After two decades of rise as an emerging economic giant, China is now attracting attention as a wielder of ?soft power?. Harvard academic Joseph Nye coined the term, defining it as ?attractive? power, resting on the ?ability to shape the preferences of others?. Unlike later writers, Nye excluded economic might from his conception of soft power, and that seems right, since economic and military strength are similar in their impacts. China?s exercise of soft power is more in line with the recent, more elastic view of the term, and the country?s leadership has been explicit about the interconnection of culture, economics and politics in shaping national power. China?s leaders see soft power as a cover for hard power.
What does China do in practice? The Beijing Olympics and Shanghai World Expo are recent high-profile examples that are often cited as epitomising China?s charm offensive. Parama Sinha Palit, of Singapore?s Rajaratnam School of International Studies, has very recently assessed China?s initiatives on this front in South Asia and elsewhere. Efforts to promote its culture include hosting arts festivals, increasing the number of foreign students in the country and setting up as many as 500 Confucius Institutes worldwide to promote Chinese language and culture. Bilateral agreements with various South Asian governments support cultural, educational and sports exchanges and collaborations.
None of this is unique or novel. Nations such as the old imperial powers Britain and France, and the Cold War giants, the US and USSR, have all attempted to project their cultures and societal values around the world. And behind this soft exterior was always the hard reality of economic and strategic interests. Much of Palit?s paper is about China?s economic engagement in South Asia, which she classifies as exercising soft power, but in the original definition this set of actions is really much firmer in nature, if not quite coercive, and certainly more than ?attractive?. The case of India illustrates the limits of China?s soft power. Cultural diplomacy has had limited purchase there, and while economic ties have been increasing, the reality of strategic rivalry overshadows other considerations. In this context of regional strategic competition, China?s statement of goals to ?enrich, harmonise and reassure the neighbourhood? lacks credibility.
The China-India case even calls into question the standard conceptualisation of soft power. Nye recognised that soft and hard power can be inter-related. But even his narrow conception of soft power may miss the mark. I offer a contrarian view here. My proposition is that power exercised purposively for strategic gains by an authoritarian government is essentially hard power?there is nothing soft about it. Does soft power exist at all, then? Yes it does. India?s film industry, long before it was christened Bollywood, is a prime example. It was not encouraged, manipulated or funded by the government, yet it had deep impacts on people?s perceptions about India, especially in other developing countries. The difference is a bit similar to that between a corporate ad campaign designed to influence preferences and viral marketing, though the corporation does not back its ads with an army. Even if a government subsidises cultural outreach, there is a basic difference between democracy and authoritarianism. A democratic government, in principle, is carrying out the will of its people. Its policies are, at a remove, an expression of the popular will. There is no such link in the case of an authoritarian government.
The real world is messier than any simple categorisation. Even democratic governments abroad act in ways that may be abhorrent to their citizens.
Democratic will itself may be exercised with negative consequences for other nations. Yet it seems that the nature of the actor must be taken into account, in addition to the nature of the action, in deciding when power is soft. There is a difference between the Berlin and Beijing Olympics on one hand, and Barcelona on the other.
Not everyone will agree with my narrowing of the scope of the term ?soft power?, especially when others have been broadening it. Perhaps ?soft? and ?hard? is too simple a dichotomy. On the other hand, simplicity is seductive and convenient for categorisation. Choices between concepts have to be made on the basis of their usefulness in describing the world and predicting what future outcomes will be. In that sense, I think that China?s power is not soft, no matter how it is labelled. Perhaps there is also a value judgement to be made here?there is something attractive and benign about the term itself. Should any exercise of power by an authoritarian government be termed ?soft?? I would say not.
The author is a professor of economics, University of California, Santa Cruz