By (Mrs) Amb Narinder Chauhan
Japan and South Korea (ROK) have significantly improved their relations in recent months and are attempting to align their regional strategies in response to perceived threats mainly from three nuclear states: China, Russia, and North Korea. The two maritime neighbours share many cultural, economic, and military ties, their economies are amongst the largest in Asia, and they are both military allies of the US. Relations, however, are complicated by several issues, including territorial claims on Liancourt Rocks and conflicting views on mutual history.
Japan-ROK relations reached a low point in 2019, when diplomatic and public disagreements spilled over into economic and military ties, triggering a tit for tat imposition of trade restrictions, and bringing an end to bilateral military information sharing. Since then, China’s economic coercion and territorial ambitions, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a heightened North Korean missile and nuclear threat have combined to spur ROK and Japan to overcome their many differences. Under the leadership of ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, both countries are attempting to restore ties and trust with each other.
The worsening external environment was significant, but the real door opener was a crucial policy turnaround by ROK’s new conservative government which announced a plan to settle the historical dispute on reparations and compensate victims of Japan’s forced labor during the final years of its colonization of the Korean Peninsula- funded solely by Korean companies. In doing so, ROK unilaterally offered a solution to a legal deadlock caused by a 2018 Korean Supreme Court ruling that ordered several Japanese companies to individually compensate victims, threatening to seize their Korean assets if they refused. This was highly contentious in Japan since, from its point of view, all reparations had been settled by the normalization treaty of 1965. The Korean ruling had precipitated an all-time low in relations.
The ensuing shuttle diplomacy brought ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese PM Kishida Fumio together in Tokyo in March 2023 and again in Seoul in May 2023, which had important implications for the security of both countries as well as for the stability of a trilateral partnership that includes the US.
The rapprochement also built on Yoon’s first Indo Pacific strategy, called the Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo Pacific region and Japan’s new National Security Strategy, which were both released in December 2022. Yoon’s strategy differs from the southeast asia focused New Southern Policy of Yoon’s predecessor, by expanding the scope of ROK’s engagement to the whole region and beyond. Two important strands of the new strategy, i.e., expanding networks of security cooperation and building stronger economic-security networks align ROK’s regional vision with that of Japan’s. Furthermore, each country’s strategy document lists the other country as a key partner for Indo-Pacific policy coordination.
Japan and ROK’s shared interests soon reflected in enhanced cooperation in the proliferating regional groupings. Japan invited ROK to the G7 meeting in Hiroshima in May 2023 in the realization that the common external challenges could be better faced together. During the Summit, Kishida and Yoon together visited a memorial to Koreans killed in the atomic bombing-a significant gesture, given that the more than 20,000 Korean victims were largely forced laborers brought to Japan during the colonial period. Both sides also agreed to work together on the issue of the treatment of Fukushima nuclear waste that is an irritant in the relationship. NATO’s deepening of ties with Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the ROK have also offered opportunities for closer Japan-ROK security cooperation.
The QUAD working group on critical and emerging technologies including the semiconductor supply chain initiative aligns with ROK’s Indo-pacific strategy focus on supply chain resilience for critical technologies. ROK already is part of the Chip 4 Alliance with Japan, Taiwan, and the US. Japan and ROK have already announced that the mutual fund created to strengthen bilateral economic ties will be used for semiconductor and energy cooperation initiatives and, in a promising move, the ROK’s Samsung has announced it will build a new $222m chip research facility in Yokohama (Japan) with subsidies from the Japanese government.
Japan also stands to benefit from the accession of ROK into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) from which ROK is estimated to gain $86b annually. ROK and UK’s entry in the bloc promise to provide a counterweight to the China dominated RECEP, particularly in economic governance and rules formation.
ROK’s rapprochement with Tokyo coincides with its efforts to improve relations with the US. The successful launch of ICBM by North Korea appeared to have triggered Yoon’s visit to the US on April 25, 2023 to coincide with the 70th anniversary of bilateral relations during which the landmark Washington Declaration was signed as a nuclear deterrence strategy. The US extended deterrence commitment to ROK in the face of North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile capability. Faced with an aggressive North Korea, ROK would have liked to have its own nuclear deterrence. Japan is undergoing a defense transformation of sorts, planning, and doubling its defense budget and boosting interoperability of forces with countries from the Philippines to Australia.
All the above fed into the historic summit at Camp David on August 18, 2023, between the leaders of the US, Japan and ROK and is viewed as opening a new era in trilateral cooperation through institutionalization of ties among the three allies. The three leaders announced a commitment to consult in response to common security challenges; though well short of binding treaty language this political statement represents the first time that they acknowledged their security is intertwined. They also announced plans to build a long-term calendar of expanded military exercises and increased ballistic missile cooperation, including an annual multi-domain event, annual meeting of ministers, and initiatives related to development finance, supply chain security, and the protection of critical technologies-a significant broadening of the trilateral policy agenda compared with the past. Walking away from these commitments would be no small thing for any leader.
The Camp David Summit set ROK on a new strategic direction. Bilaterally, for ROK and Japan it was a defining moment: they agreed to consult and coordinate their response actions on regional challenges, provocations and threats affecting their countries. At the strategic level, the trilateral summit represented an airtight alignment of ROK’s strategic interests with those of the US and Japan in the Indo Pacific and beyond, indicating ROK’s embrace of an expanded role and responsibility as the “global pivotal state”. The joint statement also declared a shared commitment to promote respect for human rights in North Korea, including the issue of abductees, a longstanding priority of Japan and ROK. Japan and ROK agreed to reduce energy dependence on Russia, opening opportunities for strategic energy cooperation. This is also the first time that Japan expressed support in writing for a ‘unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace’. Yoon in his August 15 Liberation Day speech had also made the unprecedented statement regarding the interlinked security of the three allies when he acknowledged the UN Command rear bases provided by Japan were critical to ROK’s defense.
There are still challenges ahead. Cooperation on security and supply chains is easier to announce than to execute, given the reality that the US, Japanese, and Korean firms are often direct competitors in high tech industries like semiconductors. The joint statement makes no reference to the limits on outbound investment into China, a US priority that both Japan and ROK are hesitant to endorse.
The Summit also caused uneasiness in ROK, raising concerns about China’s potential punitive actions and the impact of the enhanced US-ROK-Japan partnership on the deepening strategic ties between North Korea, China, and Russia. In addition, some point to the danger of ROK’s entrapment in Japan’s security issues with China in the region. Finally, others criticize the summit outcomes for their lack of a domestic consensus, suggesting that the trilateral partnership will likely face internal and external challenges.
The Summit signified that trilateral cooperation is not just about security but also to achieve the larger goal of stability and prosperity which in turn buttresses the leadership credentials of the three countries. The US succeeded in bringing the two together with ROK finally moving away from its colonial past with Japan, and Japan significantly moving away from post war pacifism towards becoming a full-fledged member of the US led western democratic alliance. This also enables Japan and Korea to now pursue trilateral diplomacy with China from a position of strength and engage in a pragmatic dialogue with China which came for sharp criticism at the Summit. For Japan the Camp David Summit will no doubt add to Japan’s sense of growing confrontation with China. China expressed deep displeasure with the Summit which it viewed as aimed at itself and called the meeting as “an act of gross interference in China’s internal affairs” and the start of a de facto military alliance, a “mini Nato” to contain China and the start of ‘a new cold war’.
The trajectory of the thaw in relations between ROK and Japan show that much of the current rapprochement stems from personal commitment of Yoon and Kishida, who have staked their political futures at the altar of diplomacy. Outstanding historical issues still simmer. South Korea’s Liberal Party, now in opposition, continues to run on a platform of anti-Japanese sentiment seeking justice from Japan for past historical issues. The 2019 trade dispute revolving around compensation for wartime forced labor, had led to nationwide boycott of Japanese products, even causing a 17.9% decline in travel to Japan. The perceived historical revisionist statements from Japan or paying visits to Yasukuni Shrine keep the controversies alive. Though Kishida expressed ‘profound heartache’ for their painful colonial past, it still falls short of a fresh apology, which many in ROK find unsatisfactory. Issues related to territorial disputes, textbooks etc. will continue to periodically reappear. This includes ROK’s decade long ban on seafood originating from the area around the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster. Japan vehemently protested a December 2023 ruling by the Supreme Court in favor of a group of South Korean women, known as “comfort women”, who were forced to work in the Japanese wartime brothels, ordering two Japanese companies to pay compensation.
Although alignment on security issues was not sufficient in the past to overcome the weight of history, the sheer speed and scope of change in the current economic and security landscape lends a degree of insulation from the domestic pressures. For a truly sustainable rapprochement both Yoon and Kishida are boldly trying to demonstrate that the benefits of a good relationship are worth more than the lingering historical pride, despite their domestic popularity rates falling.
Neither Japan nor ROK alone have the strength or capacity to deal with the looming regional tensions. Given that ROK and Japan are the closest treaty allies of the US in Asia, the institutionalization of trilateral cooperation raises hope that at least some of the benefits of Yoon-Kishida thaw will be lasting. The US, Japan and ROK, for instance, have announced the launch of a real time missile data sharing system to help monitor North Korea’s nuclear and missile programme. The current rapprochement is also clearly in US interests, and one that could prove to be enduring in the current strategic environment.
(The author is a former Indian Ambassador.
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