By Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM(Retd)
Vladimir Putin has never lost a war. Over his two decades in power, during past conflicts in Chechnya, Georgia, Syria and Crimea, Putin succeeded by giving his armed forces clear and achievable military objectives that allowed him to declare victory. Will his latest initiative in Ukraine be any different? We will see.
Putin’s motivations in starting this war may become more evident in the coming days as Russia continues its offensive. But if his aims are redrawing borders or toppling the current government after quickly taking over Kyiv and asserting control over the eastern half of the country, the risk of a prolonged insurgency, supported by the West, would always remain. The Russians may have calculated that occupation is manageable. It is also not certain that regular Ukrainians are prepared to go for the insurgency, and a flat country doesn’t lend itself to guerrilla tactics. However, Guerrilla forces can cause havoc along the supply lines that will provide the logistic needs of an occupying force.
There is a feeling that once Kyiv falls, the military operations will give way to a political settlement that may put a Russia-friendly government in place. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has agreed to a talk at the border of neighbouring Belarus. It is too premature to guess what will ultimately happen.
There is also a possibility that the war could turn into an insurgency against Russia. Ordinary citizens and a regular Ukrainian army can take up arms with the U.S. and European countries providing support. Russia may end up waging a full-fledged counterinsurgency in Ukraine, including urban warfare and airstrikes on populated areas. It may look like Russia’s two wars in Chechnya in the 1990s, where more than 100,000 people were killed.
Any insurgency with reliable supply lines, weapons, equipment and funds, sufficient number of fighters and sanctuary over the border for medical treatment, training, rest and recoup can sustain itself indefinitely. A long-drawn conflict would sap an occupying army’s will to fight, affect its morale and deplete political support for the occupation at home.
Ukraine’s geography will benefit any insurgency. Ukraine has borders with Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Russian ally Belarus has borders with two NATO countries: Poland in the west and Lithuania in the north. The U.S. and NATO can provide all types of assistance through these long borders. They can also stoke unrest in Belarus by providing covert aid to the opposition of Lukashenko’s regime. Russia has to think twice before chasing insurgents across the border in Poland since such actions could trigger a war with NATO.
With the availability of the latest technologies of drones, satellites and thermal imagery, insurgents will find it difficult to escape occupying forces’ reach. The Russians will label the insurgents’ attacks as acts of terrorism while people in the West will applaud them as the actions of freedom fighters.
A Likely Insurgency Scenario
When conflicts begin, unimaginable and unpredictable outcomes can become all too real. As the invasion started, anti-Russian fervour and homegrown nationalism surged in Ukraine. Russia’s military advantages over Ukrainian forces will reduce as the Ukraine army changes from an organised army to a decentralised and mobile resistance force. A Russian invasion would involve heavy losses including to large numbers of Russians returning home in body bags which could risk backlash from the Russian public. Russians are already surprised that their military investments are being used to kill fellow Slavs and destroy a country with which they feel close kinship.
Sustained occupation of even part of Ukraine would be painful and expensive for Russia. Russia’s military advantages will be much less if the conflict shifts into Ukraine’s populous cities. Suppose Russia finds that it is facing stiff resistance and insurgent attacks. In that case, it is likely to increase the use of firepower in urban areas causing massive casualties and colossal collateral damage. Fighting in Built-Up Areas(FIBUA) or Military Operations in Urban Terrain(MOUT) is a different ball game altogether.
As the Russian army becomes occupation forces, it will be subject to harassing attacks designed to inflict casualties and undermine military discipline. An influence campaign unleashed by the West replete with horrific images of carnage of both civilian Ukrainian and Russian military deaths will aim to sow anti-war sentiment in Russia. It would counter Russia’s narrative that grateful locals welcomed their forces as liberators.
Initially, Russia will take advantage of years of intelligence collection and quickly expose the insurgency’s initial leaders. But insurgencies adapt swiftly, much faster than the large, hierarchical structured armies they are fighting and new leaders emerge. Their agility becomes a huge advantage.
Russia is unlikely to win the trust of a politically distrustful population. Russian forces may become stretched, increasing their vulnerability and presenting Putin with the prospect of a bloody failure. The Chechnyan capital, Grozny, was all but razed to the ground, and it would give anyone pause about taking on Russian forces. If Chechnya and Syria are examples of Russian operations, Russia will likely shift from promising good governance to ruthless repression.
We do not know what is in Putin’s mind. Putin could choose to destroy Ukraine and leave the West to pick up the pieces. A dysfunctional and dismembered Ukraine could suit his interests. Russia’s recent conflicts have been carefully calculated and limited in cost. There’s no guarantee that this would be different. Indeed, Russia has a record of subduing insurgencies, most notably in Chechnya. Whether Russians would accept such treatment of Ukrainians is another question.
Russian Way of Handling Insurgency
Western intelligence officials and diplomats believe that Putin seeks to decapitate the western-leaning leadership in Kyiv and replace it with a government that will be faithful to Putin. Putin does not want to occupy the entire country to accomplish his greater goals. Putin may want a puppet state like Belarus.
Some U.S. intelligence officials believe that, “After the government in Kyiv is dismantled, there will be no opposition within Ukraine for us to support militarily. It’s not realistic to mount an opposition campaign. Putin does not value human life the same way that the free world does, hence Russian troops will eradicate any opposition en masse.” This pessimism is based in Putin’s past behaviour, when more than 20 years back, he supervised a scorched earth campaign to ruthlessly put down an insurgency in Chechnya.
Beyond the brutal campaign to put down Muslim rebels in Chechnya, Putin sliceded off the two sections of Georgia in 2008, that he wanted to control. He took back Crimea in Ukraine, In 2014, he set up separatist movements in two heavily Russian speaking provinces in the east, Donetsk and Luhansk now declared as “independent republics.”
It is likely that the conflict will terminate relatively quickly with a negotiated settlement. It may cede some territory to Russia, install a new Russia-friendly regime in Kyiv and a partial withdrawal of troops. That would allow Putin to avoid the quagmire the West so badly wants him sucked into. Putin will claim that he dealt a devastating setback to NATO.
For years Russia has been waging a disinformation campaign about Ukraine and NATO in a battle of narratives. This information war is continuing. How the social media platforms manage this new situation will be watched carefully.
Though the Russians are very good at offensive cyber warfare, their defensive cyber capability is suspect. Hackers from Belarus are targeting the members of the Ukrainian government and military. GigaTrans, Ukraine’s internet backbone provider, has been targeted. Anonymous group has breached the Russian Ministry of Defense website and has downloaded its contents.
Role of U.S and West
The U.S. can assist, advise, train and equip the Ukrainian intelligence organisations and military. The U.S. is better at supporting insurgencies than in running counterinsurgency operations.
The CIA is a past master in supporting an insurgency. The CIA’s recent experiences in supporting and fighting insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria would come handy for opposing Russia’s conventional forces. U.S. special operations forces have been training Ukrainian forces in irregular warfare. The conflict in Ukraine will give the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) an opportunity for revision of its capabilities, doctrine, organisation etc for its new era of confrontation with Russia.
It is fair to assume that the CIA has provided training and materials to Ukraine for years. In January a Yahoo News report reported launching of a covert CIA training program in 2015 for elite Ukrainian special operations forces and other intelligence personnel following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Most probably, a covert program to organise the resistance to Russia with communications infrastructure, intelligence collection capabilities and operational plans are already in place.
The U.S. and its Western allies would need to provide military assistance to Ukraine including anti-tank guided missiles like Javelins, man-portable air defence systems such as Stingers, Patriot anti-air missiles, anti-ship missiles like Harpoons, cyber warfare support, electronic warfare equipment and other aids. The U.S. could provide the Ukrainian armed forces with extensive intelligence with respect to the strength, movement and logistical support networks of Russian forces in the field. Ukrainian artillery bombardments directed by US-supplied satellite intelligence could kill hundreds of Russian troops.
The U.S. could offer its immense satellite communications capabilities to Ukrainian forces. There would be interoperability problems but these networks could provide more secure and immediate communications than what Ukraine’s armed forces currently have. Ukraine could even use the assets of private space companies.
Examples of aid to support a Ukrainian resistance might include:
· Provide communications equipment, loke tactical radios, satellite phones, mobile computing, night vision devices, unmanned aerial vehicles and power generators.
· Increase NATO Information warfare efforts to counter Russian information warfare and disinformation campaigns.
· Offer non-military supplies to maintain resistance cells including medical supplies, food, clothing, water purification tools, shelter materials, cash, power sources and vehicles.
· Supply demolition materiel, such as explosives, IEDs, fuses and mines.
The more advanced systems may not get delivered in time to ensure appropriate training and integration to achieve full operational capability. But some of the systems can still be deployed with initial operational capability. These may not change the balance of military power between Ukraine and Russia. However, they can impose additional costs on Russians and contribute to deterrence when coordinated with other actions.
Russian army in Ukraine would pose a serious threat to NATO, especially countries located near Ukraine’s western border, such as Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia. It could put Russian main battle tanks, armoured personal carriers, self-propelled artillery howitzers, multiple launch rocket systems, towed artillery, surface-to-air missile systems and other equipment within striking distance of their borders.
America’s military may be having better trained soldiers and technologically advanced weapon systems. What is important, is the ability to use force for specific aims. Russia has developed exactly the capabilities needed to advance its influence in Eastern Europe. The U.S has let its room for maneuver in the region steadily decrease, surrounded by Russian cyber and electronic warfare threats and antiaircraft systems. Capabilities like soft power and economic influence are good to have, but they cannot stop Russian armour to roll toward Kyiv.
Over the past decade and a half Russia has been meticulously rearmaming itself. Russia has transformed the poorly equipped army it inherited from the Soviet Union to a modern mean fighting force, having everything from new missiles to advanced electronic warfare systems. Western capabilities have not increased in comparison. So it is no surprise when Russia showcases its hard power across Ukraine, the West stands by.
President Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, argued recently, “We are 50 percent plus of global G.D.P.” compared to Russia’s unimpressive 3 percent share of the world’s economic output. Nevertheless, economies don’t fight wars; militaries do. America’s economic power is being tested when America threatened tough sanctions if Russia were to invade Ukraine. Mr. Putin did what he wanted to do, betting that hard power would carry the day.
America would like Russia to get bogged down in a long drawn insurgency in Ukraine. It would bleed Russia financially, militarily and morally to a very weak state. Both Russia and America have gone through Afghanistan. Putin is too smart a operator to get into this trap.Events unfolding in next few days can give us an indication which way things will move finally.
(The author is an Indian Army Veteran. Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position or policy of Financial Express Online. Reproducing this content without permission is prohibited).