The talks over the Bhutan-China border settlement have raised concern for India. For Bhutan, the border settlement with China is about getting rid of the historical burden, messed with centuries-old feuds over the clumsy border dispute. In fact, it was not until 1998 that Beijing even formally recognized Bhutan as a sovereign state.
Bhutan also looked forward to ending that era of constant skirmishes that often took place over the disputed land between them.
However, can Bhutan overlook India while engaging with China during the key negotiation over such disputes? At least, at some points, the areas of dispute converge with India. The recent remarks of the Bhutanese Prime Minister on the ongoing border settlement with China indicate the drift. While China is pushing through for the settlement of its remaining border disputes with Bhutan likely due to the present aggressive pasture as it thinks a ‘right time’. Look no further as China began breaking all norms of boundary settlement mechanism with India, leading to the Galwan crisis. China shares its borders with 14 countries.
Among all the contentious places, the key issue is a strategic plateau called Doklam – situated close to the tri-junction between India, Bhutan and China. Bhutan and China claim the region and India supports Thimphu’s position. Doklam plateau is a 269-sq km plateau in Bhutan, which overlooks the strategic Chumbi Valley. The plateau is also claimed by China. What is then the state of affairs between Bhutan and China?
Bhutan and China: Clumsy ties
While the border disputes between Bhutan and China have existed for a long time, the matter was flagged in the early 1950s after China annexed Tibet. Bhutan shares over 400-kilometre-long border with China. The point of contention is part of the land in Bhutan’s western districts (269 square kilometres) and northern districts (495 square kilometres).
After many years, the two sides began negotiations to settle their boundary differences in 1984. Subsequently, Bhutan and China signed the Guiding Principles on the Settlement of Boundary Issues in 1988 and the Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the border areas in 1998. Since then, they have held a total of 24 rounds of diplomatic talks. Despite the series of talks which also included the Bhutan-China-India tri-junction measuring 269 square kilometres and the Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys near Tibet, it fetched no concrete results.
Further, Bhutan has a written agreement with China that pending the final resolution of the boundary issue, peace and tranquillity should be maintained. However, in 2017, the China-Bhutan border discourse took a different turn with the Doklam stand-off. Militaries from both countries—India and China— came very close to the point of confrontation. In fact, during the last round of negotiations in 2016, China agreed to a joint survey of the disputed areas and a pledge for further discussions under the mechanism.
“China worked in a pattern as is evident since 2020, the first time, China actually brought Sakteng region in eastern Bhutan into the dispute,” said a former diplomat who had closely observed the development.
While India maintained that the bilateral issue between Bhutan and China is of strategic concern to India where the Doklam Plateau remains just as important to India as it is to Bhutan.
Bhutan-Doklam matters
So, the matter of concern is the Chumbi Valley, a tenuous and treacherous mountain frontier which connects to the Amochhu river. Reports based on surveillance images suggest that the construction of villages by China along the Amochhu river as it triggered speculation that Bhutan has ceded territory to China.
According to the experts, China’s Chumbi Valley, to the north of Doklam, and India’s Siliguri Corridor, to the south of Doklam are among “strategic mountain chokepoints critical in global power competition”. In fact, famed global strategic expert, John Garver has called the Chumbi Valley “the single most strategically important piece of real estate in the entire Himalayan region”. The Chumbi Valley intervenes between Sikkim and Bhutan south of the high Himalayas, pointing towards India’s Siliguri Corridor like a “dagger”.
So, the Chumbi valley has a significant strategic position towards the Siliguri Corridor to the south. The Siliguri Corridor is a narrow 24-kilometre-wide corridor between Nepal and Bangladesh in India’s West Bengal state, which connects the central parts of India with the northeastern states including the contested state of Arunachal Pradesh. Further, the Chinese push toward Mount Gipmochi and the Zompelri Ridge will pose a massive security challenge to not only India but Bhutan as well.
The Siliguri Corridor, a 60-kilometre long and 22-kilometre wide lies in the Indian state of West Bengal, also known as the “Chicken’s Neck”, and connects India’s north-eastern states with the rest of the country, including the Arunachal Pradesh. Often referred to as the “chicken’s neck”, the Siliguri Corridor is strategically important to India which also holds strategic significance to Bhutan, leading the main supply routes into the country.
“It implies enough how the Doklam plateau matters for both,” said a former Indian military chief adding that “the bilateral talks between Bhutan and China over Doklam must embrace Indian position.”
Interestingly, China has already outlined its indications by establishing a military garrison only 60 km from the Brahmaputra River—a clear threat to the northeastern region of India.
“Not doing so is indeed a matter of serious concern, which dents India’s claim position in the overall sphere of Indian foreign policies,” he points out.
The situation is exacerbated as per the recent statement of Bhutanese prime minister Lotay Tshering, where he outlines the border settlement with China. Tshering also said that there was no Chinese intrusion into its territory as the fact remains that China laid claim to the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in eastern Bhutan. A satellite image clearly shows China has also built villages, inside Bhutanese territory, but Tshering dismissed the claims in an interview with Belgian newspaper La Libre in Brussels.
The basic framework of India – Bhutan bilateral relations is the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1949 between the two countries, which was updated and signed during the visit to India of His Majesty Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck in February 2007. The framework recognizes the special relationship which is sustained by the various tradition and pacts—some written and unwritten– at the highest levels between the two countries. It has a firm basis; Bhutan is one of the largest benefactors of the Indian development assistance program with a $282 million allocation during 2022-23. India and Bhutan have a robust free trade regime and New Delhi accounts for 82% of Thimphu’s total external trade. More so, during the COVID-19 pandemic, India was the first nation to send covid shield vaccine consignments. The India-Bhutan Trade and Commerce Agreement which expired in March 2005, has been renewed for a period of 10 years on the basis of such special relations.
“While Bhutan, as a sovereign independent country, has well-meaning plans for the transition which is all about its economic growth and technological progress, it also has to address such security concerns, especially with India as it matters, sums up a senior security analyst.
For India, it is the drift that matters—a gap in its neighbourhood-first policies.