By Narinder Chauhan
The Indian Ocean region is witnessing the rise of India as a maritime power. Enjoying a vital geographic location in South Asia, its vast landmass jutting into the Indian Ocean and astride critical sea-lanes, India is in a pole position to play an important economic and security role in the region. India’s regional maritime strategy thus far has been aimed at building bridges of friendship with the littorals, improving partner capability, and expanding crisis response capacity. Today, the Indian navy’s principal objective is the effective policing of the Indian Ocean particularly in the context of the changing regional security situation. A pillar of India’s maritime strategy is outreach to Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) island states, African rim states and the Gulf countries. Through bilateral exercises, joint patrols, training, capacity building and hydrographic surveys, the navy has sought closer ties with regional maritime forces of friendly Asian, African and Gulf countries.
In line with India’s growing power, the Indian navy has expanded its operations in the Western Indian Ocean, the Middle east, and the Gulf, positioning itself as a ‘regional security provider’. With its $3 trillion economy, India, a leading consumer of energy resources, and with a robust defence apparatus, fits into the Gulf countries’ notion of a strategic partner.
India has vast stakes in the waters of its near and extended neighborhood which promote and nourish global trade. Four out of the six major global choke points lie in this region. Among these the Straits of Malacca-through which a quarter of the world trade passes-is the most vital not only for South Asia but also for the economies in East Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Likewise, the Strait of Hormuz is a critical conduit of energy shipments from the Gulf region, and for the flow of Asian workforce, capital, and consumer goods to the countries in the region. With more than 150,000 vessels transiting through these narrow waterways every year the fate of the regional and global economies is dependent on effective maritime security and unhindered movement of the littoral navies.
Rising global trade has led to the emergence of new trading centers in the region. This has led to development of ports on sites that were earlier little more than fishing harbors such as Gwadar in Pakistan or Hambantota in Sri Lanka. This has also led to competitive port building by China in Hambantota and Gwadar and by India in Chabahar on the Southeastern coast of Iran. Similarly, the US has developed Duqm in Oman. The navies of India, UK, and China are the main power brokers in the region. India has invested in the Asia-Africa growth corridor to establish economic linkages and industrial networks across the Indian Ocean western rim. India is developing marine infrastructure in the Agalega Islands of Mauritius and the Assumption Islands of Seychelles which has added a new security dimension.
India’s outreach to the Middle east is a significant component of our maritime strategy marked by frequent ship visits and training. The Gulf countries appreciate the importance of counter terror cooperation with India, and the need for intelligence-sharing. They recognize Indian diaspora interests and are willing to accommodate them by accepting greater Indian naval presence in their region. India’s growing market for their energy resources has led to a greater acceptance of Indian regional security initiatives, for instance, Indian Navy’s ‘Operation Sankalp’ to assist Indian flagged ships transiting through the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The IONS-The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium of which many Gulf States are members – has served as a forum to boost bilateral and multilateral initiatives.
Pakistan and China both pose significant challenges, though. Pakistan’s strong ties with the Gulf countries acts as a constraint on India’s geopolitical maneuvering in the region. Accordingly, Indian participation in regional security has been limited to humanitarian cooperation and crime prevention, steering clear of disputed areas. Significant differences also exist with Iran as the Indian navy continues to engage with Iran to the discomfiture of the Gulf countries.
It is the China factor that poses the most significant challenge to India’s politico-military strategy in the Western Indian Ocean. China has scaled up its engagement in the Middle East, developing relations on different sides of the regional divide. Central to China’s growing presence is the BRI for greater connectivity among Asia, Africa, and Europe. The Middle East is particularly important due to China’s dependency on seaborne energy imports from the region. Chinese investments in ports, storage facilities and soft power projection through increased participation in anti-piracy and rescue missions have enabled China to establish its credentials as a legitimate Indian Ocean power which has strategic implications for India.
After the 2020 Galwan clashes in Ladakh, Indian policy makers worry that the Indian Ocean could become a new front in the regional rivalry given the multiple Chinese military bases in the Western Indian Ocean including Djibouti and Gwadar. The growing Chinese submarine visits to the Indian Ocean littorals are pointedly aimed at dominance over the Indian Ocean’s critical sea lines of communication.
India, for instance, this week sent a submarine to Sri Lanka on an Operation Turn Around (OTR) mission to coincide with Sri Lanka’s Independence Day, to replenish supplies, while conveying a message to China and Maldives as a Chinese spy ship continued sailing towards the Maldives. China uses its research vessels not only for hydrographic surveys but also for monitoring missiles or satellites test-fired in the vicinity. Sri Lanka recently decided not to allow China’s research vessels to dock in its ports for one year. In response, China decided to leverage its growing relations with the new Male regime, opting to use its ports instead.
The new Maldivian government has not only steered closer to China, but in a reversal of its ‘India First’ policy, it has also distanced itself from India and has asked India to withdraw all its military personnel who are deployed in the Maldives mainly for operating and maintaining aircraft and helicopters provided by India for humanitarian and medical emergencies from the distant islands of Maldives. Maldives has also cancelled the hydrology agreement with the Indian Navy to enable China’s marine surveys of the surrounding areas unhindered by the Indian ships. China is unique in using its marine and seabed surveys of the far seas for strategic purposes, including enhancing its anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Given its global naval footprint China, it is claimed, weaponizes ocean surveys which can be used for both civilian and military purposes. India is also worried about the possibility of China developing a naval base in the Maldives and building an ocean observatory at Makunudhoo in north Maldives, near Lakshadweep.
Equally, increased economic interaction with the Gulf States has not significantly increased India’s geopolitical traction in the region. Despite cooperation on regional security, capacity building and training, India is not seen as a serious player in the stormy Gulf; the US is the indispensable security provider. With India the Arab navies prefer to limit their engagement to non-traditional security issues.
India sees its security role in the Indian Ocean not only in terms of trade and energy security but also to guard against increasing militarization of the Indian Ocean rim. In South Asia, Pakistan, Sri lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar have all been acquiring military hardware including submarines. The conflicts in the Middle East have intensified with greater injection of arms. On the Horn of Africa, there is a scramble for bases, with China as an active player supplying military equipment to several East African states. In pursuit of its objectives India has signed logistics agreements with the US, France, and Oman.
India has now deployed over 10 frontline warships with marine commandos in the region stretching from the north and central Arabian Sea to the Gulf of Aden, further stepping up its naval presence to show the flag and deter piracy and drone strikes. This unprecedented ‘enhanced maritime security operations’ are being conducted independently by India which has refrained from joining the US led multinational ‘Operation prosperity Guardian’ launched in the Red Sea in December after attacks on civilian as well as military ships by Houthi rebels of Yemen following Israel-Hamas conflict.
With escalating piracy and drone attacks on commercial vessels threatening critical sea lanes of communications, which has already led to a major jump in freight rates, the Indian Navy is also maintaining a ‘persistent presence’ in the Arabian Sea to help stabilize the situation and promote net maritime security. Regular ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) missions are also being flown by P-81 long range maritime patrol aircraft and unarmed MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones. There is also continuous sharing of information and coordination with all friendly foreign navies.
India has been regularly deploying warships on anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Eden since 2008. On January 5 Indian Naval ship and aircraft had thwarted the attempted hijack of a Liberian merchant vessel and rescued a 21-member crew in the North Arabian Sea. In late January 2024, one of its warships INS Sumatra foiled a hijack attempt on an Iranian fishing vessel and rescued all 17 crew members. The menace of piracy that peaked more than a decade ago and almost disappeared since 2017 has resurfaced after the regional naval forces moved to the Red Sea following Houthi strikes as a reaction to Israel’s offensive on the Gaza.
A key enabler of India’s maritime initiatives has been the Security and Growth for All (SAGAR) concept of the Indian government. India realizes the need for it to be a gentle security stabilizer – a source of positive deterrence and promoter of trade and commerce. India is projecting power in the Indian Ocean in ways that reassure regional states, while pushing back against aggressive posturing by extra-regional players.
The author is a former Indian Ambassador.
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