When Arun Jaitley was given additional charge of the defence portfolio along with finance in the Modi government, many were at a loss as to how to interpret this decision. Most felt that he may not be able to do justice to both ministries. Jaitley?s record as a temporary defence minister seems to have put the collective doubts to rest. He has masterfully handled the twin role, as stated by a veteran journalist-parliamentarian, in demanding (as a defence minister) and rationalising (as a finance minister) allocations for national defence at the same time as well as guiding both the challenging ministries with confidence.
Jaitley?s track record at defence ministry in the last 100 days speaks for itself: within 48 hours of being sworn in, he cleared the controversial appointment of the Chief of the Army Staff General Dalbir Suhag by stating that ?we may have a problem with the process, but not with the person??a hint at addressing structural-organisational problems as well as larger issues of civil-military relations. Consider his other decisions: he avowed ?more procurement, faster procurement? in a function in Mumbai; allocated more resources to defence ministry than what was proposed in the interim budget (R2.3 lakh crore, out of which R94,500 crore will be for capital expenses); cleared projects worth more than R45,000 crore (in two phases, with more approvals to follow), the bulk of which were languishing for the past few years for some reason or the other; promised more projects for private companies (for example, the replacement project for Avro military transport aircraft); addressed non-equipment issues of the armed forces (infrastructure, land allocations, housing, etc); raised the FDI limit to 49% in defence; and is personally looking into most of the problem areas?structural, organisational, higher defence, procurement, production, S&T and related institutional mechanisms.
One may not be surprised if a set of important changes occurs in policy domains like defence offsets, transfer of technology, procurement procedure (DPP) and even a revised defence production policy in coming weeks. In sum, a half-mantri has not only touched upon most aspects of the Indian defence sector, but also promises to come up with undeniably fresh reforms packages in a short span of time!
Jaitley?s extraordinary abilities as a thinking politician to deftly retain the micro picture in macro scenarios seem to be seamlessly embedded in the larger idea of making India a self-reliant military power. This is where he complements Prime Minister Narendra Modi?s vision. Consider some of
Modi?s ideas before he became the PM: Modi had called for ?framing a holistic policy to make India self-reliant in defence production, in addition to fulfilling the defence needs of smaller and developing nations too (hinting at military exports)?; asked ?entrepreneurs with engineering background to set up their defence equipment units, in a cluster form in Gujarat?; emphasised the need for ?indigenous electronics manufacturing in strategic sectors like defence?;
was the first to raise the issue of ?one rank, one pension? for 24 lakh ex-servicemen; and promised that ?Gujarat is taking initiatives to make India self-reliant in the sector of defence by bringing out a new policy?.
In the last three months, Modi has given enough hints about his ideas through many of his public speeches??manufacture here, sell anywhere?, ?every one respects a military power?, ?innovate and excel?, ?chalta hai attitude (of DRDO scientists) is not good?, ?if we make efforts, we can be an exporter of arms?. Joining the dots in Modi?s symbolism and Jaitley?s pragmatic steps seem to suggest a grand idea of self-reliance in defence that is being slowly worked out, although there is not much concrete evidence available at the moment. Much would depend on how these ideas translate into action.
It is in this context that the next step in Indian defence S&T and industrial capacity building process must be contemplated. A ?strategic defence technology and industry roadmap? must be outlined with an eye on creating a globally-competitive Indian defence industrial base, where state-owned and domestic private sector and foreign arms manufacturers are accommodated suitably.
Among the existing procurement choices??buy? (outright purchase), ?buy and make? (collaboration between Indian and foreign OEMs) and ?make? (indigenous)?it is the ?collaborative route?, which should be smartly followed by India. This, in turn, could lead to more indigenous projects (make) as a corollary of the second wave in Indian military industrialisation process. Apart from the Russians and Israelis, there are companies like MBDA, EADS, BAe, Boeing, Lockheed and many others (South Koreans, for example), who could be more than willing to partner Indian companies (MBDA-DRDO-BDL consortium for a futuristic SR-SAM project, Javelin ATGM, M777 ULH, to name a few) for meaningful collaborative projects. Of course, politico-industrial dynamics as well as national interests could come in to play while evaluating such projects, but they must be weighed vis-?-vis larger strategic goals of national self-reliance efforts?a test case for Indian prudence and diplomacy.
Jaitley appears to be the best man to lead the otherwise conservative defence ministry. His statement?more procurement and faster procurement?should be stretched to include ?more collaborations?.
The author is a New Delhi-based defence analyst. He can be contacted at deba205@gmail.com