The global balance of power is slowly but surely shifting. America decided, earlier this year, to put its fiscal interests ahead of continuing the war in Afghanistan. Last month, Britain announced cuts to its armed forces that will severely constrict its ability to project power at sea and on land. Barely two days later, America promised $2 billion of further military aid to Pakistan, prompting fears of a military imbalance in India?s own neighbourhood.
India?s military chiefs have been uncharacteristically open about some of the new strategic challenges facing India, and about some of the possible solutions. The country?s new military doctrine emphasises greater strategic reach in the Indian Ocean, the risks posed by asymmetric threats and?most controversially?the need to develop a capacity to wage a simultaneous two-front war against China and Pakistan. It almost goes without saying that they have stridently condemned the US?s latest offer to Pakistan, arguing that the weapons and technology could be used against India.
All of this is eminently sensible for an aspiring regional power, particularly when India continues to feel threatened by border disputes with its two most militarily capable neighbours. But it may not be adventurous enough in the current strategic climate, especially for a country that seeks a seat at the world?s top table. As the scope of India?s national interest expands and the shared threats facing major powers increase, we need to think more seriously about how to harness the shifting strategic climate to its own quest for greater global power.
Today?s most prominent emerging strategic threats?cyberwar, internationally networked terrorism and the risk of ?dirty bombs??derive much of their power from the attacker?s ability to deny ownership of a strike and to act without giving any notice at all. The Mumbai attacks were textbook examples. Many criticised India?s lack of strategic retaliation in the wake of the attacks. But even the traditional strategic alliances have yet to develop workable responses to a world in which formal declarations of war may become the exception rather than the rule.
In today?s climate, deniable or asymmetric attacks are as big a challenge for India as conventional military threats. Being able to identify perpetrators through intelligence and scientific work will be key to countering them, as will be the ability to convince the world of the legitimacy of reprisals against identified perpetrators. Strategic defence is not just a matter for the military. It is also about new diplomatic strategies and a more robust approach to cyber-security in government and in the private sector. Changing public perceptions of security and defence is crucial to making this shift happen.
The public?s view of India?s declared status as a nuclear power will also have to become more nuanced. Too often in India?as in Pakistan?the nuclear stockpile is taken to be an uncomplicated symbol of India?s military strength. The reality is more complex, not least because India?s deterrent is focused on a regional threat rather than a global one. Being declared nuclear powers limits both India and Pakistan?s military options?neither can afford to come close to winning a conventional war for fear of a last-ditch nuclear strike.
Another strategic consequence is that Pakistan?s conventional military capability cannot be allowed to slip too far below India?s, for fear of tipping its military doctrine decisively towards the tactical battlefield use of nuclear warheads or pushing it to encourage even more destructive asymmetric proxy attacks on India; India?s nuclear weapons constrain its ability to argue for a weaker Pakistani military.
India?s real opportunities lie outside the immediate regional context. For example, India could choose to become indispensable to the protection of weaker coastal states, global shipping and even the global flow of oil. If India extends its strategic patrolling role eastward into the Southeast Asian littoral, it would stand alongside the US and Australia as key brakes on China?s strategic and economic ambitions. China threatens India?s cyber-networks just as much as those in the US and Europe, and countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan incubate militant networks that threaten India?s cities just as much as those in the West. Here, India?s readily available pool of tech-wizards and deep regional expertise could become indispensable strengths. India needs to learn to trade these strengths for what it lacks: supercomputer technology, cutting-edge interception technology and sufficient numbers of highly-trained linguists. This will involve accepting closer ties to America and Britain?and in the process forgoing the luxury of denying a ?strategic tilt? (as PM Manmohan Singh was able to do in Malaysia). But, as with India?s nuclear warheads, there will inevitably be a price to pay if India wants to exercise the trappings of greater international power.
India can grab a greater share of global power as the world realigns itself, but it will have to let go of its wariness of superpowers and its postcolonial baggage in order to do so. Call it alliance-making or a convergence of strategic interests: great powers can never go it alone.
The author is a researcher in the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Cambridge