By Deepak Gupta

One of the distinguishing, and damaging, feature of governance has been its increasing politicisation, and within it, a deeply divisive political culture, as seen in almost a no-holds-barred divide between political parties and personalities as well as the slugfest between the Centre and the states, particularly where the ruling parties are different. While this has led to many unnecessary controversies, it was almost inevitable that it would cast its long shadow over the All India Services. Simmering over the years with periodic flashpoints, it has led now to the controversial proposals of the Central Government to amend the IAS (Cadre) Rules, 1954 as they relate to deputation of IAS (AIS) officers from the states to the Centre. The fact that states where parties other than the BJP are in power have strongly opposed them while those where the BJP is in power have mostly consented emphasises both the divide and the politicisation. There have been many articles on these proposals, many by senior retired officials, who have dealt with this matter. They have mostly expressed concern while acknowledging the problem. An attempt is made here to examine deeper structural issues leading to this problem and suggestions for resolution to ensure effective cadre management rather than a sudden knee-jerk response that only furthers controversy.

Let us briefly recall the position at Independence. Chief Ministers wanted state services that they could control. Sardar Patel strongly resisted this pressure and argued for an All India Service modeled on the ICS. Officers would be shared between the states and the Centre, and go back and forth. There should be, he said, adequate allowance for ‘provincial susceptibilities’ in a country of ‘multi-cultural communities’, but precisely because of that, the service should be centrally controlled, which alone would keep the service efficient, impartial, free from local or communal bias, party allegiance or political influence; otherwise, it would not be able to act independently or offer resistance to local politics or intrigues. There would be reciprocity in the distribution of advantage between the Centre and the states. This would put the Centre in close touch with ground realities and contact with people, while the provincial administration would acquire a nationalistic outlook and wider perspectives and efficiencies. The services would be centrally recruited. This central control was necessary and must be accepted. Eventually, the Centre must have the last word.

Accordingly, all these years, officers have been coming on deputation to the Centre after names of willing officers are forwarded by the state. From this list, officers are chosen by the Centre to go to different central ministries as per their experience and suitability. Mostly, the states relieve those officers, although sometimes there have been problems. In that case, the officer concerned was debarred from central deputation for a certain period of time. In general, there used to be great interest in officers seeking central deputation. Officers wanted better and wider experience. Some wanted to leave from being in a state which was not their home state. Selection also suggested competency of the officer. A steady stream was, therefore, maintained. Occasionally, the Centre sought services of particular officers, especially for senior positions. States generally agreed, though their consent, and that of the officer, was required and there was no enforcement by the Centre by fiat.

Over time, especially in the last two decades—increasingly so in recent years—the number of officers seeking deputation to the Centre has been declining for various reasons. The Cadre Deputation Reserve is normally expected to be 40% of the total strength of the state cadre. Currently, the numbers from many states are reportedly even down to about 10%. This has created a shortage of officers in the Centre. Therefore, the first of the two proposals to ensure this percentage, or in proportion to the actual strength, is prima facie reasonable and is in the spirit of the all-India service structure. The moot point, however, is whether this is even possible.

The real problem is the great shortage of total officers. Parliament was informed in January 2019 that there were only 5,205 in position against the total cadre strength of 6,699. It seems that cadre strengths have not increased while posts in the Centre and the states have. Further, a couple of decades ago recruitment to these services was severely restricted. A few years later it was increased to 180 annually for the IAS. The Centre has not further increased recruitment all these years although the shortage has been becoming more and more evident. If officers are now suddenly sent to the Centre in proportion, the shortage will simply be transferred to the states where all the action and implementation is. How will they manage? This is now a genuine problem, both for the Centre and the states.

But this by itself does not explain the extreme shortage of officers going on deputation. This has four reasons. First, contrary to its all-India character, 33% of state cadre officers are promoted to the IAS from the State Civil Services. The promotee officers—many of whom are admittedly outstanding—are not selected on merit but on seniority. They rarely go on deputation to the Centre. They also retire 4-6 years after promotion, thus hardly serving any useful purpose. Second, it is expected that officers in the first 10-12 years of service have postings in the districts as sub-divisional officers, deputy development commissioners and collectors. Thus roughly a further one-third of the cadre cannot go on deputation. Third, officers not empanelled as joint secretary, additional secretary or secretary never go to the Centre. Earlier, this category used to be around 15-20%. In the last few years, this has perhaps doubled. Finally, a view has been expressed that officers, especially at the deputy secretary and director level, used to the comforts and perquisites available in the state capitals, are not keen to shift to Delhi. Apart from the accommodation and cost of living issue, getting admission of children to good schools in Delhi is a genuine problem. Of course, chief ministers are also often reluctant to relieve competent (and sometimes favourite) officers on the grounds that they are rendering useful service in very sensitive posts. Some officers, and more of those who belong to the state, accept the relative comfort zone of serving in the state. This is possible because deputation is by choice. Thus more than 60% of the cadre simply cannot go on deputation, and many others are not willing. How then will 40% officers of a cadre go to the Centre?

Cadre management, and the very concept of the All-India Services, has three objectives—ensure availability of adequate number of officers for both centre and states, ensure the federal character of the service by sending officers to states other than their own and ensure that the group of officers constituting the service are competent and capable to help provide good and effective governance in both the Centre and the states. In this context, the serious issues raised above require urgent consideration and resolution, and that can only happen over a period of time. The following measures could be considered.

First, increase direct recruitment annually to 300 from 180 while the strength of the state civil service promotees remains the same as today’s. Ideally, there should not be any such promotion at all and there should only be direct recruitment. They can get higher scales of pay within the state, and those who get promoted through a robust appraisal system, will no doubt occupy senior positions in the state. Alternatively, younger state civil officers should be promoted through a well designed examination and interview system with each officer to compulsorily serve at least one term in the Centre and some to go to other cadres like the directly recruited all-India service officers. They can’t have their cake and eat it too.

Second, remove the artificial distinction between promotion and empanelment. There should be a very intense and robust promotion process through the UPSC. We should pension off those not empanelled or promoted (10-15% at each stage). No longer would non-empanelled officers rise to the highest positions in the state. To ensure capable senior officers in the states, it is suggested that additional secretaries should be sent back to states. Often, in the Centre, they become a mere addendum. Incidentally, these steps will also immeasurably improve performance of officers in general, as also improve the administrative capability of the state. There would not be any choice for deputation except for the time an officer wants to go. At least one term for deputation would be compulsory for all. The federal character of the service will also be strengthened by ensuring that most of the officers remaining in a state do not belong to that state, as is happening today.

It appears from letters of the chief ministers to the prime minister that the second proposal has been added subsequently. These empower the Centre to seek the deputation of selected officers working in the states ‘in certain situations,’ which are undefined, make it mandatory for the state governments to comply, failing which the officers shall stand relieved from a date that may be specified. These provisions could prove detrimental to the interests of the states, and to the service. Fears have been expressed by the states that they can be used to “poach” the most competent officers and, in extreme cases, to destabilise the state administration, for example, by demanding the services of the secretary to the chief minister, the finance secretary and the home secretary at one go, or for “punishing” officers, who while working in the state government, may have taken actions which are unpalatable to the Centre. The timings of the change, following incidents in West Bengal and Punjab, legitimises such fears. Cordiality and mutual adjustment is required, not compulsion and controversy, which could be disruptive in its consequences.

For the officers of the service, there is a worry that an individual officer could become a ‘puppet’ manipulated by the twin masters, either in the state capital or Delhi, with the threat of the latter being much greater. His/her choice seems to have been done away with. All seem to have forgotten the pleadings of Sardar Patel that ‘an efficient, disciplined, and contented service, assured of its prospects as a result of diligent and honest work, is a sine qua non of sound administration under a democratic regime even more than under an authoritarian rule … we should ensure that political considerations … are reduced to the minimum, if not eliminated altogether’. This change makes for greater politicisation of the bureaucracy, not for better governance.

It is not clear what led to these proposals to amend the rules so suddenly. Further, seeking comments is hardly any consultation. The proposals, along with the larger problem and other related issues, must be comprehensively discussed and debated to find mutually satisfactory solutions which promote co-operation, not conflict. Since their conditions of service are being changed, the associations of the IAS Officers should also be consulted. It is indeed a wonder that they have themselves not expressed opinions on such critical changes. One could argue that there could be a barely-visible silver lining on the darkening clouds for them, since both the Centre and the state seem to be seeking more officers from the service. Let us make this so in practice.

Federalism is not just a concept. It is a system which emanates from a deep, democratic conviction that has to be nurtured by institutions, practices and guiding principles. The All India Services are in the nature of sinews which uphold the federal structure. Let us not weaken them. Let us never forget Sardar Patel’s warning: ‘you will not have a united India, if you do not have a good All-India Service, which has the independence to speak its mind …. This Constitution is meant to be worked by a ring of service, which will keep the country intact.’

(The author is former chairman, UPSC. Views are personal.)