By Group Captain Praveer Purohit (Retired)
July 26, 2024, marks 25 years since the culmination of the victorious campaign by the Indian defence services to evict Pakistani intruders successfully. This high-altitude conflict was fought over treacherous terrain against an ensconced enemy determined to gain a strategic advantage in Western Ladakh. From being strategically surprising to the moment of reckoning when the nation redeemed its honour, the Kargil saga was also India’s first televised war that brought its grief, pain, bravery and victory into people’s drawing rooms. It also exposed many shortcomings in our higher defence management and national security. After the conflict, the government constituted the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) to investigate events leading up to the Kargil crisis and seek ways to prevent similar future crises. The unclassified version of the KRC report and books written on the conflict have brought out mistakes and lessons. Some lessons have been acted upon, and 25 years later, it’s worth exploring some lessons that have not yet been actioned.
In 1967, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) proposed establishing an Indian Defence University (IDU). The KRC reiterated this need, but the government took another 11 years to grant ‘in-principle’ approval. When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh laid the foundation stone in 2013, there was hope that this long-felt need would materialise. But alas, 57 years after first being mooted and 25 years after Kargil, the IDU is still a pipedream. The Union Cabinet has not yet approved the draft of the bill to establish this university, although it was put up in 2016. This procrastination and inaction have raised costs, besides wasting precious time. More importantly, the IDU was meant to raise the quality of Professional Military Education (PME) within the services, address deficiencies in national security policy-making and act as a centre of excellence for multi-disciplinary strategic studies with a good mix of defence and civilian experts as faculty. Although the defence services have improved their ‘in-house’ PME, lacunae still exist, especially in strategic thinking. Tactical acumen is still the ‘default’ mode, even in higher ranks, rather than strategic brilliance. Wargaming and scenario building exist but are mainly service-specific with a sprinkle of jointness. Inadequacies in civilian inputs and negligible civil-military fusion severely hamper the PME. Consequently, the services construct scenarios based on a limited ‘bandwidth’ that often fails to consider the complexities of modern war, geopolitics and an economically intertwined world.
Before the Kargil conflict, India had fought four wars and spent countless years in Counter Insurgency (CI) and Counter Terrorism (CT) operations. We undertook overseas military operations in Sri Lanka and Maldives, and our troops garnered glory in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). Barring 1971, in all the other wars and conflicts (including the one in Sri Lanka), India’s shortcomings in strategy were starkly evident. This resulted in ad-hoc responses. In February 1999, the then-Indian Prime Minister undertook a bus trip to Lahore to revive the peace process with Pakistan. There was genuine hope for a thaw in the India-Pak animosity. However, this ‘hope’ was divorced from ‘realpolitik’ and the state of powerplay within Pakistan. In trusting but not verifying, we made a strategic blunder that was to prove costly. The failure of the Indian strategic establishment to brainstorm and ‘think through’ such initiatives and muddle through crises prompted calls for a National Security Strategy (NSS). Yet, 77 years after independence, we have still not articulated an NSS that can guide policy and strategy. All leading powers in the world and those facing security threats have promulgated an NSS. The Indian ineptness in addressing the Chinese challenge directly manifests the lack of an NSS. Some pertinent questions arise. Do we lack the intellectual depth and bandwidth required to develop an NSS? Or is it more a case of escaping accountability should a situation go awry? Whatever the case, isn’t it ironic that in a country of 1.4 billion that aspires to be a leading power, has two bothersome neighbours, and faces numerous social and economic challenges, devising an NSS takes a back seat?
Coming back to Kargil circa 1999. The terrain and magnitude of the intrusions made reclaiming our territory an onerous task. The junior leadership of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force were made of stern stuff. Driven by passion, professionalism and perseverance, they overcome all odds. The role of firepower was also crucial. A combination of audacious attacks by the infantry, precise targeting by the artillery and IAF, robust logistics, timely evacuations of casualties by IAF and Army Aviation helicopters, and the incessant life-saving surgeries by army medical officers all contributed to the war-winning effort. Pakistan once again suffered a humiliating defeat. But India’s victory came at a great human cost. The official history of the Kargil conflict has not yet been released, and many unanswered questions exist.
Even if our adversaries have a vote on when to start or end a conflict or confrontation, one expected that at least India wouldn’t be strategically surprised in future. One hoped our soldiers, sailors, and airmen would never be disadvantaged when facing the enemy. One trusted the defence forces would have the equipment required to win at minimum human cost rather than fight with ‘what we have.’ One anticipated the proclivity to resort to ‘emergency purchases’ at the slightest hint of a crisis would be a thing of the past. However, such hopes were belied in April/ May of 2020 when history repeated itself. The Chinese surprised us; we lost our soldiers, and we resorted to emergency purchases.
This July 26, the military will hold solemn ceremonies to honour the brave soldiers who fought for the nation’s honour in Kargil. A fitting tribute to our braves who fought in the conflict would also be to overcome the lacunae that emerged and continue to plague our national security architecture. It is high time the government brings the IDU and NSS to fruition.
The author is a former IAF officer with extensive experience in operations and PME. He writes on geopolitics, international relations, and defence matters.
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