By Group Captain Praveer Purohit
In this very month, 81 years ago, the Americans and Japanese fought an intense four-day air-sea battle in the Pacific Ocean. Historians hail it as a decisive engagement that turned the tide of World War II in the Pacific. Known as the Battle of Midway, it was unique for two things. One, it laid to rest Japanese hopes of neutralizing American naval power and two, the decisive role played by air power in its conduct and outcome. The Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 had brought to fore the deadly punch inherent in aircraft carriers. It also reinforced the offensive characteristic of air power. Preceding the Battle of Midway by a month, the USA and Japanese had fought each other in the Battle of Coral Sea – the world’s first air-sea battle with carrier borne air power.
Fast forward to present. On 31 May 2023, the Indian Air Force (IAF) tweeted about four Rafale aircraft undertaking a six-hour long mission in the Indian Ocean. On 09 June, the IAF tweeted about, “another outing in the Indian Ocean”, this time by Su-30 aircraft that flew for nearly eight hours. Well, the excitement did not end here. The very next day, on 10 June, the Indian Navy (IN) tweeted and released video footage of multi-carrier operations in which both the aircraft carriers- INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant operated in tandem along with a significant element of embarked air power assets. Few media reports gave it a “with an eye on China” twist. Air power practitioners in both IAF and IN would have been more circumspect, knowing as they would, the enduring lessons – both doctrinal and tactical from the aforementioned World War II battles. The importance of air power at sea was not lost on the Indian Navy. Its first aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant was commissioned on 04 March 1961, giving our Navy a head start in carrier operations. Acquisition of the next aircraft carrier had to wait till 1987, even as budgetary constraints and a continental mindset prevented it from acquiring the much needed third carrier. To be sure, Indian air power at sea has made steady progress, due to the experience gained in carrier operations, expansion of shore based naval aviation and modification of IAF aircraft with anti-ship capability. Recent acquisitions such as P-8I and MH-60R Helicopter have significantly boosted the maritime air capability. Yet, a dispassionate and professional analysis reveals, to paraphrase Robert Frost, that we have miles to go before we sleep.
Capability development is a function of many factors, primary amongst these being the national strategy and a military strategy that flows from the former. Since India has not enunciated a national security strategy, the exercise of force structuring and capability development suffers from lack of sanctified guidance. However, examination of factors such as the geography around us, our vast coastline, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), island territories, maritime trade, freedom of navigation in the oceans & Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and the Chinese game plan give us indicators on the capabilities that we must develop. With Indian interests extending not just in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) but also in the Pacific, it is but natural that we must factor the geography and requirements of force projection not just in IOR but in the larger Indo-Pacific.
It is in this context that our air power at sea assumes greater importance. As the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway showed, the outcome of the larger war was decided in air-sea battles in the ocean, far away from the mainland of both Japan and the USA. No system by itself is a game-changer, be it surface combat ships, submarines or ship-based air power. It is the synergistic application of these systems linked with shore-based air power through a robust, secure, reliable and redundant network that acts as a meaningful deterrent to the adversary. It also acts as a comforting factor to friends, allies, and partner countries. The inherent characteristics of air power such as reach, responsiveness, lethality and versatility lend itself as a system of choice to keep own warships out of harm’s way and ensure sea control. Quality and quantity of platforms is both important to demonstrate capability and viable deterrence. Let us examine the assets that can be brought to bear in maritime air operations over the Indo-Pacific. The IN presently has only the MiG-29K fighter that is beset with serviceability problems. The Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) project has still not been accorded approval by CCS which means it won’t be on the operational flight line before 2031-32. Sadly, the interim requirement of IN for 57 fighters to be purchased ‘off the shelf’ was curtailed to 26. Despite trials of the F/A-18 Super Hornet and Rafale-M, government decision on the acquisition is awaited. The present capability may appear adequate for fleet air defence but seems woefully short for strike roles. Shore based fighters of IAF can augment the strike capability but the low strength of IAF fighters and their commitment to many other equally important missions poses a major challenge. Fortunately, the P-8I and the smaller Do-228, accords us good capability in Maritime Reconnaissance (MR). The threat from enemy air power entails us to possess good early warning capability. On land one can deploy several radars and aerostats, but at sea there are limitations on the number of radars (which is a function of the number, types and position of warships deployed) as well as their range. This is sought to be overcome by Airborne Early Warning (AEW). The IN does not have any fixed wing AEW aircraft and hence employs the Ka-31 helicopter for the purpose. Its development began in 1980 and first flew in 1987. The Navy received the first batch of these helicopters in 2003. The mechanically scanned radar has a range of about 150 kms for a fighter class target and it can remain on station for two and half hours. Thus, the only AEW asset with the Navy is obsolescent and its numbers, serviceability and vintage imply the Navy has to do with ‘what it has’ rather than ‘what it must have’. The IAF’s AEW/ AWACS assets are also limited resulting in an unhealthy situation. The answer lies in ship based fixed wing AEW aircraft that have the advantage of better range, time on station and sensors than their rotary wing counterparts. Sadly none of our aircraft carriers can embark such aircraft for lack of a catapult launch system. The helicopter fleet of the Navy still flies the vintage but venerable Chetak and Sea King. Its ongoing induction of the MH-60R is a shot in the arm but the numbers contracted (24) are inadequate against the earlier stated requirement of 123.
Air power can deter and destroy multifarious threats in the maritime environment that emanate from under the surface (submarines), surface (warships) and from air. Its ability to do so fast and without getting close to the enemy would undoubtedly give sleepless nights to a nation without adequate air power, even in peacetime. Chinese expansion of air power is progressing at a hectic pace and given its trajectory and our tortoise like pace, we run the risk of spending sleepless nights. Hence, it is imperative that we invest substantially in crafting a potent capability. To do so, here are a few ‘must do fast’ actions. First, a third aircraft carrier of at least 75000 tonnes, capable of operating fixed wing AEW aircraft and a larger number of fighters requires immediate approval and commencement of work. Secondly, the IAF requirement of 114 Multi Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) and IN one of either F/A-18 Super Hornet or Rafale-M must be fulfilled on a ‘fast track’ basis. Thirdly, the quality and quantity of critical combat enablers in IAF such as Air to Air Refuellers (AAR) and AWACS must be augmented immediately. Fourthly, add more teeth to the anti-submarine/ anti-surface vessel capability by inducting more numbers of MH-60R. Fifthly, increase joint participation by IAF and IN in multinational maritime exercises in the Indo-Pacific. Last, develop a major joint air base in the Andaman &Nicobar Islands and deploy assets that give it full spectrum conventional capability.
Geo-political currents in the Indo-Pacific due to China have destabilized the region. As a Quad member, India can be a major stabilizing player. Neither the littorals in the Indo-Pacific nor China will be swayed by our statements or optics. Hard power is what the Chinese respect. Hard power is also what will enable us to live in peace, focus on stability and ensure development, which is our vision of Security And Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). Our hard power must bring more value to the table. The more valuable our hard power is to friends, partners, and allies, the better our geo-political standing. Enhancing our air power capability is a good start.
The author is a former IAF officer with over 5500 hours of flying experience.
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