Whichever way one looks at it, there is no escaping the fact that President Barack Obama?s first Asian tour beginning this week is about coping with the rise of China and its irrevocable impact on the political and economic structures of Asia.
Whether it is managing the new strains in the US alliance with Japan, unveiling a new engagement with Myanmar, the first ever collective meeting with the leaders of Southeast Asia, or trying to roll back North Korea?s nuclear weapon programme, the US is being compelled to come to terms with the consequences of China?s rise.
During his four-nation tour, Obama will find that Asia is less amenable than Europe to his undeniable charm and that negotiating its changed geopolitical landscape is not easy.
Asian leaders in general, tend to be wary of the Democratic administrations, which are protectionist in their economic orientation and somewhat unpredictable in their security politics.
On top of it comes the unfolding shift in Asian balance of power in favour of China over the last decade, when the US was preoccupied with its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Worse still, the global financial crisis has removed the traditional Asian awe about the invincibility of American capitalism.
Obama does recognise the essence of the change that has taken place in Asia?that China?s emergence as the dominant power in the region has come much quicker than anyone in Washington had anticipated. Nor do his Asia advisors need any lessons from history, which suggest that big changes in distribution of power often lead to conflict among nations.
Obama?s main message during this visit is simply that the ?US is here to stay in Asia? and that it is determined to maintain its leadership role in the region.
Asian leaders, who tend to be polite to a fault, will not ask the question that will be at the top of their minds?tell us how? For the real question is about the ability of the US to adapt to the new power realities in Asia.
Let?s begin with China where Obama will arrive after a stopover in Tokyo. Obama is probably the first US President who did not attack the China policy of his predecessor during the campaign and restore business as usual once in office. For it can no longer be business as usual with China.
The financial crisis has revealed the extraordinary economic interdependence between China and the US. This has made it a lot more difficult for the current leaders to play the so-called ?China card? whenever convenient.
The crisis not only underlined the new importance of China in resolving the US economic dilemmas, but also the challenge of defining a new framework for the bilateral relationship with
Beijing.
During the Bush years, the term ?stakeholder? came to define Washington?s engagement with Beijing. This, in turn, meant that China must ?prove? itself before it can be accommodated into the world system.
Amidst the changed Asian balance after the financial crisis, Beijing has enough clout to demand an accommodation on its own terms. This is not something the US has been used to since the end of the Second World War.
The challenge before the US is as daunting in the case of its long-standing ally, Japan, which is the first stop for Obama this week. Although Washington knew that political change was imminent in Tokyo during the recent general elections, it has not been prepared for the foreign policy consequences.
As the new Japanese political leadership puts a new emphasis on engaging a rising China and Asia and demands a reorganisation of the alliance with the US on equal terms, Obama will be hard pressed to hold on to what Washington calls the very cornerstone of US strategic edifice in Asia.
In South Korea, the final stop for Obama, addressing the nuclear challenge of North Korea is not the only issue that is on top of South
Korean leaders? minds. Although the alliance seems secure for the moment, volatility in US relations with Korea is never too far below the surface. Meanwhile, Obama is bound to face questions in South Korea on his reluctance to push for an early US Senate ratification of a bilateral free trade treaty that was signed in 2007.
That brings us to the broader challenges that Obama confronts on Asian economic regionalism. In Singapore, Obama?s third stop, the President will participate in a summit of the Asia-Pacific leaders and sit down for the first time with leaders of the 10-nation Asean.
At precisely the moment that China has emerged as the main engine of economic growth for East and Southeast Asia, the protectionist sentiment in Washington is at a high, thanks to the financial crisis and the hold of trade unions on the Obama administration. If the ?business of Asia is business?, Obama?s trade policy portfolio during his Asian tour looks a little empty.
Obama?s decision to cut short his carefully planned Asian tour by a day, in order to attend a ceremony for the victims of a recent shooting rampage at a US Army base in Fort Hood, Texas, points to something that Asian leaders might not easily appreciate.
The US itself is in the throes of domestic political and economic change?and that might well turn out to be the single-most important variable in the American ability to cope with a rising China and a transformed Asia.
The author is Henry A Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy & International Relations at the Library of Congress, Washington, DC