Ever since India and Pakistan formally put to rest years of speculation?on whether or not they did possess nuclear weapons?with their nuclear tests in May 1998, many scholars and media persons had insisted that South Asia was now on the brink of disaster. Furthermore, the nuclear saber-rattling by Pakistan during the Kargil conflict of 1999 and the muscle flexing by India following the attack on India?s Parliament caused further panic in the Western world, where apparently the bulk of the wisdom on nukes resides! But few, if any, were able to argue that having nuclear weapons is a strategic force multiplier?and even an equaliser, as Pakistan sees it?but their use is generally a matter of academic debate.
However, this book under review, on ‘India, Pakistan and the Bomb’, is authored by Sumit Ganguly and S Paul Kapur, both scholars of high repute with many comprehensive works on south Asia to their credit, creates two templates and provides competing arguments and what these patterns mean for the world?s next proliferators.
Ganguly?s is an outcome-based approach, emphasising the results of militarised conflict, claiming that nuclear weapons have prevented Indo-Pakistan disputes from blossoming into full-scale war for fear of mutually assured destruction, but they offer limited strategic space for short conflicts (like the Kargil conflict). Kapur?s is a process-based approach stressing the specific pathways that lead to conflict and escalation. Kapur argues that nuclear weapons have emboldened and fuelled a violent cycle of Pakistani provocation towards India (like the Jehadi attacks), giving rise to a number of crises that might easily have spun into chaos. Kapur thus believes nuclear weapons have been a destabilising force in south Asia and could similarly affect other parts of the world.
In fact, S Paul Kapur, also an academic in the US, echoes the concerns of many in the American establishment, fearing that tensions between the two countries could lead to either side using the bomb in frustration to settle matters. He calls it ‘strategic pessimism’, challenging the logic of optimists like Sumit Ganguly and claiming that the danger of nuclear weapons will even get rational leaders to behave aggressively and could eventually lead to a catastrophe.
Though the arguments made by both the authors are not new, since much of the material in this slim volume has been culled from their earlier publications and studies, this is still an important work of scholarship that is comprehensive and easy to understand. It provides the history of the adversarial relationship of India and Pakistan, with the region?s nuclear past, the present and the future.
And, while the book talks about known disagreements of both countries, it also touches on the three points of agreement, though the jury is still out on what India might do in the event of another Mumbai-type attack that could once again come from Pakistani soil. Or what Pakistan might do in return when pushed into a corner by its giant neighbour. And, the biggest question remains: ‘What happens if Pakistan?s arsenal falls into the hands of hardliners or a terrorist group?’ Some say that this could only come with the total collapse of the state of Pakistan. But if it were to happen, then it is not simply India, but the whole world will stand threatened. In short, Pakistan?s ?bomb? will remain of greater concern than India?s minimum deterrent.
?Maroof Raza comments on military issues and is the head of Security Watch India