By Lt Col Raj Singh Bhown

Military, traditionally, has been synonymous with power, [especially the Political]. In fact, the Military and the Ruler were inseparable and unthinkable as two. Most emperors or kings were great warriors themselves. Elitism thus came naturally to the military. That was the era of imperialism.

With the advent of industrialization, the days of imperialism were getting numbered and the old canvas of Politico-Military states was being repainted as Politico-Economics. Polities around the world were reincarnating themselves from Monarchies to Democracies. Karl Marx, a German philosopher, went a step further to theorize political economics in a revolutionary concept of socialism.

The changing political scene had casted a telling impact, looming on the military, the descent of which would soon rob its elitism and equation with power to rule. Military, was no longer to remain as the chief instrument of empire building, and ironically not even a ladder to the State’s seat of power; that would soon shift to economics.

The slide thus began for the military to start losing its empowerment, niche in the nation’s hierarchy, elitism and glamour as well. Military, was to reconcile itself as servant of People, the guard of the nation state’s territorial assets. It was quite a fall from warriors and knights to a security force.

INDIAN MILITARY

Indian Military couldn’t be any different, it was also ordained to reincarnate itself from Colonial Army of British Imperialism to that of a democratic peace-loving India. Change is most painful process, especially in a society or fraternity like that of the military which is highly conservative, traditional and orthodox. The reluctance and resistance to relinquish power had been natural. Soon after independence, in 1947 the process to castrate the military began with a bang. The political power stood transferred in the hands of freedom fighters, mainly the forbearers of Indian National Congress, who saw the Military as an illegitimate child of British Colonialism. Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India had expressed his utter dislike for the military publicly on more than one occasion. Reasons were obvious. The Indian Military was the ruling hand of the British during the Raj, which was being fought back by the Indian Independence Movement. In fact, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru as a Foreign Minister in Council of India in 1946 itself wrote about the changes required in the Indian Army. His paranoia of Military Coup, and dislike for the Military led to two ill-fated consequences of his policies. One, the military was disempowered severely to influence any national decision-making process and two the political leadership got cozier with civilian bureaucracy. They needed someone to run the governance for them. Stephen Cohen in his seminal work Army and the Nation argues that civil services and politicians had forged an alliance “for the purpose of reducing the role of the military in the decision making process. That triggered a turf war between Military and Civil Services, with the latter at an advantage with politicians on their side. A syndrome of ‘Us and They’ thus got set in. Military, in reality, now became a step child from an illegitimate one. Surprisingly, no major protest or resistance came from the Military. A fair guess would be the top echelon of Military brass having left for the UK leaving huge vacancies to be made up by Indian officers, lurking in the junior echelons. Those pliable were sought and promoted.

MUTATION BEGAN

First casualty was the Commander in Chief. Three services of the Military were led by Chiefs of Staff, with independent Headquarters. A Ministry of Defense staffed by civil services officers, was set up as a controlling apparatus. The executive control of the Military lay with the Prime Minister through the Council of Ministers and the Raksha Mantri assisted by the Defense Secretary, an IAS officer. Contrary to C-in-C being the extraordinary member of the defense council reporting directly to the Governor General of India.

The new impetuous structure created for defense of the country started showing effect earlier than expected. Soon came ill planned, ill thought out ‘Forward Policy’. It led to national embarrassment and shameful defeat at the hands of the primitive Army of China. That had no impact on Nehru, even if he died with that in his heart.

The Civil authority yoke continued to get tighter and it led the Military to turn at its mercy for everything. Though, Military was given full autonomy for internal functioning, deployment and conduct of operations it lacked the moral authority at every step.

Today, the DNA of a traditional Military stands mutated and it competes and races with other armed police forces of the country. Ridiculously, during one of the flag marches in a very recent time, the Troops carried placards announcing the carriers were Army, because they were not distinguishable from other police forces.

Yet, to the credit of the Indian Military, the legacy, the sound footings given by the British empire, it stood the test of times, and remains to be the most trusted institution of Government in India. Some call it the last bastion of India, but all these credits are not enough to shave off the Nehruvian paranoia for the Military to gain its rightful place in the decision making process.

Indian Military has logged a spectacular victory in 1971 war with Pakistan, probably the one of its kind in world history. The study would reveal that it was possible not due to a self-driven system but a personality-oriented synergy which was more of a cosmic arrangement.

Later, an expeditionary opportunity in a neighboring island nation. Indian Military performed with valour but remained hostage to faulty policy making by the higher direction of war, which had inexperienced, self-obsessed civil officials or politicians. That was not the first or last. Then Kargil happened. A fiasco better not be retold.

Military, starved of its needs and stripped of its greater responsibility, fought Pakistani intruders entrenched in treacherous heights, COAS shouting ‘We will fight with whatever we have.’ The Government at the center was shamefully blackmailed by the US and Pakistan against a nuclear war. It was only the Indian Military who could unleash a frontal assault regardless of personal safety. Riposte or Turning Flanks were politically disallowed. Military had lost its voice in decision making. A Committee led by India’s sole strategic thinker of his times K Subramaniam did the autopsy of ‘Op Vijay’ and came out with a long list of recommendations. That only gathered dust for the first few decades except for some cosmetic changes in Intelligence Agencies. A glaring need of C-in-C was felt due to lack of synergy between Indian Army and Indian Air Force. The Committee did recommend a post of Chief of Defense Staff. What we got after 20 years was a Defence Secretary of Military Affairs with Strategic control of Armed Forces not with the office.

Recommendations

Indian Military has proven its credentials, all these decades post independence, especially with respect to its unquestionable obedience to Civilian supremacy; the most exemplary being the Kargil. As we step into Amrit Kal, it would be prudent for the Government to consider suitably elevating the Military, in the national decision making hierarchy, though with due deliberation, so that its contribution in nation building is more productive.

The security environment in the subcontinent has been volatile and internally India has had no end to its integration problems. Military has been deployed in internal security duties for protracted periods, which has started looking eternal now. There is a strong case to relieve the Military from internal security duties which have taken its toll on organizational fatigue. Practice of treating Indian Military as proverbial Man Friday must end, being enough is enough.

India’s territorial boundaries (land) are disputed, and are operationally live with military deployments round the year. Constitutionally, demarcation of boundaries and connected policies are purview of the Ministry of External Affairs whereas, their defence is the responsibility of the Military. It’s a grey area where sync and synergy is much needed and the Army needs to be dovetailed with a greater say, into cartographic exercises that Indian diplomacy takes.

Ideally, India would need to have a C-in-C but in the current polity of India, it wouldn’t fit in, come what may. Nor would the three Services Chiefs allow their autonomy to be encroached upon. Yet, we need a single Military window as an interface with the civilian Government. The Kargil Committee recommended a post of Chief of Defence Staff for that purpose. There are two primary roles that would be incumbent upon the CDS to perform. One, efficient employment and deployment of Military assets and resources, to force favorable outcomes during wars or battles. Two, maintaining an efficient inventory of War Ordinance which is not only cost effective but abreast with modern technology. Both these roles are complicated since the job involves allotment of right priorities and that of a pragmatic judgment, which are suspect of subjectivity. There is also a glass ceiling of civilian supremacy, and the desired CDS’s appointment is perceived to be breaking that. It will never be allowed. Yet, there is a strong case for consideration by the Government that the post of Defense Secretary could be made open to military veteran officers as in the US Defense Department. In fact, the Home Secretary likewise is an IPS officer.

Conclusion

Military, should be able to reincarnate itself with a new DNA, settling down in its new found groove. It has to well reconcile to the fact that civilian supremacy is a reality and not going anywhere in future. Yet, there is no reason for it to mishandle the internal autonomy that the Government has accorded mercifully. The civil-military relations have to be rewritten from a higher perspective, rising above the petty turf wars, accommodating each other in the power zones. Government intervention in this would be politely solicited. There is a likely danger of losing the apolitical nature of the Military, which must be guarded at any cost against every attempt by the politicians. There are no easy solutions or templated system frameworks in the market to be adopted in preventing politicization, sadly. Integrity of military leadership and its professional honesty are the best bets as of now. As British legacies get whirl winded, the military must holdfast the Chetwode credo, sacred than any other mantra of nationalism.

Author is Indian Army Veteran and from Jat Regiment.

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