By Col Ronnie Rajkumar (Retd)
On August 15, Afghanistan has completed the first 365 days of rule under the Taliban regime 2.0. It was on this day last year that a military blitzkrieg, spearheaded by rag-tag band of Taliban fighters mounted on motorcycle and NSTVs (AKA Technicals), that reverberated throughout the region and the world, ended at the gates of Kabul City and the advance columns of the Taliban entered the capital of Afghanistan. The white flag of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) was hoisted on the Arg which signalled the start of a new cycle in the turbulent history of Afghanistan that seemingly ended on 13 November 2001 when the Taliban were evicted from Kabul and from Afghanistan by 14 November 2001. The years between the Taliban defeat in 2001 to their victory and conquest of Afghanistan in 2021, has been one of the most violent and bloody chapters in the history of human conflict and will remain the focus of study by strategists and polemologists for time to come.
The Afghanistan of today
Conflict Mapping of Afghanistan: The maps below depicts the geographic concentration of violent incidents in Afghanistan in periods as shown against each and registrers a very significant decrease in violence in the post -15/8 period of the Taliban rule: –
Geographic Concentration Of Violent Incidents: Pre-Taliban Period
September 2020 – July 2021
Geographic Concentration Of Violent Incidents: Post-Taliban Period
September 2021 – July 2022
Please see a comparative table below that gives out the sharp drop in violence levels between 15 August 2020 to 15 August 2021 (pre -15/8 when the Ghani administration was still in power and the US and NATO had a strong military presence in-country) and 16 August 2021 to 29 July 2022 (post -15/8 with the Taliban at the helm of power): –
INCIDENT TYPE | 15 AUG 2920TO15 AUG 2021 | 16 AUG 2921TO29 JUL 2022 |
BATTLES | 5383 | 971 |
RIOTS | 11 | 07 |
EXPLOSIONS | 3420 | 387 |
VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVS | 887 | 771 |
TOTAL INCIDENTS | 12711 | 2136 |
TOTAL FATALITIES | 55,518 | 3958 |
Public Perception
There is an increasing and perceptible feel-safe factor among the general populace from physical harm being inflicted by kinetic attacks that include rockets, complex attacks (CPX), vehicle borne / body borne suicide attacks (VBIEDs / SBBIEDs), EoF (Escalation of Force) and a host of conflict-related incidents that used to take a daily collateral toll of civilian life on the streets of urban Afghanistan and in the surrounding rural regions. The general public perceive that Afghanistan is much safer today than it was in the previous years, and to some, a much safer living and working environment in the living memory of three generations in the conflict-scarred nation. A few, of what I feel are the most relevant factors, are brought out below:
Removal of Fortifications
Immediately after the Taliban takeover, orders were issued by the new regime to remove / dismantle all blast walls, HESCOs, towers, road barricades, sandbags and war fortifications in urban areas. In rural areas, within two months of the Taliban takeover, all checkposts were dismantled, In Kabul specifically, where the most horrendous and devasting attacks in the war were carried out, this immediately opened up space for free pedestrian movement, cut down on traffic congestion and removed the oppressive claustrophobia and fear of being enclosed in a potential fire / explosive zone from lethal attacks. Most Afghans left for work in the mornings never knowing if they would return home that evening. And many did not.
Also read: At Regional Security Dialogue, NSA Ajit Doval calls for enhancing Afghanistan’s capability to counter terrorism and terrorist groups
Absence of Foreign Troops
With the exit of US and NATO from the conflict landscape, there has been a sudden absence of high value targets (HVTs) that the Taliban can target or attack within built-up areas or in the provinces. An unusual calm now prevails over Afghanistan. The movement of US / NATO convoys and MRAPs (Mine Resistant Ambush Proof) armoured vehicles down Kabul’s thoroughfares has ceased. This was a major public irritant and a life-endangering risk in any cross-city movement as when these convoys move, civilian traffic froze on every lane. Minimum safety distance to be kept was 450 meters for an attack by a potential explosive platform on an SUV with 700 kgs of explosives (HME – ANFO) as US / NATO vehicles were lightning rods for SVBIED and even SBBIED attacks. The devastation on the target and to civilians and vehicles in the blast radius was complete. Additionally, the personnel on the MRAPs were ever vigilant to this threat. The Rear Gunner on the MRAP never permitted civilian vehicles to get within 200 meters from the rear of the convoy or to the flanks, else warning shots were fired and often with lethal effect. That was how EoFs occurred. The war of winning hearts and minds of the Afghan people was really lost on the streets of Kabul. I have heard people cursing the US nearly every other day for bringing the war to their cities. This does not happen today.
Something is different… An article in the WaPo that was also carried by the Counter Extremism Project very lucidly brings out that things, whichever way we turn it, are indeed a bit different today.
‘Rustam Haidery, 22, was watching a TikTok video in his bedroom Wednesday morning when a bullet smashed into the window ledge above his head. Leaping up, he saw uniformed Taliban forces setting up barricades in the street below. From a 12-story apartment building on the next block, he thought he heard someone crying for help. Soon, heavily armed men were knocking on neighbours’ doors, charging upstairs and taking up positions on nearby balconies and rooftops. Gunfire was coming from several directions. Haidery and his family decided to flee and soon found themselves in a stream of residents hurrying away from the danger. “The children were scared, but the police escorted us out of the area until we could find a car,” Haidery said Thursday morning, soon after the family returned home. He recalled hearing as a child that the Taliban extremists, who held power from 1996 to 2001, were bullies and killers.
This time, he said, they seemed different. “They are in charge of the government, and they know they have to protect people.” The battle raging that day, which would stretch to more than seven hours, was a high-stakes confrontation between Taliban forces and a group of commandos from the Islamic State, a rival Sunni Muslim militia that views Shiites as apostates.”
Where Things Stand Today…
But all is not well. It must be understood that the reason why
the Al Qaeda, a fundamental Arab organization, chose Afghanistan and South Asia despite differences in ethnicity, religious ideologies and customs, over the Middle East or Egypt, is rooted in faith. The Prophet Muhammad prophesied that ancient ‘Khorasan’ would be the initial battlefield for the ‘End of Times’… So Al Qaeda set out to accomplish this mission. Thus we will find that Afghanistan and its immediate regions will always remain the lodestar for Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) and jihadist fighters. Against this backdrop, we find an insurgency trying to transform itself into a government amidst a milieu of designated terrorist organizations, both foreign and indigenous, that in the permissive Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, find the strategic and tactical space that is less vulnerable to monitoring and targeting by the United States and its coalition partners. They will be able to take advantage of a huge pool of experienced armed labour drawn from former Taliban, Afghan security forces and other militant ranks and will have increased space to forge new collaborations and plan operations in the region and further afield. The US government has estimated that the ISKP could “reconstitute its ability to conduct external operations against the US in six to 12 months while Al Qaeda could do so within a year or two.” India and its global partners, meanwhile, are concerned that the LeT and JeM, which have used Afghanistan as a secondary theatre for recruiting and training, will have even greater room to plan attacks against Indian targets. The Taliban are now engaged in fighting a two-front counter-insurgency campaign against the NRF (National Resistance Front) and the ISKP.
Some points are given below:
NRF: Since early summer of 2022, the NRF started hotting-up its offensive posture despite all the Taliban’s protestations to the contrary. The NRF is stepping-up the tempo of offensives in the Panjshir and Baghlan Provinces and though these are still in the nature of hit-and-run attacks, it is increasing in frequency and ferocity to 12 or more attacks per week and hurting the Taliban where they are the weakest in the Northern Provinces. NRF fighters have gained limited capacity to confront the Taliban but they usually withdraw to mountain redoubts, avoiding direct clashes when the Taliban send reinforcements. Taliban counter-insurgency operations that primarily constitutes of displacement / relocation of locals and population pockets, has caused severe destabilization, both security and economic, in the area of operations.
The map below shows the geographic concentration of areas of NRF activities and violent incidents from 15 September 2021 to 15 July 2022: –
ISKP
The Taliban consider the ISKP to be ‘khawarij’ or heretical extremists. There is a difference in their perception of the world order: the ISKP seek to disrupt it while the Taliban have positioned themselves as a player within the system of nations. The ISKP presents a clear and present danger to a nascent de facto Taliban government. The ISKP’s tactical investment in attacks, though lethal with a high victim yield targeting primarily Shias and Shia mosques, vary in frequency and tactics adjusting to and countering the Taliban’s counter-insurgency strategy. The ISKP has 4,000 fighters mainly bolstered by prison escapees / inmates released by the Taliban.
The map below shows the geographic concentration of areas of ISKP activities and violent incidents from 15 September 2021 to 15 July 2022: –
Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has and will continue to maintain a significant presence in Afghanistan despite all declarations and agreements made by the Taliban. Afghanistan remains a central strategic node for the Al Qaeda and, with the Taliban victory in 2021, the top hierarchy started to trickle back to Afghan soil. The Al Qaeda calls the Taliban ‘Ibnul Balad’ or ‘Sons of the Soil’ and they are the adopted ‘Blood Brothers’ of the Al Qaeda. The historical connections between the Al Qaeda and the Taliban are long and strong with both Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri swearing ba’yat to Taliban Emirs. The drone-kill of Zawahiri in Kabul demonstrates the personal intimacy between Al Qaeda and Sirajuddin Haqqani. It also torpedoes the Taliban’s expectations for obtaining international recognition in the near future. Today the AQIS (Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent), which has sanctuaries in South Afghanistan, numbers about 150 to 400 fighters mainly from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Myanmar and these fighters are represented at individual levels among the Taliban’s fighting units.
The Taliban Regime
The de facto Taliban government in power or the Islamist Emirate of
Afghanistan, is essentially, a motley collection of mullahs, primarily Pashtuns with almost no ethnic diversity and with no women. Majority of these mullahs possess no scholarly background except for religious training in madrassas in FATA and Kandahar and many are bloodied fighters who have clawed their up through the ranks to positions of eminence on Shuras and Taliban councils. Sirajuddin Haqqani is one such example, He is the Interior Minister of the regime and leader of the Haqqani Network (HQN) and now heads the predominant faction in the governing regime known as the HQN Group or the Eastern Taliban. The split occurred in the grab-for-power gambit amongst the Taliban leaders in September / October 2021. The HQN group controls Kabul and about 80% of the provinces (34). The other and weaker faction is the Doha Group and is led by Mullah Baradar. They are also known as or are closely aligned to the Kandhari Taliban (Southern Group). So the Taliban, reputed for its cohesiveness, has already shown deep fissures in the command and control hierarchy well before the first anniversary of their victory (A brief snapshot of the infighting between the factions is covered in a paragraph below). Post 15/8, the Taliban were militarily a much weakened force having sustained significant attrition of its fighters in the continuous battles from April 2021 onward. Hence both factions seek the support of the VEOs and militant outfits now operating in Afghanistan by Taliban patronage and it is inevitable that Indian-oriented jihadi groups like LeT, JeM will be allowed increased freedom to use Afghanistan for logistics, recruiting and planning, that will reduce their dependency on Pakistan.
Read More: India’s approach to Afghanistan guided by ‘special relationship’ with its people, says Ambassador Tirumurti
Inter-factional Clashes (IFC)
Known militarily in Afghanistan as BLUE on BLUE, the first IFC recorded after the Taliban takeover was in early September 2021. A clash occurred in Kabul during cabinet-forming meetings between forces loyal to Taliban co-founder and Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and those loyal to the Minister for Refugees Khalil ur-Rahman Haqqani, a leader in the Haqqani Network. The event has not been further remarked upon by Taliban officials. Additionally, several Taliban infighting events have been recorded in areas where the NRF has been active (The NRF has reported that some local Taliban commanders joined the NRF with their troops and military equipment in early January 2022 and some local Taliban members from Panjshir province, unhappy with Taliban actions, have left the Taliban or were dismissed because they were not Pashtun Meanwhile, Taliban infighting has also occurred due to ethnic fault lines within the group. Although the Taliban predominantly consists of fighters of Pashtun ethnicity, the group has commanders and members of other ethnicities. As the Taliban deploys its mainly Pashtun members into different provinces after coming to power, tensions between the local communities and Taliban members arise. In January 2022, a clash was recorded between Uzbek and Pashtun Taliban groups in Faryab province, where Uzbeks are the majority ethnic group. The Taliban later sent troops to Maimana City to ensure stability. Several days before the clashes, a Taliban commander backed a communal militia as they seized lands from Uzbeks in neighbouring Sar-e Pol province. These events suggest that the Taliban’s policies around ethnic minorities may be causing tensions among Taliban factions themselves. The highest number of reported fatalities resulting from a single event of Taliban infighting occurred along the Tajikistan border in January 2022. The Tajik president has expressed concern over the presence of Taliban forces along the border, though the Taliban denies the fighting took place.
The map below shows the IFC incidents between August 2021 to March 2022: –
Poverty Factor
The population in Afghanistan stands at 40,779,147 today with a poverty rate projected by UNDP at an abysmal 97% in 2022 and unemployment rate expected to be 25% by end 2022. The primary cause for this catastrophe is the lack of education (47% literate), lack of employment, biting drought and the toll of war. The Taliban has done away with meritocracy and has enforced an edict that only males who have fought the ‘jihad’ will be considered for any employment hence Taliban fighters with no education or skillsets are occupying positions which move the wheels of competent governance. Therefore a significant ‘brain drain’ is taking away professionals – in fact this started in 2016 when many educated Afghans read the tealeaves – who are leaving by the day via Pakistan or Iran. Afghanistan carries a very young population with a median age of 18.4 years and with the melting away of this national asset, only the aged and infirm will remain. Poverty has hit hardest in the rural hinterlands which were the traditional strongholds of the Taliban. Even with 2,000 clinics under the aegis of WHO functional in Afghanistan, it is just not enough as many areas are inaccessible and some are just no-go areas with UXOs and ERWs littering the area. I am not touching on women’s rights or girl’s education as enough has been discussed and written on the subjects. Suffice to state that no girl has a future in today’s Afghanistan. People I know with daughters are desperately seeking an exit from the country. An Afghan who I know intimately as a colleague, with two daughters, and with whom I spoke to this week, is trying for a visa to Pakistan. Any port in a storm.
Provisions and the Supply Chain
The rising cost of basics is affecting the livelihood of households. Some prices I obtained (as on August 8) are as under:
Petrol: Afg 88.
Diesel: Afg 95.
Rice: Afg 135 / kg,
Flour: Afg 52 kg.
Oil cooking: Afg 1100 / 5 litres.
Mutton: Afg 550 / kg.
Nan (220 gms): Afg 220.
(01 US dollar = Rs 79.63 and AFG 89)
At a glance, not too costly vis a vis India but we have to keep in mind the lack of liquid cash in most households due to unemployment. Though Afghanistan is portrayed as the land of ‘kebabs’ and ‘kabuli pulao’, it is not so as every day is not a ‘meat day’ and most Afghan family meals are very simple – nan, vegetables mainly potatoes and / or red beans. So with the rising costs of groceries, the Afghan household has to stretch the Afghani to feed their children. All provisions are transported by road through the Torkham Dry Port via Jalalabad to Kabul. This 228 km HW (AH 1) is fraught with danger – through the years 2001 to 2019, the Taliban had laid ambush to numerous oil tankers and supply trucks of NATO and the Afghan government. Today their supply routes are being interdicted by the ISKP and armed bandits, forcing the Taliban to detail the Taliban police to ride shotgun on these convoys. Latest inputs indicate that the elite battle-hardened Badr 313 Unit has been given the responsibility.
Conclusion
In the present context, what is the most disturbing is that a whole set of known unknowns have sprung up with the loss of the HUMINT assets on ground and intelligence gathering technical platforms. Afghanistan today presents very opaque optics to correctly assess and monitor what is actually happening, what new threats are developing, what are the militant groups movement flows, new leaderships, new groups or new partnerships being forged. Threats cannot be predicted nor timely responses be planned. What are the alternatives? For the western world – develop intelligence sharing partnerships with Pakistan? A maybe. For India? A food for thought… Jai Hind
Note by the Author: The points covered here, as in most of this article, are not ordinarily touched upon by media, as I have attempted to bring out aspects from my own personal experience having lived and worked In Afghanistan as a Security Advisor for 12 years. In my organisation we worked outside ‘the wire’ as most projects were in remote areas where armed escorts are an invitation to trouble. This afforded me a unique opportunity to work and learn from my team of Afghan security supervisors. Some points included in this article are as gleaned from personal friends, contacts and colleagues who still live in Afghanistan and with whom I keep my contact alive. And I owe my life to these gallant Afghans who kept me safe to return home…
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position or policy of Financial Express Online. Reproducing this content without permission is prohibited.