By Abhishek Sharma
The Indian Ocean region (IOR) is uniquely positioned in international politics and trade. But unlike other maritime spaces, it does not dominate geopolitics or geoeconomics discourse. Even though it is strategically vital for the economy and security of many countries beyond the region, it remains neglected. This is because the region lags interests from great powers to the degree other maritime spaces get. However, the tide seems likely to shift towards the Indian Ocean. In the words of US deputy secretary of State Wendy Sherman, ‘The Indian Ocean region is home to 2.7 billion people—more than a third of the world’s population—and with an average age of 30 years, [and] that percentage will only grow.’ This strategic realization in the US on the importance of the Indian Ocean is not new but vital in the current context when the region is emerging as a new strategic space for contestation between India and China. India, the largest country in the IOR, has vital security and economic interests and aims to protect those. The IOR is also essential to China’s economic and energy security and expansionist aspirations beyond the South China Sea. In the last decade, we have seen China’s increasing role in the region, which is not seen positively by New Delhi, with whom the relations in the previous few years have substantially deteriorated. Amidst the changing power dynamics in the IOR, India seems to have adopted a flexible strategic approach to deal with the China factor.
A strategy in the making
India’s concern has become more realistic as China ventures into the IOR. New Delhi sees Beijing’s increasing investments, influence, and initiatives through a historical lens, a different view from many regional capitals. The growing Chinese activities in the IOR have generated regional security concerns in recent years. However, there has been some stability as the crisis has settled in Sri Lanka and Maldives. After the Sri Lanka crisis, India again emerged as the first conflict responder in the IOR. This has allowed India to be more flexible in its strategy, as it has gained some confidence. With conflict receding, India has gained the confidence to ease its traditional perspective toward the IOR. This confidence and lingering concern have allowed India to recalibrate its strategic approach. The approach entails partnering and seeing ‘like-minded’ countries through a new perspective in addressing the region’s challenges. Lately, India has started opening up to new and old friends. This was not the case even some years before when India was suspicious of even friendly countries’ interests in the region.
India, which considers itself the region’s net security provider, has a policy for IOR known as Security and Growth For All in the Region (SAGAR) which signals its unwavering commitment. This policy emphasizes upgrading India’s relations with regional countries, assisting their economic growth, and maintaining regional stability. Traditionally, India has focused on strengthening ties with regional countries in different formats—bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral institutions like IORA and IONS. However, in recent years, two new patterns have been incorporated into India’s IOR strategic approach. The First emphasizes the interconnectedness of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a joint maritime security space. This has allowed the incorporation of the Indian Ocean into the broader Pacific fold through the Indo-Pacific concept and has manifested through strengthening partnerships with ‘like-minded’ countries to address regional challenges. Second, India aims to strategically build its regional capabilities to counter future threats and minimize risks, focusing on developing maritime infrastructure and institutionalizing cooperation.
Manifesting the strategy: Building partnerships and developing maritime capabilities
By allowing multiple actors to be stakeholders in the region, India is trying to counter the possibility of turning the region into a bipolar contest with China. It recognizes that in a bipolar contest with China, India’s position will likely be weak due to the limited capabilities and resources it has to offer to the region. With more states partnering in the initiative, India aims to develop ‘Incremental multipolarity’ in the region. India-Australia-Indonesia and India-Japan-France trilateral are examples through which it seeks to enhance its capacities and assist regional countries through targeted initiatives like debt-restructuring programs in the case of Sri Lanka. The military exercises with partner countries like France, the US, Japan, Australia, and the UK in the IOR also signal an intent to get them more involved in the region. This flexible strategy aims to gain greater support which helps to form a better counter-strategy to China and avoids putting the binary choice to regional countries like bandwagoning and balancing. At the same time, this presents small states with better alternatives—having more hedging opportunities—increasing their bargaining power to maximize their interests. This ‘incremental multipolarity’ strategy is a win-win case for India and the regional countries. India realizes that the multipolar Indian Ocean suits India’s interests better than a bipolar one. However, this would not be smooth sailing. The Indian Ocean is known for its unpredictable and rough weather; even with more assistance, India would have to do the heavy lifting by strengthening its ties and gaining bipartisan support in capitals, which is not the case right now.
The other focus is on building domestic capabilities. Since 2017, Doklam incident in 2017 India has been very cautious about Chinese activities in the region. India has focused on strengthening its strategic position in the IOR to counter it. Upgrading and investing in maritime infrastructure is Andaman and Nicobar Island (ANI)—a strategic maritime post signals its long-term commitment. The plan is to develop the ANI to attract more tourism, establish it as a shipping hub in International maritime trade, and utilize its strategic advantage by building defense infrastructure. Due to its strategic importance, India has focused on improving the undersea connectivity to the ANI in the last few years. However, being an eco-sensitive maritime zone, experts have highlighted the challenges from the development activities, which may threaten vulnerable flora and fauna, indigenous populations, and the marine species in the coastal region. The Great Nicobar project comprising the International Tran-ship terminal Port, International Airport, a 450 MV gas and solar-based power plant, and a township project, is at the center of controversy. Some experts have also questioned the lack of transparency, fast-tracking, absence of comprehensive environmental assessment, and violation of tribal rights in project construction. Due to a lack of procedural and ecological preprocesses, the National Green Tribunal has put the project on hold. These interventions bring out the lack of preparedness, planning, and consideration to uphold the environmental security of the region and the myopic perspectives taken by the state.
Will it be smooth sailing?
What drives India’s insecurity in the region is the rising dominance of China, and these concerns have accumulated after the 2020 Galwan conflict. The IOR may appear only as a maritime space for many. But, for India, the region has a connectedness to its geographical territory; the security of the maritime domain is interlinked with the territorial landscape of the Himalayas. Any increasing Chinese offensive actions are snippets of the window to the future. India recognizes that to avoid future threats from Beijing, it must strengthen its regional military power through this flexible strategy—Enhancing partnerships with ‘like-minded’ countries and building its maritime capabilities. Strengthening partnerships with ‘like-minded’ countries may seem easy, but it has its challenges—limited support, regional sensitivities, and a balance of power. In addition, IOR remains neglected in international discourse compared to the South China Sea. Other challenges exist in building domestic capabilities. The projects that aim to accomplish the vision are not easy to complete due to the absence of a holistic perspective—ignoring environmental laws, fast-tracking clearances, and neglecting tribal rights. To address these problems, India must undertake comprehensive planning in partnership with environmental experts, scientists, and local communities to ensure the strategy succeeds rather than fastening the projects. This will ensure a sustainable way of development and also address the legitimate concerns of the natives who feel threatened about their livelihoods. Going forward, if India aims to achieve its objectives, it must ensure that all steps must be taken, keeping regional and domestic sensitivities in mind; bringing an interactive and collaborative approach at both levels will help build sustainable security.
The author is a non-resident Kelly fellow at the Pacific Forum and a PhD student at the University of Delhi. His research focuses on intersection of geopolitics and new emerging technologies in the Indo-Pacific, and Indian Foreign Policy.
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