By Lt Col Manoj K Channan, Veteran
The relationship between India and Bangladesh has been both intricate and significant since the latter’s liberation from Pakistan in 1971. India’s instrumental role in Bangladesh’s independence war laid the foundation for a bond built on shared history, cultural affinity, and geopolitical interests. However, this relationship has not been without its trials. The assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 and the subsequent political turmoil in Bangladesh introduced a period of uncertainty and complexity in bilateral relations. India’s response to these events was marked by caution and strategic interest, aiming to balance its support for democratic movements with the imperatives of regional stability.
The Reign of Sheikh Hasina
Over the past fifteen years, Sheikh Hasina’s leadership has generally fostered closer ties with India, especially in counterterrorism, economic cooperation, and infrastructure development. Under her governance, Bangladesh has witnessed significant economic growth, improvement in social indicators, and better regional connectivity. However, her tenure has also faced criticism for authoritarian tendencies, suppression of political dissent, and allegations of human rights abuses. These internal challenges, coupled with the evolving geopolitical landscape, have necessitated a nuanced approach from India in managing its relationship with Bangladesh.
Quota Policy and Youth Unemployment
The situation in Bangladesh, characterised by the quota system and high unemployment rates, resembles the challenges faced in India. Bangladesh’s student protests over job reservations—where 56% of jobs were reserved, leaving meritocracy sidelined—mirror India’s own caste-based reservation system. With unemployment in India alarmingly high at 83%, disenchantment among the youth is a serious issue that needs addressing.
Interestingly, after the Bangladesh Supreme Court suspended on July 3rd the lower High Court’s order on restoring reservations, Bangladesh has no quota policy currently. All reservations in jobs, including the freedom fighters’ “one descendant” quota of 30%, were scrapped by the Sheikh Hasina government in 2018 after a large-scale agitation by students. In 2018, there was no quota until a group of petitioners went to the High Court in 2021 and fought a case to get back the 30% freedom fighters’ reservation in civil services (government jobs).
After hearing the issue for three years, the High Court reinstated the 30% quota on July 1, triggering the recent protests. The Attorney General approached the Supreme Court right after the High Court’s decision, filing a petition on July 16 to strike down the High Court’s controversial judgment. According to reports, the Supreme Court had on July 10 suspended the High Court’s order for four weeks. The Chief Justice had asked protesting students to return to classes, saying the Court would issue a decision in four weeks.
However, the uprising occurred due to the government’s inability to create more jobs for Bangladesh’s teeming youths over 18 and the people’s dissatisfaction with the Awami League’s ten years in power.
Current Situation
Political Unrest and Asylum Considerations
The recent political turmoil in Bangladesh, culminating in the potential deposition of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, presents a complex challenge for India. The notion of Hasina seeking asylum in India is fraught with significant implications.
Perception of Unfriendly Act. Any new regime in Bangladesh might interpret India’s offer of asylum to Hasina as a hostile act, potentially leading to strained diplomatic relations and a reassessment of bilateral cooperation. As this article goes to print, the UK government has yet to accede to the request, considering that the leader of Bangladesh’s opposition is there on political asylum. India may have to give Sheikh Hasina political asylum yet continue to work with the interim government sworn in.
Safety and Security. Given the historical and geopolitical tensions in the region, India may not be the safest refuge for Hasina compared to options like the UAE or the USA. These regions offer better security and less political backlash.
Diplomatic Challenges
The political upheaval in Bangladesh, combined with instability in neighbouring countries like Myanmar and Sri Lanka, puts India’s diplomatic agility to the test. The potential regimes of leaders like Oli in Nepal and Muizzu in the Maldives add further complexity to India’s regional strategy. India’s diplomatic efforts must navigate these turbulent waters to maintain stability and protect its strategic interests.
Security Implications for India -Impact on Northeast India
The instability in Bangladesh has direct and profound security implications for India’s Northeast region, a strategically sensitive area.
Strategic Vulnerability: The turmoil in Bangladesh affects India’s strategic leverage in the Northeast. The Siliguri Corridor—often called the “Chicken’s Neck”—is a crucial narrow stretch connecting the mainland to the northeastern states. Any disruption here could isolate the region, making it vulnerable to external threats and internal strife.
Infiltration Risks. There is a heightened risk of infiltration across the West Bengal border, particularly by minority Hindus who may feel unsafe under a new regime in Bangladesh. This could exacerbate communal tensions and lead to demographic shifts that impact local politics and security.
Increased Radicalization. The potential resurgence of radical elements like Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh poses a significant threat to regional stability. These groups have historically been hostile to Indian interests and could reignite insurgency issues in the Northeast.
Geopolitical Ramifications
Chinese Influence. China might exploit the instability to expand its influence in Bangladesh, offering economic and military support to the new regime. This could undermine India’s strategic position and increase China’s foothold in the Bay of Bengal, potentially encircling India with adversarial forces.
Military Diplomacy. Strengthening military-to-military ties with Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka is essential. This includes robust engagements beyond ceremonial roles, building lasting strategic partnerships and ensuring that these countries do not drift into China’s sphere of influence.
Sheikh Hasina’s State Visit to China
During Sheikh Hasina’s recent state visit to China, her treatment highlighted the growing ties between the two countries, raising concerns in India. China has been aggressively pursuing its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in South Asia, with Bangladesh being a key participant. Hasina’s visit underscored Bangladesh’s strategic importance to China and Beijing’s intent to deepen its regional economic and political footprint.
However, Sheikh Hasina’s abrupt cancellation of her state visit and return to Bangladesh are assessed to be due to a loss of confidence by the Chinese leadership in her government and simmering political considerations in Dhaka.
Critical Aspects of the Visit
Economic Agreements: Several agreements were signed during Hasina’s visit, focusing on infrastructure development, energy cooperation, and trade. China’s investment in Bangladesh’s infrastructure, particularly in ports and energy projects, is part of its broader strategy to establish a maritime Silk Road.
Military Cooperation. Discussions also included enhancing military cooperation, with China offering to supply advanced military equipment to Bangladesh. This move is seen as an effort to counterbalance India’s influence and secure strategic military alliances in South Asia.
Diplomatic Support. China expressed solid diplomatic support for Hasina’s government, signalling its preference for stability and continuity in Bangladesh’s leadership. This support extends to backing Bangladesh in international forums, potentially against Indian interests.
Pakistan’s Role and Implications for Jammu and Northeast India
Bangladesh’s turbulence is not occurring in isolation. There is a growing belief that Pakistan, with its historical ties to radical elements in Bangladesh, is leveraging its relationship with China to create instability in the region. This dual strategy of Pakistan acting at the behest of China has significant implications for India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast.
Jammu and Kashmir
Increased Militancy. There has been a noticeable uptick in militant activities in Jammu and Kashmir, with reports suggesting increased infiltration attempts from across the Line of Control. These activities are believed to be orchestrated by Pakistan with tacit Chinese support, aiming to divert India’s attention and resources.
International Pressure. Pakistan, backed by China, is likely to ramp up efforts to internationalise the Kashmir issue, seeking to portray India as an aggressor and human rights violator. This could increase diplomatic pressure on India at international forums like the United Nations.
Northeast India
Insurgency Support. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has historically supported insurgent groups in Northeast India. The current instability in Bangladesh provides a fertile ground for these groups to regroup and receive support, posing a renewed threat to India’s internal security.
Strategic Encirclement. China’s increasing influence in Bangladesh and its support for Pakistan’s activities in the region point to a strategy of encirclement, in which hostile or unstable neighbours surround India. This limits India’s strategic options and poses a significant security challenge.
Parallels in Domestic Issues
Bangladesh’s situation, characterised by the quota system and high unemployment rates, resembles the challenges faced in India. Bangladesh’s student protests over job reservations—where 56% of jobs were reserved, leaving meritocracy sidelined—mirror India’s caste-based reservation system. With unemployment in India alarmingly high at 83%, disenchantment among the youth is a serious issue that needs addressing.
Interestingly, after the Bangladesh Supreme Court suspended on July 3rd the lower High Court’s order on restoring reservations, Bangladesh has no quota policy currently. All reservations in jobs, including the freedom fighters’ “one descendant” quota of 30%, were scrapped by the Sheikh Hasina government in 2018 after a large-scale agitation by students. In 2018, there was a quota when a group of petitioners went to the High Court in 2021 and fought a case to get back the 30% freedom fighters’ reservation in civil services (government jobs).
After hearing the issue for three years, the High Court reinstated the 30% quota on July 1, triggering the recent protests. The Attorney General approached the Supreme Court right after the High Court’s decision, filing a petition on July 16 to strike down the High Court’s controversial judgment. According to reports, the Supreme Court had on July 10 suspended the High Court’s order for four weeks. The Chief Justice had asked protesting students to return to classes, saying the Court would issue a decision in four weeks.
However, the uprising occurred due to the government’s inability to create more jobs for Bangladesh’s teeming youths over 18 and the people’s dissatisfaction with the Awami League’s ten years in power.
Conclusion
India’s approach to the evolving situation in Bangladesh and the broader region should balance strategic patience with proactive engagement. Maintaining a non-interventionist stance, India must avoid direct military involvement in Bangladesh’s internal affairs and focus instead on diplomatic channels to influence outcomes favourably.
Encouraging democratic institutions and processes in Bangladesh is essential for regional stability. India’s support should prioritise the welfare of the Bangladeshi people rather than any specific political entity. Strengthening intelligence capabilities and diplomatic outreach in Bangladesh is crucial for pre-empting and mitigating security threats.
India should continue fostering regional cooperation through initiatives like the Look East and Neighbourhood First policies. Addressing the instability challenges in Myanmar and Bangladesh while maintaining strong diplomatic and economic ties is vital for securing India’s borders and ensuring regional peace.
Focusing on military diplomacy is also crucial. Strengthening military-to-military relations with neighbouring countries—particularly Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka—should go beyond ceremonial roles and aim to build robust strategic partnerships that counterbalance Chinese influence.
Given the heightened risks of infiltration and radicalisation, enhanced border security and management are necessary. India must bolster its border security measures by increasing surveillance, improving infrastructure, and fostering cooperation with border communities to enhance security and stability.
India must also leverage its diplomatic channels to mitigate the adverse impacts of Chinese and Pakistani activities in the region. This involves engaging with international partners, participating in regional forums, and advocating for policies that promote stability and cooperation in South Asia.
The current geopolitical turbulence in South Asia presents significant challenges for India. The political unrest in Bangladesh, coupled with instability in Myanmar and Pakistan’s activities in Jammu and Kashmir, necessitates a comprehensive and strategic response. By balancing strategic patience with proactive engagement, strengthening military diplomacy, and enhancing border security, India can navigate these challenges and secure its regional interests.
India’s approach must be multifaceted, involving diplomatic, economic, and military strategies to maintain stability and promote regional cooperation. The ultimate goal should be to foster a stable and prosperous South Asia, where countries work together to address common challenges and build a peaceful and prosperous future.
(The author is an Indian Army Veteran.)
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