By Shriram Subramanian, The author works with InGovern Research Services
For over a decade, India has pursued one of the world’s most ambitious renewable energy transitions, rapidly scaling solar and wind capacity while investing heavily in national transmission corridors to carry green power from resource-rich states like Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Ladakh to major consumption centres. This dual push reflects that the energy transition is equally about generating and evacuating clean power.
As India enters its next phase of renewable scale-up, a structural challenge is emerging at the intersection of infrastructure planning, grid operations, and investor confidence. In Rajasthan, one of India’s largest renewable energy hubs, more than 4,000 megawatts (MW) of fully commissioned solar capacity faces near-total curtailment during peak generation hours. These operational plants can produce electricity but are unable to inject power into the grid when generation is the highest.
At the heart of this issue lies General Network Access (GNA), which defines how much power the interstate transmission system commits to evacuate for a power generator. GNA exists in two forms—permanent and temporary. Permanent GNA is granted once designated transmission systems are completed, and such projects enjoy priority access. Until these systems are ready, projects operate under temporary GNA, using spare capacity after permanent commitments are met.
Because transmission infrastructure takes longer to build than renewable plants, temporary GNA was designed as a pragmatic bridge. For several years, this worked reasonably well—after serving permanent GNA holders, the grid retained operational margin for temporary GNA users. Temporary access was shared proportionately, allowing partial evacuation of 40-50%. Revenues were lower, but projects remained viable and clean power continued to flow.
Rajasthan’s current experience marks a sharp departure. The state has roughly 23 gigawatts (GW) of commissioned renewable capacity, yet usable evacuation capacity during peak solar hours is under 19 GW. With priority given to permanent GNA projects, little operational margin remains for temporary GNA generators. Meanwhile, about 4,375 MW of GNA was operationalised, consuming incremental headroom.
The commissioning of the 765 kV Khetri-Narela transmission line—one of India’s highest-capacity corridors—was expected to ease this constraint. Instead, incremental usable corridor capacity declared after commissioning was only 500-600 MW, far below what the asset’s physical scale and cost might provide.
This raises an important question: Why did a massive capital-intensive new transmission asset result in only such a small increase in declared usable corridor capacity? If the physical corridor is large but operationally declared margin remains low, stakeholders need visibility into the operational constraints explaining this gap.
Simultaneously, substantial projects previously under temporary GNA were upgraded to permanent GNA according to commitments linked to this line’s commissioning. Priority allocation to these projects absorbed not only newly declared capacity but also residual margin that temporary GNA users had relied upon. Several GW of commissioned renewable projects shifted abruptly from partial to near-zero evacuation.
This unpredictable curtailment undermines project bankability, erodes investor confidence, and raises capital costs for future renewable investments. Grid-support equipment installed at these plants remains underutilised. Curtailment at this scale creates wider economic inefficiency, raising questions about planning alignment and operational design—implications that extend beyond individual developers to affect the credibility and pace of India’s clean energy transition itself.
This is not an argument against operational caution. Grid operators maintain system security under complex constraints protecting against cascading failures, often translating into security-driven operating limits that are prudent given India’s past grid disturbances. However, when these limits materially cap usable capacity unlocked by new transmission investments, a legitimate policy question arises: Are we extracting full public value from transmission assets financed by consumers and the wider economy?
High-voltage transmission corridors cost thousands of crores and are financed by consumers and the wider economy. Greater transparency is essential—in how operating margins are calculated, how limits are applied and how incremental capacity is unlocked. This would restore confidence among generators, lenders and system planners.
Transparency helps but won’t solve curtailment alone. The system needs quick, practical fixes like special protection schemes (SPS), which can reduce avoidable curtailment by allowing the grid to run safely with more usable capacity. Additionally, where permanent GNA capacity is unused in real time, a clear, rule-based way to temporarily share that spare margin with temporary GNA projects could provide immediate relief.
Over the medium term, high-congestion renewable regions need an interim operating framework that clearly communicates expected evacuation margins, timelines for capacity additions, and sequencing of access operationalisation. If temporary GNA is a bridge, it must have predictable operating cover so project economics aren’t exposed to sudden losses.
Over the longer term, the lesson is coordination. Renewable commissioning and transmission readiness must move in closer alignment. Unlocking green power at scale will require not only technical rigour, but also institutional coordination and transparent decision-making, so that when capacity is built, it can actually be used.