By (Mrs) Amb Narinder Chauhan
Post the Korean war 1950-53, Republic of Korea (South Korea) primarily relied on the United States (US) for its security, whereas its foreign policy largely remained limited to North Korea and its nuclear theatre in forcing the importance of balancing relations with North Korea’s benefactor, China.Republic of Korea (ROK)is one of the few US partners in the region to have hesitated to associate itself with the Indo-pacific concept, the core pillar of the US regional strategy. Despite being the world’s tenth largest economy, ROK has been criticized for being an observer of global politics and not an active player. Therefore, in response to the felt need for a stronger diplomatic framework, especially for the Indo pacific region, ROK launched its first comprehensive regional strategy, the Indo Pacific Strategy in December 2022, joining other countries such as India, Japan, Canada, UK, EU, in doing so.
ROK in its Strategy aims to emerge as a ‘Global pivotal State’ by reinforcing its security alliance with the US, diversifying security partnerships, and advocating a free, peaceful, and prosperous Indo pacific. The implementation of the Strategy will be based on three principles of cooperation-inclusiveness, trust, and reciprocity, that neither targets nor excludes any specific nation. The Strategy appears more as a global foreign policy doctrine rather than a dedicated Indo-pacific strategy.
For the ROK, the Indo-Pacific region, besides being economically vibrant, is also home to countries with strategic industries such as semiconductors. Additionally, the region is also challenged by threats to a peaceful, free, prosperous and a rule-based order. These challenges range from great power competition, deepening arms race, lack of transparency and trust in the military and security domains, North Korea’s buildup of its nuclear and missile capabilities, disruption in supply chain networks.
The Strategy is a step ahead from the previous New Southern Policy which had elevated its relations with ASEAN and India in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres, among others, to the same level that Korea maintains with the four major powers US, China, Japan, and Russia. The Strategy is a more comprehensive and an elaborate document as all the major regions in the Indo-Pacific area find mention including the Americas, parts of Africa, Europe, and Asia. Given the centrality of Asia for the vision, two sub-regions standout, namely, Southeast Asia and South Asia. Platforms like the QUAD have been applauded and ROK’s keenness to join initiatives such as on infectious disease, climate change and critical and emerging technologies under it have also been expressed.
While the value of this broader focus remains to be seen, one clear winner is ASEAN, ‘a key partner’ and ‘the heart of the Indo-Pacific region’ and thus ‘central to maintenance of peace and security’. In fact, the Strategy was first declared at the ASEAN-ROK Summit in November 2022. Apart from increasing its cooperation funds for ASEAN and the Mekong region, the ‘Korea-ASEAN Solidarity initiative’ has been announced dovetailing ASEAN’s outlook on the Indo-pacific with the common challenges of digital trade and technology, climate change, environment, and health.
In South Asia stress has been given on further strengthening the ‘special strategic partnership’ with ‘like-minded’ India recognizing its growing market, cutting edge technologies in IT and space,and upgradation of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, even though lopsided bilateral trade remains a matter of concern. The new threats from an assertive China, its growing rift with the USand convergence with Russia, the Ukraine war, the North Korean nuclear resurgence etc. have compelled middle powers like India, Japan and now South Korea to step up their engagement with one another. Learning lessons from the supply chain over dependence on China during Covid, India and ROK have post Strategy agreed to work together on creating resilient and robust global supply chains, thereby injecting new areas. Equally, both remain unwilling to take an overtly hardline stance on China. Given the centrality of India in South Asia and its burgeoning profile among the IndoPacific states, India is set to become a priority in the ROK Strategy.
In Oceania, with Australia new areas of cooperation have been identified, for instance, national defense, defense industry, security, critical minerals, climate change response, and supply chains. Climate change will be the focus area with the Pacific Island states as well, while maritime security cooperation will be the main area with East Africa and Indian Ocean littorals.
A multi-pronged implementation strategy has also been mapped out, namely: 1. Build regional order based on norms and values; 2. Strengthen non-proliferation and counter terrorism; 3. Expand comprehensive security cooperation; 4. Build economic security networks; 5. Strengthen cooperation in critical domains of S&T and close Digital gap.; 6. Engage in ‘contributive diplomacy’ through tailored development cooperation partnerships.
The Strategy has attracted widespread attention, not least because it resembles the US Indo-pacific strategy and outlines growing engagement outside of the Korean peninsula, but also because it attempts to balance the negative impact the shift could have on its relations with China, while seeking to decrease its reliance on the country. China is, notably, mentioned only once directly in the document, as ‘a key partner’ in contrast to the US strategy that describes China as a ‘challenge’. This explains the muted response from China while the US has been vocal in its positive comments. The language in the Strategy also indicates that ROK is seeking partnership and not confrontation with China.Notably, through this document ROK has reiterated support for the US Strategy and Alliance First Policy which is not necessarily the same as the support of US’ conflict with China.
In economic terms, the IndoPacific accounts for 78% of ROK’s exports; 27% of this goes to China apart from dependency on supply chains, rare earth minerals and other critical tools of the ROK economy. The Strategy seeks to change this by speaking of a resilient and stable supply chain and technology given that the economic dependency on the country limits ROK’s ability to act independently. Stung by the sanctions imposed by China because of the establishment of the THAAD air defense system in 2017, thereby impacting both its economic performance and security situation, the Strategy puts a great deal of stress on diversification.
The strategy is not without seeming contradictions. Though the Strategy puts China on notice, ROK is indecisive whether it will join US’s proposed Chip 4 Alliance involving democratic states and their semiconductor supply chains. The Strategy even mentions Taiwan, perhaps for the first time ever in an official document, and the importance of peace and stability for regional security. If not direct, indirect support for Taiwan is implied through increased orientation towards democracies and liberal economies. However, in refusing the visit of former Speaker Nancy Polosi after her Taiwan visit, South Korea made clear its position that it did not want to provoke China. Equally, the Strategy bemoans a regional arms race when ROK’s own defence exports are booming, of course, for commercial reasons.
Additionally, given that ROK faces direct military threat from North Korea, China can act as a spoiler. ROK still depends on China to defuse the tension and to prevent the peninsula from getting embroiled in great power conflict. Yet, the Strategy speaks of denuclearization of North Korea in reversal of earlier policy of denuclearization of the Peninsula! Neither is likely to happen! It is not unlikely that China can hold the intra-Korean relations hostage if ROK were to distance itself too far from China. Due to the increasing assertive behavior of China in the region and internationally, ROK is eager to consolidate its security relations with the US and improve relations with Japan.ROK was invited to the NATO Summit for the first-time last year, reflecting some common concerns on issues like cyber security etc. where NATO sees Russia and China as key adversaries. US-ROK conducted their largest military exercise in March this year.
The Japanese PM’s visit to Seoul on May 6, 2023, after a gap of 12 years has signaled a return to shuttle diplomacy after ROK PM’s visit to Tokyo in March; his cautious personal expression of contrition for Japan’s colonial rule in the Korean Peninsula may ‘open a new era in the relations’ which remain fragile due to the historical baggage. Both the leaders have staked a lot on the relationship even though their respective domestic support is weak.
It remains to be seen if ROK can afford to disengage itself further from China and engage with mini laterals such as QUAD and AUKUS, to counter the influence of China. ROK can be expected to involve itself with more opportunities for regional economic and development cooperation, avenues which are at least theoretically open to China’s involvement as well.
Despite ROK’s new strategic clarity, it will continue to navigate between the China-US rivalry just as India has achieved strategic balance by maintaining relations with Chinaand Russia as well as a major defense partner for the US because of India’s centrality to Indo-Pacific geopolitics. Similarly, ROK looks to maintain autonomy for diplomacy with China.
In sum, ROK’s effective implementation of the Strategy will depend on how it manages regional relations with China, potential economic contradictions between economic growth and supply chain resiliency, and dual security challenges from China and North Korea. ROK wishes to move closer to the US and Japan while trying not to upset China. Unlike the USand Japanthat have expressed varying degrees of disquiet over China, the ROK Strategy seeks to include Chinaas ‘a key partner for achieving peace and prosperity in the Indo Pacific region’. ROK does not appear to have burnt any bridges here and it may be possible to say that ROK’s new IndoPacific Strategy fully supports the US strategy while maintaining good relations with China.
The author is former Indian Ambassador who has also served in the region.
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