read account of what has happened over the past decade in the borderlands of Af-Pak region ? which the Pakistanis call, FATA ? and how it fell to the Al Qaeda, which has transformed itself from an organisation to ?an ideology that transcends borders? (of Al Qaedaism). Its top honchos are now perched in this harsh and desolate region, as they regroup, train and plan to strike at other targets, on another day.
The reviewer is a commentator on strategic affairs