Maj Gen Ashok Kumar, VSM (Retd)
Leave aside the 1962 conflict between India and China, China has been encroaching on Indian territory almost on a regular basis. Border clashes, skirmishes and jostling by both sides have been continuing since long and the apparent resolutions have largely been a kind of face saving between the parties to the conflict but status quo ante has not been really restored in absolute terms in majority of the cases. The apparent phase of peace and tranquility between both the nations has largely been ‘Advantage China’ wherein it has exploited the Indian market to the hilt. A huge trade imbalance exists in favour of China which has not changed much despite huge decibel levels articulated to boycott the Chinese goods.
Probably a belief has set in the mind of Chinese thinkers that they can continue transgressing Indian territories and still treat the relations as ‘normalised’. This is the approach and argument being advanced by China post LAC transgressions in Eastern Ladakh on a regular basis. In addition to the earlier articulations on the issue of transgressions, the same stance was advanced by the Chinese Defence Minister during bi-lateral meet on the sidelines of SCO Defence Minister’s meet on April 27. The Chinese mindset of never reverting to pre-transgression areas remains largely steadfast.
India is categorically articulating its views about relationsbeing normalised only when the China returns to pre Apr-May 2020 positions.There has been no deliberate move either at the foreign minister level or at the PM level to discuss this issue one on one though some political-diplomatic engagements have been seen including some meetings on the sidelines of some other meets/deliberations during transit movement. It will be worthwhile to examine as to how such transgressions have been resolved in the past indicating a direction of a way out on India-China relations which appear to be moving to a point of ‘no return’. The transgressions apparently resolved in certain locations are ‘Advantage China’ as on one hand it is in physical occupation of large areas of ‘Aksai Chin’ besides now adopting a nuanced approach to delineate LAC in the Eastern ladakh wherein it is accepting a ‘buffer zone’ on the transgression points being purely in its interest.
China’s 1967 skirmishes turned out to be a failed experiment for China as it treated India as a country of 1962 capability. It got heavy beating both at Nathu La as well as Chola. Both the countries talked at an appropriate level and the issue was resolved and further escalation was prevented.
India changed its strategic approach to war fighting in 1965 and opted for an offensive option to checkmate Pakistan. It also demonstrated its military capacity in 1971 which was noticed the world over while it created ‘East Pakistan’ as Bangladesh. India was keeping a close watch on Chinese activities prior to the Samdurong Chu incident of 1987. India took a proactive stance of declaring Arunachal Pradesh as a new state of India on 20 Feb 1987 besides mobilising its troops to occupy a large tract of its own forward areas in response to China establishing Wangdung camp South of Samdurong Chu. The foreign minister then Mr N D Tiwari travelled to China while enroute to North Korea and discussed the issue with his counterpart in China. Issue was resolved and the conflict escalation was prevented though China did not vacate Wangdung camp either then or thereafter at any stage. Wangdung was the Special Security Bureau (SSB) post which they used to occupy in summer and vacate in the winter. This winter vacated post was occupied by China and semi permanent structures continue till date. Even the Indian offer that SSB will not occupy Wangdung location in the future, if China vacates it, was not agreed by China and not implemented.
China transgressed again in the Depsang area in 2013. India also responded by holding the physical positions at the extremity of Chinese deployment. This standoff was again resolved when Indian Foreign MInister Mr Salman Khurshid travelled to China. The issue was resolved but apparently the Chinese extracted some concessions wherein India had to remove some structures in the Chumar area.
The Doklam issue of 2017 also had huge conflict escalation potential as troops both from China and India were facing each other. This issue was also resolved diplomatically though China remained disguised in its comments on the issue. Though China has not returned to the conflict site, there are reports of substantial construction in the Amo Chu river bed by China. Once the face off was over, both the heads of state of China and India met on the sidelines of BRICS summit on 05 sep 2017 and reiterated to avoid such incidents in the future. This seemed to be a political guideline and it was hoped that this would be adhered to by China.
But as usual, China did not honour its commitment, a trait displayed on the agreements with India on a regular basis. China carried out large scale transgressions at multiple locations on the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. Though interactions of politico-diplomatic-military level are continuing to resolve the issue but the requisite push is missing at the apex level. As against the defence Minister, the issue is more close to the charter of the Foreign minister as far as LAC resolution is concerned. Stance of the Defence Minister of China is now well known and the same can be spiralled in the positive direction only either by the foreign ministers or by the head of the states.
The current Chinese foreign minister Mr Qin Gang is scheduled to visit India between May 4-5 as part of SCO foreign ministers’ meeting. A bilateral meet with his Indian counterpart is also scheduled during this time. It is but natural that the issue of LAC transgressions will get discussed. Qin Gang had also visited India on March 23 as part of G-20 meeting but no progress was made on the LAC transgression issue. Unlike India, Chinese ministers articulate the view as per their state head’s thinking and therefore, it will be interesting to see how this bilateral meeting turns out between the two Asian neighbours. If it does not result in softening of the Chinese stance, the relations are likely to move towards the point of ‘no return’ as the next opportunity comes in July wherein India will be hosting the SCO summit to be attended by PM Modi and Chinese Premier Xi Jingping. In an earlier summit at Samarkand in September 22 during the SCO summit, the dialogue between both the leaders was missing. Whether it is going to be repeated in July 23 or conversation shapes the contours of India-China relationship for times to come, will only be known later but it’s generic direction may unfold during foreign ministers meet now .One hopes that ‘dialogue’ is trusted and resolution reached as else one will be heading towards the point of ‘no return’, a disadvantageous construct for both countries.
Author is a Kargil war veteran and defence analyst. He is a visiting fellow of CLAWS and specialises in neighbouring countries with special focus on China.
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