By Somit Dasgupta
The next meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP28) is scheduled to be held from November 30 to December 12, 2023 at Dubai. A number of issues are going to be discussed, which will include the global stocktake (GS) report, the loss and damage (L&D) fund, resource/technology transfer to developing nations, carbon markets, etc. Going by the progress made in the past, the general feeling is very pessimistic. Total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2022 are estimated to be around 53.8 gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent (gt CO2eq). To contain the temperature rise to 1.5°C by 2100, there has to be a reduction of 50% of the emissions by 2030. As against this, the UNFCCC has projected that the GHG emissions would be about 53.2 gtCO2eq in 2025, before coming down marginally to 51.6 gtCO2eq in 2030.
Out of all the issues which are likely to be discussed during COP28, only two of them are being elaborated in this piece. The first is the GS report and the second is the L&D fund. The GS report emanates from section 14 of the Paris Agreement and the primary aim of this is to make a collective assessment of how the world community is progressing on climate change. Work on GS is divided into three overlapping phases wherein the first phase (2021 to mid-2023) was for data collection, the second phase (mid-2022 to mid-2023) was for technical assessment and the third phase is meant for consideration of outputs where countries discuss findings and their implications at the political level. These discussions will be held during COP28 and the findings will also be used to step up the nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
In September 2023, the GS’s synthesis report was released, which highlighted that global temperature is now expected to rise by about 2.4-2.6°C by the end of this century compared to 3.7-4.8°C projected in 2010. This assessment is based on the latest nationally determined contributions (NDCs) which cover global CO2 emissions, 91% of methane emissions, 89% of nitrous oxide emissions etc. The synthesis report thus makes it clear that we are not on the required path and that there is an ‘emissions gap’. Most essential is to phase out fossil fuels, scale up renewable energy and reduce carbon dioxide emissions from industry and transport and finally, to reduce methane emissions. Preserving forests and undertaking sustainable agriculture are also a part of the agenda.
Coming to the L&D fund, the idea was mooted in the deliberations of COP27 at Sharm-El Sheikh in 2022. It may, however, be added that section 8 of the Paris Agreement did make a mention of an L&D fund to deal with the adverse effects of climate change but substantive discussions took place only during COP27. Only the concept of the fund was agreed to and further details were to be finalised by a transitional committee (consisting of 14 developing countries and 10 developed countries) in the intervening period between COP27 and COP28. There have been five meetings of the transitional committee till now (including the one held at Abu Dhabi as late as November 3 or 4, 2023) and, as expected, serious differences have cropped up. Disagreements are on account of who all should contribute to the fund, what should be the size of the fund, who should be the beneficiaries, and finally, where should it be housed?
The developed countries feel that the criteria to distinguish between developed and developing nations was fixed way back in the 1990s and a lot of water has flown since then. The US and the EU are of the view that contributions should also be forthcoming from countries like China and the oil rich nations, like Saudi Arabia. The developed nations also made out a case that contributions from non-government sources and other humanitarian groups can also be sought to make it more broad-based. On the size of the fund, the transitional committee declined to make a recommendation, pleading that this was beyond its mandate. Regarding beneficiaries, a view has emerged that only the least developing nations, the island states, and those countries that are ‘particularly vulnerable’ should get the benefit. The problem is that ‘particularly vulnerable’ has not been defined. Even what would constitute as L&D has not been spelt out leaving everything to a subjective opinion.
The housing of the fund is also a contentious issue. Countries like the US want it to be housed at the World Bank (WB). This is opposed by the developing world for four reasons. First, by housing in the WB, it gives a lot of scope to the US interfere in the working of the fund. Second, the WB generally operates through loans whereas what is required by developing nations is grants. Third, there is a hosting fee of 17% if it is housed in the WB which is viewed as an unnecessary leakage. Fourth, getting loans from the WB is very time consuming (takes a couple of years) and fraught with a lot of procedures and will defeat the very purpose of the fund where the need is immediate. The transitional committee has finally recommended that that the fund will be housed in the WB only for a period of four years as an interim arrangement. The developing countries, however, feel that half the battle has been won by the developed world since any change after a period of four years is rather unlikely. Also, contribution to the fund is not mandatory and there is no legal obligation.
From India’s perspective, things are rather hazy since one is not sure whether it would be viewed as a donor or a beneficiary of the fund. In any case, seeing the tone and tenor of the developed world in the meetings of the transitional committee, it is unlikely anything will take shape in the near future. India, however, is bound to be criticised for going full steam ahead on coal-based generation after advocating phase-down (as against phase-out) during COP27. It is the government’s current policy that in order to meet the burgeoning demand, there will be practically no retirement of coal-based plants (at least till 2030) and that India will also import coal and run these plants to full capacity. Frankly speaking, India really has no choice since pace of renewable installation is much slower than required, cheap natural gas is not available, and its performance has been poor in installation of fresh capacity in hydropower.
The author is a senior visiting fellow at ICRIER
Views are personal