Acknowledging errors is a rarity among political parties, especially those hardened by long terms in power. Drunk from holding office for years, ruling parties become sclerotic and turn a blind eye to gross failures of omission and commission. Marxist-Leninist and Maoist political parties undergo even more excruciating self-introspection pangs because they equate the state with the party and believe in their own indispensability even if the masses want to see their backs.
The recent post-electoral debacle brainstorming session of the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM) conformed to this truism by pinning mild blame on the entire Central Committee instead of identifying individual culprits or questioning the innate contradiction of its brand of ?market Leninism?. By resorting to the alibi of ?collective responsibility? for defeat, the CPM attempted to diffuse criticism for the colossal blunders of its top politburo leaders. It was a typical cover-up, comrade style.
Historically, leadership change has been a necessary precursor to at least partial acknowledgement of communist parties? errors. The ascents of Nikita Khrushchev in the Soviet Union and Deng Xiaoping in China were essential for ?de-Stalinisation? and ?de-Maofication? respectively. To expect a clean breast from a party leadership that remains unchanged is pie in the sky. The groupthink fostered by peremptory communist bigwigs can only be exposed after they exit the scene.
Yet, despite leadership turnover, genuine stocktaking of prior faults is an oddity in communist parties. When Khrushchev denounced Stalin?s dictatorial rule in February 1956 to a closed session of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), it shocked his listeners but fell short of a complete exposure of his predecessor?s brutality. Wary of the still-formidable power of conservative elements in the party, Khrushchev had to step gingerly or risk an internal coup. Hungary and Poland?s communist parties followed the USSR?s example and went through their own versions of limited de-Stalinisation in 1956, but people?s dreams of capitalising on them were cut short through Soviet invasions and threats in a Cold War context.
The process of accounting for Stalin?s three-decade-long tyranny could only peak briefly in 1961, before fading away in 1964 when Brezhnevite reactionaries ousted Khrushchev from power. The CPSU?s case buttresses the general pattern, wherein continuity of power struggle and factionalism prevents wholesale turning over a new leaf and permits only a ?balanced? admission of past flaws.
This was evident in the post-Mao jousting within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In June 1981, the eleventh Central Committee of the CCP resolved that the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) had damaged the country, but described Chairman Mao as having erred in the cautious ratio of ?70% right and 30% wrong?. No wholesale repudiation of Mao-era excesses was possible, as that would have opened the floodgates for people to agitate and challenge the party?s monopoly on power. Also, balancing of several factions within Deng?s reformist coalition necessitated a mild expos? of Mao?s crimes. Any extensive damage done to the Maoist legacy would, by extension, be egg on the face of the party itself.
Even this less-than-honest ?Resolution? of the CCP took more than one year to draft and was circulated in multiple versions to the opaque politburo before being approved. The speed and depth of mea culpa in communist parties is thus a function of the balance of power among competing coteries. That the CPM did not come out with a wholesale rethink of its individual and systemic foul-ups after its electoral drubbing is a reflection of its internal groupings and ego tussles.
In totalitarian communist parties, every hand is bloody. Khrushchev and Deng wanted all the censure to be laid at the door of their deceased former bosses so that their own skeletons stayed locked in cupboards. The inherent cruelty and degradation of state-enforced Marxist systems was never questioned either by Khrushchev or Deng, as that would have brought the roof crashing down (? la Gorbachev in 1989-91). Communists, who are prone to a holier-than-thou rhetoric in politics, have a lot to hide and are hence immune to full repentance.
Unlike the CPSU and the CCP, CPM exists in a democratic political framework. Its election debacle is a turning point that is equivalent to the death of Stalin or Mao. But not even a limited ?de-Karatisation? or ?de-Buddhadebisation? is currently on the cards. A severer shock of getting dislodged from power in West Bengal in elections scheduled for 2011 might be needed for an unambiguous accounting of past mistakes to commence. Unwilling bosses and satraps have to be retired or interred before the party?s crimes in Singur, Nandigram, Lalgarh etc can be officially conceded and its victims rehabilitated.
?The author is associate professor of world politics at the Jindal Global Law School