The Economist, to which I am a long-standing subscriber for its well researched, strategically focused and well written pieces, has for once got it completely wrong. In its latest issue, its leader on the Indo-US Nuclear Deal makes out that China?s rise ?is perhaps the fundamental impetus behind it.? Nothing in my view could be farther from the reasons for which India has pursued this initiative with such purpose, persistence and pragmatism. We would do well to understand the contribution of the Deal to India?s vital interests so that it does not fall prey to partisan politics, Left wing rhetoric or external opposition.
The Economist?s opposition to the Deal is based almost entirely on the desire to keep the Nuclear Powers cartel (not to be confused with the 45-strong nuclear producers) as small a group as possible. It is no coincidence that these are also the permanent members of the UN Security Council. What else is so sacred about the flawed Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that exceptions cannot be made to it when at its very inception its proponents, the nuclear powers, chose to assume that countries which already had nuclear weapons simply did not matter? By making India an exception to the NPT (which India, Israel and Pakistan never signed), it argues, the US is inviting others to go the same route. It is disingenuous to equate India with all and sundry. In doing so The Economist ignores India?s unblemished record on non-proliferation, its requirements of frontline technologies to improve its industrial competitiveness, and most importantly, the necessity for the economy to diversify its energy sources. In their single-minded focus on maintaining the existing nuclear cartel, The Economist and its ilk conveniently forget that there is also the real issue of global climate change.
India will never emerge as a frontline state in any possible attempt to contain China. Those who think or wish otherwise give too little credit to the inherent wisdom in these two longest surviving civilisations which uphold pragmatism and accommodation. No doubt the two rising powers will continue to compete for influence in Asia, Africa and globally, but isn?t that similar to healthy competition amongst the declared nuclear powers?
For India, the least of the reasons for the Deal is to use it to become a stronger nuclear weapons power. It could attain this status, if it so wanted, without the Deal. In fact, the main opposition to it at home has come from those who felt that the Deal imposes unacceptable constraints on India?s future status as a nuclear weapons power. The Deal, if anything, will put India?s nuclear programme under stricter international safeguards. India has pushed hard because the Deal, while giving the required fillip to its renewable energy programme, has many positive externalities for India. It will help India raise the share of nuclear energy, currently at a mere 4%, to nearer 20%, as compared with 60% in France and Japan. This is good news for the global fight against climate change. The Deal will also signal to foreign investors that India represents a preferred investment destination. Indian industry will finally get access to frontline commercial technologies that will facilitate its transition to mass manufacturing and higher productivity.
Seen thus, this initiative could rank even more strategically momentous than Nixon?s China gambit. By bringing closer together the world?s two largest and thriving democracies, it will create a powerful coalition of soft power in favour of human rights and accountable governance in the world. A stronger trust-based Indo-US relationship could also result in a more balanced US approach towards difficult global issues. It could, for example, make for greater Indian influence on US positions on global Islam, thereby helping to nuance it with the deeper Indian understanding of cultural and religious coexistence and mutual respect for diversity in social and political discourse and behaviour. Moreover, the two countries also represent successful multi-ethnic, pluralist societies where diversity and individual rights are celebrated and institutions are nurtured and strengthened, despite the occasional knocks. For a globalising world, in which these will be not just desirable but necessary features, an Indo-US soft power alliance built on these principles would be a positive force.
Once India does become a guest and later a full-fledged member of the nuclear group, it would bring back to the international negotiating table its most deeply held and traditional position on universal disarmament. That really is the only feasible way forward in a world with blurring national boundaries and diminishing role of nation-states. So, let us hope that the Indo-US Nuclear Deal will receive unequivocal support from the NSG, the international community and the domestic political class. It will face the inevitable hurdles in the US Congress and Indian Parliament, but should cross them. That would be the appropriate response to those masquerading as guardians of non-proliferation.
?The author is director and chief executive of Icrier, a Delhi-based think tank, and member of India?s National Security Advisory Board