By Oorja Tapan
With the Israel-Hamas war continuing, Yemen-based Houthi rebels have already intensified attacks on ships traversing through the Red Sea since mid-December. The Houthi rebels essentially aimed to target Israeli-linked vessels and the threat has escalated to container ships and oil tankers from other countries as well in the Red Sea. With the recent M/V Chem Pluto chemical tanker being struck by a drone attack allegedly by Iran, 200 nautical miles from the coast of India, the conflict in the Red Sea has thickened with the Iranian Navy dispatching the Alborz destroyer in the Red Sea. The conflict might not get out of hand as the US is facing early hurdles from its allies to implement its multi-coalition Operation Prosperity Guardian to prevent the Iran-backed Houthi militants from blockading trade in the Red Sea, as several nations are exercising restraint in jumping the gun on the full-fledged marine war in the Gulf of Aden in the background of the Gaza crisis. Container ships and oil tankers are traversing through the alternative route of the Cape of Good Hope, meanwhile, to avoid the conflict in the Red Sea. Such crises, however, always point towards the crucial role of maritime chokepoints in global supply chains for broader economic and food security and how the weaponisation of such hubs can lead to severe challenges in maritime and trade security.
The Black Sea was similarly weaponized during the Russia-Ukraine war with the oldest forms of warfare being deployed, that is, blockades from both Russian and Ukrainian sides. Turkey has recently denied access to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits to two minehunter ships donated by the UK for the Ukrainian Navy, in order to comply with the 1936 Montreux Convention and prevent escalation in the Black Sea. Things are bad for merchant shipping in the drought-stricken Panama Canal and such effects of climate change will surely manifest poor outcomes for the global trading system and food security. The Ever-Given Crisis of 2021 is still fresh in memory when the megaship Ever Given got jammed in the Suez Canal highlighting issues of grounding, maritime safety, and global supply-chain disruption. US and Iranian navies have had numerous tense encounters in the Persian Gulf and concerns of piracy in the Indian Ocean abound in the Horn of Africa with major maritime players from both Asia and Africa. The blockade of chokepoints like Bab-el Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, Panama Canal, Suez Canal, Malacca Strait, etc. either through “weaponisation” via military/economic warfare or non-traditional security threats like piracy and climate change begs us the greater questions of geopolitical and geoeconomic security.
New networks and interdependencies are a reality of our globalized world. Henry Farrel and Abraham Newman argued in 2019 about weaponized interdependence in the form of panopticons and chokepoints where states leverage global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic gains. However, the action of Houthis (even if Iran-sponsored) points to another dimension of using central economic and geographic nodes to deny access- the idea of non-state actors too indulging in coercion through weaponizing chokepoints and paralyzing global shipping and trade networks. Their deployment of drone warfare complicates the ‘chokepoint effect’ and goes beyond the actions of pirates in such zones. Nation-states including strategic thinkers and policy-makers need to think differently about foreign economic policy and national security in the era of weaponized interdependence.
Chokepoints here create new vulnerabilities that are harder to navigate than mere maritime passages. The danger of the creation of chokepoints now includes internet exchange infrastructure, cloud computing, 5G networks, financial payments, and market access points. Heavy dependence on particular nations, for instance, in managing migration flows or the control of rare earths, can create chokepoints that can be weaponized further. However, it is difficult to escape the chokepoint effect wherein geographical and structural advantages would result in certain states becoming central economic nodes for supply chains. Reshoring and decoupling are not easy solutions here as supply chains remain fully integrated. Weaponising choke points often proves to be less risky and expensive for the coercer than other types of actions and has more far-reaching consequences for other actors in the network. For example, the US has often been more assertive in exploiting its centrality in the global financial system- sanctions on Iran and Russia have had severe consequences for European businesses. China has gone a step further in reducing the chokepoint effect for itself by following a new economic strategy of “dual circulation” building fully domestic supply chains while tying foreign businesses to the Chinese markets even more muscularly through the Belt and Road Initiative and digital currency initiatives. However, in terms of crude oil imports, Chinese dependence on maritime chokepoints remains- case in point, its “Malacca Dilemma” crowding its energy security from the Middle East.
US-China rivalry along with challenges from Iran and Russia will present the world with unique challenges in managing the chokepoints during wartime coercion by belligerents, as and when the case arises. There has been little room for maneuver as the existing communications infrastructure around these chokepoints, especially in the Persian Gulf, is insufficient to limit miscalculations. Smaller states like Iran can easily weaponize choke points to win influence- as witnessed in the Strait of Hormuz, and with the help of non-state actors like the Houthi rebels in the Red Sea, allegedly. Continuous tensions between Tehran and Washington as well as ad-hoc communications between their vessels leave officers of limited authority in charge of preventing unintended confrontations.
There is a need for rules-based and inclusive control over these chokepoints, through steps like treaties on the Suez Canal or Bosphorus. The formation of Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) to uphold the rules based international order in the maritime space by countering illicit non-state actors on the high seas is a step in this direction – with countries like India also participating in it. However, other states like Iran, China and Russia are antagonized by the presence of such US-led initiatives. The US has been inviting countries like India to step up for its Operation Prosperity Guardian in the Red Sea under the CMF- but like other US allies- France, Australia, Italy, etc., India is also moving ahead with a separate naval presence as a cautious response in the region. Nevertheless, states need to recognize and combat the issues associated with interdependencies through chokepoints and their weaponisation both by state and non-state actors. States cannot afford continuous failure in dealing with blockades of choke points especially in a recovering post-pandemic world economy.
Weaponised interdependence has several implications for the grand strategy including the naval strategies of major powers amidst such conflicting environments. Both the increase in coercion and defense against such attempts in chokepoints have serious ramifications for the global political economy. There is a need for de-risking of supply chains from such geopolitical conflicts in the chokepoints, if not decoupling, to build resilience in global economic networks and venture out for true multilateral cooperation in combating the ‘chokepoint effect’.
The author is Doctoral Candidate in Diplomacy and Disarmament, CIPOD, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
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