When cornered about cross-border terrorism, Pakistani leaders tend to do excessive talking that signifies little except a whiff of cover-up. Asked about Pakistan?s ? or, indeed, elements based there ? involvement in the November 26-29 terrorist outrage on Mumbai, President Asif Ali Zardari told CNN: ?I think these are stateless actors who have been operating all throughout the region. The gunmen plus the planners, whoever they are, [are] stateless actors who have been holding hostage the whole world.? The jehadi organisation which perpetrated the attack, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, is a ?banned organisation? in Pakistan and around the world, Zardari claimed.
That?s Version 2.0 of the erstwhile ludicrous policy of plausible denial. And, the new official spin, that shifts the responsibility to ?non-state actors? from the state, needs a few hard knocks of reality-check, too. Which side the state is really on? By now, every sensible person reckons, there are areas in Pakistan that are either ungoverned or ungovernable that serve as breeding grounds for jehadi terrorists but, nevertheless, technically fall within the sovereignty of its boundary. Does that mean that terrorists should be allowed to freely operate and set up training camps where they can plan and coordinate devastating attacks on neighbouring countries? While reinforcing the argument that sovereignty should be reassessed to address the question of making sure one?s own territory does not become a platform for attacking others, isn?t Zardari unwittingly building up the case for foreign intervention short of full-scale war?
No, wait. Asked about the possibility of Indian military strikes against terrorist camps in Pakistan, he said: ?I would not agree with that because this is a time to come together and do a joint investigation and look at the problem in the larger context. We have a larger threat on our hands… it?s a threat throughout the region. So that would be counterproductive.? Obviously, Zardari alludes to the fact that Pakistan might be very volatile politically and vulnerable economically, but it?s not easy to manipulate it diplomatically. No surprise, there. If diplomatic stratagems in its arsenal (say, the threat to move troops from western frontiers bordering Afghanistan to the eastern boundaries bordering India) are anything to go by, it?s Pakistan that pulls strings as master-manipulator in world capitals that can change or moderate Islamabad?s behaviour the most.
Yet, as it happens, Zardari should be credited for speaking out his mind ? in October, in an interview to
WSJ, he called jehadi forces fighting in Jammu & Kashmir ?terrorists? ? which all of his predecessors, including Gen Pervez Musharraf, so petulantly refused to.
The trouble is, digging into a modified position of denial won?t help matters. In their heady days, it was not uncommon the same actors that Zardari now brands ?stateless? were hailed by important members of the country?s military-espiocracy establishment as ?Pakistan?s reserve army?. Not without reason, they reasoned, as groups like the Lashkar and Jaish-e-Mohammad had successfully tied up the Indian army in Kashmir in the ?war of thousand cuts?. Sadly for them, the elusive goal of strategic depth on eastern and western borders exploded on the establishment?s face. Rather than draining India, the proxy wars the state sponsored, over the years, sapped Pakistani civil society?s will to fight elements of radicalisation within, the country?s economy and its international standing. Madrasas that openly propagated violent extremism provided the supply line of jehad. A dubious person like Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the Lashkar?s patron-in-chief, could get away easily with a mock demonstration of the group?s attack on Delhi?s Red Fort in front of a congregation at the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore even as his frequent rantings that painted democracy as an anathema to Islam ? and parliament as ullu (owl) ? warmed the cockles of the military?s heart.
What groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (literally, ?the army of God?) lacked in ideology ? they are no ideologues at all; rather, they labour under the illusion of recreating the Caliphate of yore, this time cleansed of all infidels and ?impurities? within their own religion ? they made up for aggression. Parallel to external aggression, many of these forces were found to be hand-in-glove with similarly homegrown outfits of sectarian mass-murder (notably, the Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) inside Pakistan. In the face of the US ultimatum following the December 2001 attack on Indian Parliament organised by the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, the military government asked jehadi groups to pipe down, banning the Lashkar and Jaish along with many other such groups, and froze their assets. Beneath the surface, though, it was business as usual. They quickly changed their names, their command and control remained in place, while operational and fund gathering went underground. Evidently, the military-espiocracy establishment has not given up on the ?reserve army? option. Not certainly until 26/11 took place.
Robert D Kaplan, one of the most respected Western correspondents of the Muslim world, said in an interview to the website of his own magazine The Atlantic in 2001 that no matter where Pakistan stood in the war against terrorism, it is not a country that would ?fade away gently? from news. It is not, most agree. Yet, until the country allegedly fade away gently from news, nations like India which pay the heavy, unacceptable price for terrorism emanating from its soil has the important role to play in holding the Pakistani state accountable for it. No amount of corner-cutting by Pakistani leaders ? try this rather nice one from Zardari: ?democracies don?t go to war? ? can obliterate the fact that a state that tolerates terrorist thugs in its midst has a lot to answer for the actions of ?stateless actors? it fosters.
The writer can be reached at rajiv.jayaram@expressindia.com