Blaming the unscheduled interchange scheme, which is only an accounting procedure, cannot be the remedy. This scheme has to work within a modified grid code. Adopting the one put forth in the Electricity Act is an essential step forward

There was a grid collapse in 2000. The government appointed a committee headed by the chairman of the Central Electricity Authority (CEA). The committee recommended that training should be conducted for transmission and load dispatch engineers, support for charging, self-start facilities at Faridabad, implementation of under-frequency relay scheme, periodic maintenance of important lines, better communication and recording facilities, implementation of ?expert systems? for analysis and restoration, review of black start procedures and islanding schemes. It also recommended the upgradation of high voltage direct current (HVDC) systems with the help of international experts and annual training workshops for load dispatch engineers. Further, it recommended that the government of UP should appoint a committee to review R&M programmes, and that the National Resources and Environment Board (NREB) should monitor the progress of the implementation of various recommendations and report the same to the ministry of power on a quarterly basis.

The government was concerned about grid stability, and it appointed a committee on manpower, certification and incentives for system operation and ring fencing load dispatch centers (LDC). The Pradhan Committee gave its report in August 2008, and recommended that LDCs be suitably ring-fenced to ensure functional autonomy, and should be made financially self-reliant. It also recommended training schemes for system operators, and the setting up of a forum of load dispatch centres.

The Northern Grid collapsed again in the northern region on July 30, 2012, and in the north-eastern region on July 31, 2012. Further, as reported by the Indian Express, a serious incident involving a sudden back-down of generation from three major hydel plants in Himachal Pradesh on August 22, threatened the northern grid, forcing the power secretary to rush to the National Load Dispatch Center (NLDC) to prevent a July-like catastrophe. The government appointed a committee to examine the July grid collapse. The enquiry committee under the CEA chairman gave its report on August 16, 2012. The recommendations of the committee were to review the protection systems, frequency controls through generation reserves, and the phasing out of the unscheduled interchange (UI) scheme, setting up of under-frequency load schemes for a proper defence mechanism, revision of total transfer capacity to deal with forced outages and UI transfers. It also recommended the implementation of islanding schemes, creation of security desks in NLDC and RLDC, reactive power planning, strengthening of intra-state grids, training etc. The committee also recommended that the implementation of powers under the Electricity Act, 2003 be examined.

What is remarkable about the three reports is their striking similarity, and their non-fixation of responsibility for the collapse. I am sure another grid collapse would lead to a similar report, and everyone then in the power sector would look at the ministry of power to get the report implemented through the mesh of central government, state governments, national, regional and state LDCs, different utilities and various authorities earmarked in Sections 25 to 41 of the Electricity Act, 2003. It may be recalled that the Electricity Act, 2003, was written against the backdrop of the grid collapse of 2000, and everyone writing the draft was acutely aware that such accidents could only be prevented by systems statutorily provided in the Act. Further, the Act was written after all similar practices were studied in different networks/countries, with the help of experts, and the provisions of Sections 25 to 41 of the Act brought the entire grid under the management of statutory authorities earmarked under the Act. It is surprising that the most recent committee has neither examined the follow up of the 2001 and 2008 reports, nor has it examined whether the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003, have been followed.

A little explanation is needed here about the concept of grid management before and after the liberalisation of the power sector.

Both power and telecom networks are vicious monopolies. The state, therefore, for decades, kept them as public monopolies to effectively coordinate the functioning of all elements, to ensure uninterrupted working of the grid, or connectivity. Once many players are introduced in different elements of the networks, connectivity/grid discipline can only be ensured through a very strong regulatory system. To facilitate competition for better performance, these networks started being broken up in India in the 1990s. Multi-operator unbundled networks can only perform efficiently with a regulatory law in force, and more importantly, implemented. Monopoly public networks could be easily managed by direct government action. However, unbundled public-private networks can only be managed through the issuance of clear laws, regulations on interconnection, grid discipline, etc, and their strict implementation. In India, as explained above, a very clear Electricity Act, 2003, had been issued, and institutions created to ensure the smooth working of the grid, but the law is not getting implemented, courtesy various authorities not exercising their powers but only issuing advisories. And the government is left holding the baby.

Section 25 of the Act clearly demarcates inter-state, regional and inter-regional transmission. The national, regional and state LDCs have been given clear powers and functions under Sections 26 to 33 to ensure the smooth working of the grid. The sections also give powers to give directions and powers to fine for non-compliance of directions. In case any dispute arises regarding integrated operation of the grid or in relation to any direction, the Central Commission decides (Section 29-3). Central and state transmission utilities have also been given duties and powers under Sections 38 and 39, and if these powers are exercised properly, the grid cannot fail. The government can also give directions to LDCs, but these directions can only be for maintaining grid discipline. From a reading of the 2012 report, it is clear that these powers have not been exercised, and each authority has been issuing advisories. It is a well-known regulatory principle that grids do not function in this manner. The authorities charged with the management of the grid have to ensure compliance of directions.

According to experts, grid blackouts are caused by persistent gaps in demand and supply, rampant indiscipline in following the grid codes in overdrawals by the states despite RLDC?s instructions, lack of flexibility in grid operation particularly in emergency conditions due to a lack of hydro and gas power plants development, non-availability of gas for already-installed gas stations, slow expansion of state transmission lines, slow expansion & strengthening of the national grid due to various reasons, particularly the transmission lines associated with generation projects that did not come up, poor maintenance of transmission lines and various protection schemes including under-frequency relays, reactive power management, etc, and also a lack of monitoring of O&M of power plants, transmission lines and protection schemes by the concerned agencies. We have all these macro-problems in our grid, with targets in different grid elements failing by a margin of approximately 50% each year for the last 20 years. Until these macro problems are sorted out, it is extremely important that the various statutory authorities defined in Sections 25 to 41 of the Act exercise their powers with vigour to maintain grid discipline, and we do not succumb to the temptation of finding non-grid solutions like putting chief secretaries behind bars or suspending state officers, etc. The remedy lies in enforcing an extremely well-written Electricity Act, 2003, and enforcing the grid code issued under the Act. Blaming the UI mechanism, which is only an accounting procedure, also cannot be a remedy. The UI mechanism has to work within a modified grid code, if necessary.

The author is former special secretary, power, and chairman, Trai