What lays China bare is its unwillingness to accept legal arbitration by the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea

On land, the Chinese dragon is flying in all directions?from as far as the African continent to eyeing the riches of the Arctic, carving out spheres of influence waxed lyrical by its card-carrying ?cheque-book diplomacy?. China has also been steadily?some would say stealthily?expanding its influence on the high seas. In particular, claims and counter-claims, and recent flurry of activities in the South China Sea have received much media attention.

China established a new prefecture, Sansha, right in the middle of a volubly and contentiously disputed South China Sea. It elevated Sansha?s status (established in 2007) from county to prefecture (the administrative tiers from the top are centre, prefecture, county, township, to the lowest tier, the village) under Hainan province to govern the three islands of the South China Sea?Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank and the Spratly Islands (Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha in Chinese)?much to the chagrin of other claimants, namely China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia (the latter four are Asean claimants). According to newspaper reports, the mayor and the deputy mayor of Sansha were elected by the Party. Moreover, the Central Military Commission (CMC, China?s top military body) approved the establishment of a garrison on Sansha.

Geographically, the South China Sea lies south of China?s Guangdong province and Hainan Island, the latter famously known as China?s Hawaii. But South China Sea also happens to lie at the cusp of the neighbouring countries?east of Vietnam and west of Philippines; north of Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei?literally at the intersection of the geographical and territorial waters of the Asean neighbourhood.

South China sea itself is a large territorial expanse of 650,000 square nautical miles called by many names (in different languages such as Vietnamese, Chinese, among others) leading to confusion of sorts. Then there are hundreds of ?fly specks? of islands, rock formations, banks and reefs, in the ?coral? seas, that were once referred to as the ?dangerous grounds? by the ancient mariners. In the archipelago, the Spratly Islands (so named after Richard Spratly, captain of a British whaling ship who led an expedition there in 1840) itself consists of a hundred small islands (CIA World Factbook). However, as sinologist Hungdah Chiu pointed out (1977), these ?fly-specks? may serve as a pretext to claim the adjoining continental shelf, apply the archipelago principal to delimit the territorial sea or 200 nautical mile economic resource zone.

But whose sea is it? Hard to tell, but for now, the skirmish over the territorial waters and continental shelf (sea bed around the landmass)?think oil and gas deposits?is creating deep divisions, pitting one against the other, even one group of countries, aka clique, against the other. China-Vietnam and China-Philippines have been acrimoniously warring.

Philippines claims an assorted 50 islands of the Spratly that it calls Kalayaan Islands (part of Spratly Islands, which lie 230 nautical miles west of the island province of Palawan). In 1995, the Chinese built on Mischief Reef (135 nautical miles from Palawan), that led to the beginning of Philippines?s dispute with China. In 1997, there was another skirmish over Scarborough Shoal (Scarborough Shoal is not part of Spratly Islands, but is off Luzon, the largest island province in Philippines, home to capital Manila). Political scientist Chang Pao Min has noted that in the Sino-Vietnam war of 1979, the South China Sea Islands figured ?prominently? and the clash over the islands resulted in the sinking of three Vietnamese ships in 1988.

China claims almost all of the South China Sea, harping on ?historical? claims based on maps drawn up in 206 BC to AD 220. By this logic, Vietnamese writer Huy Duong (Asia Times Online, 5th October 2011) eloquently observes that the ancient Srivijaya Kingdom of Indonesia in the 7th century spanned its control all the way till Madagascar?but Indonesia claiming waters that corresponds to this history ?would be at best ridiculous?.

China claims rights within a ?nine-dash line? or a ?U-shaped line? that encompasses most of the sea. China is playing the persecuted victim of history to hone and tap nationalist sentiment. China, indignant about Japanese history textbooks, fares no better?its own history books are nothing short of propaganda. According to academic Shee Pon Kim (1998), Chinese high school students are taught that the southern most point of Chinese territory (in the South China Sea) is James Shoal, 180 km north of Sarawak, Malaysia.

The prominence of the South China Sea naturally accrues to the metamorphosis of the seas from merely connecting arteries to economic potential. Oil, gas minerals, fishing, guano and coconut palms?succor to energy hungry, developing nations. This, especially the oil and gas factor, has not been overlooked?least of all by China.

Besides teeming with economic potential, academic Esmond Smith (1994) points to the strategic significance?the principal sea lines of communication for commercial ships transiting between the Indian and Pacific Ocean lies west of the Spratly Islands. The sea-lanes are used by America and Russia for its navies (as recently by America in Operation Desert Storm, 1991). Oil tanks enter Japan through this route. According to Smith, if the Chinese take control over the Spratly, they are likely to tweak the restrictive provisions of the Law of the Sea to their ?maximum advantage? (such as the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone around the archipelago and right of passage of commercial shipping).

In retrospect, China has been brewing its strategy since decades, beginning with the 1970s. China made its overtures in the archipelago following a ?power vacuum? (withdrawal of the Americans from Subic Bay, Philippines, in 1992 and the Russians from the Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, in the 1970s). According to academic Ian Storey, China bolstered its claims on the basis of a policy ?formulated by the Chinese leadership and influenced by senior generals of the PLA? in the late 1980s. First, China sought collaboration at multilateral and bilateral forums and secondly (which runs counter to the first) laying down territorial markers. Typically, the Chinese, as Storey says, start with building a (ostensibly harmless) hut on stilts that morphs to a bunker, and then to a small fortress (hut-bunker-fortress) that can house up to 50 people.

In the 1990s, sinologist John Garver (1992) hinted at the ?methodical nature of China?s advance (in the South China Sea) with each stage serving as the base for the next?; Philippine?s defence secretary Orlanda Mercado (1998) likened China?s steps to a ?creeping invasion? and Storey (1999) suggested that China displayed ?creeping assertiveness?. In fact, in 1992, China passed the Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, potentially claiming the South China Sea.

A careful reading of history shows that there is little denying that China was a great maritime power during the 15th century Ming dynasty exemplified by the voracious adventures of the great Chinese mariner?Zheng He (a contemporary of Christopher Columbus). However, as academic Shee Pon Kim points out, Chinese influence declined and, technically speaking, South China Sea was ?beyond China?s reach for five hundred years?. The veracity of China?s historical argument also comes undone with contending versions of history. Historical claims don?t particularly help, what with history on wheels?history is dynamic.

Cracks within the Asean fold, which thus far has put up a united front, came to the fore at the recently held Asean Ministerial Meeting held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in July?when the foreign ministers failed to sign a communiqu? for the first time in the organisation?s 45-year-old history. Even America (that withdrew from its naval base in Subic Bay, 1992) has been pulled into the dispute, engulfing the region with no signs of respite.

While the Asean Secretary General has expressed hope that the Asean sign a Code of Conduct in November, the tenth anniversary of the Declaration on the Code of Parties in the South China Sea, this is not legally-binding, but merely a feel-good rhetoric. So much for the Asean credo??One Community, One Destiny?.

What lays China bare is its unwillingness to accept legal arbitration by the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. Few powers have risen peacefully?and now China Rising is muddling waters by tying history and nationalism, with an aggressive foreign and military policy to match rankling its neighbours. This may spark a potentially dangerous game in the region. On hindsight, perhaps George Fernandes is having the last laugh.

The author is a Singapore-based sinologist, currently a visiting fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi. Views are personal