All too often the explanation for the current turmoil in Pakistan?in particular the threat of radical Islamists?is traced back to the events of 9/11. Unfortunately, that is far too simple a characterisation of Pakistan?s problems. And that is why Farzana Shaikh?s book is such an important contribution to the literature on understanding contemporary Pakistan in a historical perspective. And it sure lives up to its title?Making Sense of Pakistan? through its 200-odd pages.

Where this book departs from other work on Pakistan?s history in the post-partition years is its originality in viewing different aspects of the country?s political, economic, military and social life through the prism of Islam and the state ? how the role of Islam was interpreted, reinterpreted and constantly debated over the decades to try and give a foundation to a fledging country that was founded as a homeland for South Asia?s Muslims. In fact, Shaikh argues that it is the almost permanent ambivalence over the role of Islam that has prevented Pakistan from acquiring the necessary foundations for a modern nation state. Was it to be a secular Muslim-majority nation where minorities had rights and religion stayed away from politics, or was it to be a truly Islamic country?

Shaikh doesn?t hesitate to criticise Mohammad Ali Jinnah, often portrayed as truly secular by many in Pakistan and indeed India. But events leading up to partition, and in the brief period thereafter when Jinnah was still alive, suggest that he was as cynical a manipulator of Islam for his political cause as many of his successors. Shaikh draws the attention to numerous contradictory statements that Jinnah made in this context.

Interestingly, Shaikh highlights the fact that partition was not something that right wing Islamists supported. For them the idea of Islamic brotherhood/nation could not be defined within territorial borders. Nor in fact were residents, particularly the landlords of Western Punjab and Sindh, strong believers in partition. The movement (and the Muslim League) was driven by the salaried classes of Muslims living in Hindu-majority provinces of British India.

It is no surprise that post-1947 they struggled to establish a legitimate political base in either West or East Pakistan and therefore more often than not had to invoke Islam as the s ource of their legitimacy. However, this was never simple and Pakistan failed to agree on a Constitution until as late as 1956 primarily because there was no agreement on the role of Islam in matters of the state. Representatives from East Pakistan, which in 1947 contained a Hindu population which was 15% of the total, resisted any hardline Islamic interpretation of the state. By the time an agreement on a Constitution was reached he fledging political class had already lost much credibility and the military was ready for a takeover. Needless to say, they too would use Islam to legitimise their rule.

Unfortunately, as history tells us in no uncertain terms, Islam was never going to be glue enough for a country which was deeply divided along regional and linguistic lines. The separation of East Pakistan was perhaps the most telling evidence of the folly of appealing simply to Islam as glue for a nation.

Interestingly, the one thing that does come out from Shaikh?s work is that in fact no leader in Pakistan, in or out of uniform was genuinely secular. Even the apparently liberal Zulfiqar Bhutto placated hardline Islamists by disenfranchising Ahmediyas in 1974. And Benazir Butto turned a blind eye to militancy in Kashmir.

Perhaps the most fascinating part of the book is the bit on Zia ul Haq?how he was actually the first Pakistani leader to be able to provide a coherent?even if seriously flawed?link between Islam and the state. He extended Islamisation domestically (mostly in the social and legal sphere) and moved towards establishing an Islamic state within Pakistan?s territorial borders carefully guarded by the army. And he placated the Islamic right by persuading them that Pakistan?s commitment to Islam extended beyond territorial borders?through promoting the Islamic cause in Afghanistan and Kashmir. But as Shaikh points out Zia?s was a firmly sunni version of Islam which excluded most importantly Pakistan?s significant shia population. This created another internal divide in addition to region, ethnicity and language.

This history is most relevant to the turmoil in Pakistan today. Because for the army to turn on its (sunni) Islamists allies in Afghanistan and Kashmir is more than just betrayal?it is gong back on a fundamental tenet of Pakistani statehood (linking the state and Islam) as laid out by Zia. It would, therefore, be na?ve to pretend that any leader in Pakistan, army or civilian, can simply destroy the very allies which gave the State a raison-d-etre beyond territorial borders (within the borders, there was and is much divide). Notice how even the ?liberal? General Musharraf freely used jihadis as an instrument of state policy in Kashmir and continuously played a double game with the West even after 9/11.

This book is a must read for anyone interested in understanding Pakistan?s problems. It is a highly analytical, original and dispassionate study of one of the most complex countries in the world.