There is no magic bullet of development for the Naxal country that will work across India and cut out the bloodletting going on now. There is also little use for a belief that such a development plan can be crafted minus the Naxals and still be acceptable to the forest dwellers, principally the tribals.
In Chhattisgarh, West Bengal and even Andhra Pradesh, these state-sponsored plans have failed to create any real makeover of the terrain. But where the same states have relied on entrepreneurship and, in many cases, on participation of the private sector, they have succeeded. This is a valuable lesson, bearing out the classical economic doctrine of letting the state ensure the play of law and order and staying out of business. This is unconventional but because it is so, it has proved the winner in this crazy picture.
But to understand the dynamics of this process, it is necessary to get a feel of the nature of the Naxal problem. The Naxals of today have clearly metamorphosed into semi-military outfits from their earlier avatar as the political face of the locals, mostly jungle-based tribal groups. Their disdain for the political system is a reality. Also, where the Naxals have managed to expand, they do not now want any truck with the civil administration beyond the obvious benefits that such cooperation can provide. For instance, in their best stronghold, which is the Abujhmad area of Bastar division, 4,000 square kilometres of thickly forested land spanning three districts of Narayanpur, Bijapur and Dantewada, they allow only those facilities to be carted in that fit in with their plan.
And what is their plan? Nobody in the civil administration in the government knows. The director general of police, Chhattisgarh, Vishwa Ranjan, said the Naxals were a classical jungle-based communist group that believes in the violent overthrow of the state. This might seem about as daft an ideology as those of the northeast-based insurrection groups, but for those at the frontline of receiving bullets in those jungles, it makes perfect sense. Incidentally, in the same state, the civil administration officials said they do not know what to make of the Naxals as they never discuss their aims with outsiders. The Naxals of Chhattisgarh have obviously dug in for a long haul.
Does anyone know, for instance, why they reserve their fury for the special police officers whom the local police forces recruit in these areas, repeatedly kidnapping or even killing them? The outlaw cadres have already begun recruiting heavily to their cause tribals from the same villages and age groups from where these special police officers come. So, the attraction for the local youth from the 237 villages of Abujhmad for joining the Naxal cadre dwindles significantly. The recruiters are not amused. Incidentally, they have also set up children volunteer groups called Bal Sangams as the catchment zone for the future.
In this sort of a plan, does harping on a development-led alternative make much sense? It does in districts like Karimnagar of Andhra Pradesh for instance, where the state government has developed a unique set of employment plans for the village youth. The district has been the hotbed of Naxalite recruitment and to match those offers, the state has tied up with private sector companies as far afield as Mumbai, Delhi and Bangalore to recruit security guards for them or even to work as counter clerks at fast food joints. Those initiatives have paid off.
The same economic logic has worked in another way in the Sarguja district of Chhattisgarh. The northernmost district of the state has seen a sharp fall in numbers and a ruinous split within the Naxal ranks in the last few years. The brutal answer is the coal and transport mafia. The groups have been co-opted into the under belly of the coal business, competing and often cooperating with the local business for the same prize. This is, of course, an unstable peace. But it has created an avenue for the district administration to move into areas where there was no scope even a couple of years ago. Obviously the Andhra Pradesh model is replicable, the Sarguja one is not. But both have done the trick.
This is something the Naxals also realise. This is the reason why in their jungle fastness in south Chhattisgarh, they are zealously resisting the entry of any organised trade or commerce into the area. In fact, forget organised trade, on the 80-kilometre road between Jagdalpur and Dantewada, even the ubiquitous tea shacks are totally absent. In these situations, the state agencies become a target for easy capture.
The state government has developed a series of cooperatives in the area under the umbrella of a pan-Chhattisgarh body to run the business of tendu leaves. In the same villages are also the panchayats, often headed by a Naxal sympathiser or sometimes a member. The general demand from the civil society is to merge the cooperatives into the panchayats. The implication of the step, which so far the state has resisted, is obvious.
The other nemesis of the development plan is the impact on the tribals. The Abujhmad area, incidentally, has no land revenue records?the basic tool of the administration to take up any work in the area. The British and before them even the Mughal Emperor Akbar also reportedly failed to drum up the statistics for the area.
In future, these districts will conceivably embrace the tenets of the development paradigm. But that will be long after the Naxalite insurrection has been tackled. Both cannot happen simultaneously, at least now. Even though for political reasons, Delhi is obviously uncomfortable highlighting the police action, the alternatives are limited in this war.
subhomoy.bhattacharjee@expressindia.com