By Ambassador J.K. Tripathi and Sandeep Tripathi

As the saying goes, there is no permanent friend or foe in diplomacy. All these bilateral relationships solely depend on the national interests of the countries involved and are subject to course correction from time to time depending on the prevailing situation of power dynamics. China and Russia are no exceptions to this.

Around one year of the Russia-Ukraine war, Beijing created a soft strategic space in the evolving Kremlin’s geopolitical calculus. Beijing’s top diplomats’ visit to Moscow, just before the anniversary of the war, triggers the debate. ‘No Limits Partnership’ whether Moscow is a satellite state of China or has strategic autonomy like New Delhi. Also, Beijing sharply reacted that the US is “not qualified” to warn other countries. 

Presently, China and Russia have a common enemy (although with varying degrees of animosity)- NATO led by the USA. In this situation, both China and Russia have come closer to each other, especially since the early days of the Trump administration. As the ensuing war with Ukraine has exposed the chinks in the unity of NATO as well as in the power of Putin’s Russia, Xi Jing Ping found a golden opportunity to support Russia, albeit with caution. The energy-strapped China is getting oil at concessional rates to revive its decelerating industrial growth and, in turn, it supports Russia by abstaining from voting against Russia on various platforms. Though it is not yet confirmed whether China is supplying weaponry to Russia, the moral support and the statement given after Putin’s visit to China on 4th February last year (barely three weeks before the Russian action in Ukraine) boasting of “no limit” of cooperation with its “rock-solid” partner clearly indicate that China is with Russia at least during the war.

Going by the current geo-political scenario, it is not difficult to infer that this war has provided China with an opportunity to ensure a win-win situation. If Russia emerges victorious in this war, China will not shy of getting credit for supporting Russia and will strengthen its position as the senior partner without any major political or defence investment for this position. On the other hand, if Russia does not win the war, China will emerge as the sole big power in Asia and Europe capable to flex its muscles more belligerently against the USA. A defeated Russia will not be of much worry for China which will be able to easily manoeuvre its designs in Central Asia and also obtain a greater concession from Russian Siberia for Chinese farmers as well as for the “Polar Silk Road” projected in the “White Paper on the Arctic” issued by the Chinese Government in 2018. We can describe the current China- Russia relations as a ‘limited détente’ or “a marriage of convenience” at the best. Since there is a growing concern in Russia against Chinese expansion in Siberia and Central Asia, a ‘Sphere of Influence’ of Russia, these issues will compel Russia to restrain China in case Russia wins the war. On the other hand, if Russia loses and China emerges as the sole power in Asia-Europe, it will be a greater irritant for India as we share a long and disputed border with it.

Against this backdrop, India must cautiously choose its path.  Moscow’s proximity with China triggers strategic concerns for New Delhi policymakers regarding Moscow’s choice of either New Delhi or Beijing.  Let me retrospect the historical accounts of the Moscow-Beijing axis. Due to the height of the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet Union’s neutrality had begun to tilt towards China. Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union T.N. Kaul wrote, “Their attitude at the end of October 1962 was not even neutral but slightly tilted in favour of China”. Some scholars, however, believe that Soviet Union’s neutrality should not be viewed as support to Beijing. Then Soviet Union’s President Khrushchev rejected China’s whimsical ideological moorings. Today, geopolitical clout has changed. The “No limits” relationship has evolved especially after the Russia- Ukraine war. Under the backdrop of constant western sanction politics, Russia needs China to protect and promote its “core interest”. In Samarkand, Xi extended Chinese unflinching support to protect each other’s “core interests.”  

Today, New Delhi and Moscow enjoy the notion of ‘pragmatic flexibility’ and speculative assumptions do not dilute the “time-tested” partnership.  Moscow won’t please Beijing at the cost of New Delhi and vice-versa.  New Delhi and Moscow are deeply aligned on core geostrategic issues. On the Ukraine issue, India has abstained from successive votes in the UN Security Council, General Assembly and Human Rights Council.  On the Indo-China border standoff, Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterates No “extra-regional power” should involve in the process.  The Russian ambassador to India, Denis Alipov, viewed it as a “bilateral matter”.  However, New Delhi must be realistic in assessing Russia’s asymmetrical dependency on China. To counter China, Indian policymakers should prioritise the following issue:  

  1. To boost bilateral trade: Russia is still India’s seventh biggest trading partner. Last year, it stood at 25th position. As per the latest data from the Department of Commerce, US $18,229.03 million was registered in the 2022-23 financial year (April – August) due to the high surge of oil and fertilizer imports. China, however, is its largest trading partner.
  2. New Delhi should calculate the existing fault lines between Moscow and Beijing especially the competitive spirit in the Central Asia.
  3.  In the backdrop of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the best option for India is to keep on the time- tested current path of urging the warring sides to come to the negotiating table for a solution reached through diplomacy and emphasize a war does not decide who is right, it only decided who is left! We must not, in any case, act as mediator in the war, but should facilitate in obtaining a conducive environment for the negotiations.
  4. Since China has proved time and again that it is not trustworthy, it is prudent for us to stay with our dependable friend Russia than be fooled by the former.

Conclusion

The war in Ukraine is not likely to end very soon. But shortly after it ends, the public apprehensions in Russia about the bona fides of China amidst the allegations of economic expansionism and interference will resurface to the discomfiture of uneasy and asymmetrical Chinese relationship with Russia, compelling the latter for a course correction.

Ambassador J.K. Tripathi is Former Ambassador of India to Zimbabwe and Cousul General of India in Sao Paulo (Brazil). Dr. Sandeep Tripathi is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Sharda University, Greater Noida.

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