A new dynamism in foreign policy of GCC States

By Md. Muddassir Quamar

The ongoing war in Ukraine has raised several questions about the European security architecture ensured since the end of the Cold War by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russian ability to win the war or come out of it unscathed remains in question but the war has underlined the vulnerability of Eastern European countries to great power rivalry. The impact of the conflict can be witnessed at different levels in Europe wherein countries such as Norway and Sweden that earlier preferred to remain out of the purview of NATO are now scrambling to join it. Alternatively, Türkiye, a member of NATO has been playing a balancing role and seeking to emerge as a mediator in the ongoing war and eventually the power politics between US and Russia.

Notwithstanding, the war has impacted global politics in many ways. The focus of the United States has been diverted to Ukraine and Europe from other regional theatres including the Middle East and Indo-Pacific. To add to the complex geopolitics, China has come out in support of Russia without necessarily getting directly involved in the war. Simultaneously, China has been expanding its geopolitical and geo-economic footprints in different directions including in Central, South, Southeast, and West Asia. In Washington, this is viewed as challenging the dominance of the United States, and American analysts have often framed the rise of China as posing a threat to the established liberal international order. While the impact of the Ukraine crisis on global geopolitics and international order remains a matter of debate and analysis, its fallouts on the Middle East and the Persian Gulf are becoming apparent.

A key indicator of the emerging trajectory of regional politics in the Middle East is the response of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States to the Ukraine crisis. The six GCC countries, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are long-standing allies of the United States. They have for long depended on the US-led security umbrella in the Gulf for their defence. During the Cold War, this was based on the oil-for-security arrangement. However, in the twenty-first century, as the American and European dependence on the Gulf oil subsided and the global economic nerve centre shifted to Asia, the nature of the oil-for-security alliance changed. Hence, the US-led regional architecture ensured regional security while the GCC countries ensured the flow of oil and gas for the stability of the global energy market and the international economy. Further, in the wake of 9/11, the alliance between the United States and the GCC revolved around the US policy of ‘war on terror.’ This meant that despite the geopolitical and geo-economic shifts, the US-GCC alliance remained intact although the nature of this alliance changed.

A key component of the alliance between the US and the GCC countries was the foreign policy understanding between them. What this meant in practice was mutual support for each other in matters of foreign policy and international politics to safeguard the other’s core interests and support foreign policy priorities. However, signs of a breakdown in this arrangement began to emerge in the wake of the Arab Spring under the Barack Obama administration. The first sign of trouble appeared in the different responses of the Obama administration and different GCC countries to the call for regime change in Tunisia and Egypt. While Saudi Arabia and UAE expected to enlist US support to rescue its allies, Qatar took a different view while the Obama administration remained cautious and urged its beleaguered allies to listen to the voices of the people.

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What started in Tunisia and Egypt expanded to different parts of the region and so as the differences among the GCC countries and between them and the US. Hence, the different responses to the Arab Spring showed the first signs of the splitting of the alliance between the US and the GCC states. The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) further consolidated the divergence between Saudi Arabia and the Obama administration. Under Donald Trump, while the US changed its policy towards Iran, the lack of response to the 2019 drone attacks on oil installations in Saudi Arabia consolidated the Saudi-Emirati view that the US is no longer ready to come to the rescue of its regional allies when they face security threats. To add to the confusion, differences among the GCC states reached a flashpoint with the boycott of Qatar by fellow GCC members—Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain—and Egypt.

Under Joe Biden, the disenchantment with US foreign policy reached a flashpoint as the US highlighted the issue of human rights records to isolate Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince Mohammed Bin-Salman and further took action to pull out of its commitments to the ongoing war in Yemen. Both these steps seriously damaged the relations between the Biden administration and Saudi Arabia. Although after the eruption of the crisis in Ukraine, Biden tactically moderated his position on not dealing diplomatically with Bin-Salman, this did not substantially alter the dynamics as visible from the Saudi refusal to not cut oil production which the Biden administration had urged for.

Hence, if one looks at the US foreign policy in the Middle East over the decade since 2011, it did not always take the interests of the regional allies into account which indicated to countries like Saudi Arabia and UAE that they would need to take matters into their own hands and diversify their external relations to safeguard their interests.

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The GCC countries, therefore, have gradually adopted an independent regional and foreign policy not only with the United States but also among themselves. This has been complemented by broader fragmentation in regional and international politics. Hence, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain no longer see the need to coordinate their foreign policy response either among themselves or with the United States. This has become apparent in the wake of the Ukraine crisis wherein Saudi Arabia and UAE have refused to tow the American foreign policy line while Qatar is more aligned with the US. Partly, the policy divergences with the US have also contributed to the trend of reconciliations among regional countries whereby they have tried to set aside their confrontationist approach and engage diplomatically to discuss differences.

Three broad trends can be assuaged by this. One, the nature of the relations between the GCC countries and the United States has changed. It is no longer bound by the Cold War era alliance rather it has become a matter of issue-based alignments. Hence, wherever there is a convergence, such as counterterrorism, regional security, Iran, and Afghanistan, one sees a degree of alignment. Alternatively, where there is a divergence, such as in the Ukraine crisis, China, and the international oil market, one sees different approaches. This is likely to remain the trend in US-GCC relations in the times to come until there is a paradigm shift in regional politics or American foreign policy.

Two, the change in nature of the relations does not mean that the US is looking to exit the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Despite its reducing security commitments or appetite for military interventions, the US is the only external, and de facto regional, military power with the wherewithal to ensure regional security and order. Hence, despite their policy divergences, the security and strategic relations between GCC countries and the US and the dependence of the GCC countries for their security and defence on the US have not ended.