India?s general election has been focused on domestic issues, particularly those of growth and equity. I have suggested in previous columns that the latter dimension should include more than just questions of income distribution but also equal respect for different religious and cultural traditions within India. In this context, statements such as the one that opponents of the BJP prime ministerial candidate had better move to Pakistan (and the weak response from within the party) are a cause for concern. Such statements also illustrate the spillovers to foreign policy from the ideology that is seen by the BJP to define the nation.
Both Russia and China are interesting comparison cases for India. Both have authoritarian governments, under the veneer of democracy (very thin in China?s case), so they might seem different from India in that respect, but India has shown itself vulnerable to autocratic impulses in the past. Both Russia and China have national visions based on ethnic and cultural homogeneity that have spelled trouble for minorities within their borders and for neighbouring countries. Both nations have nurtured senses of grievance based on the historical conduct of Western powers. The result of these patterns of thinking has been a world that is riskier than it needs to be, one where foreign policy is based on emotion rather than on long-term welfare of the globe.
Of course, there are differences as well. China has pursued a strategy of economic reform and growth in a tightly controlled political environment. It has a degree of collective leadership and some distribution of regional power that creates checks and balances. It also uses its masses sparingly in whipping up sentiment against neighbours that threaten its regional hegemony. The leadership?s goal is to manage a transition to great power status?for China, a place once again at the centre of the world.
The Russian case is more worrying. Because it underwent a disorderly transition to economic and political freedom after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has a much stronger dependence on its oligarchs, who have been part of a nexus of economic and political power. There has been some freeing up of the economy in day-to-day matters, but the levers of control are concentrated in very few hands, with a degree of centralisation that is perhaps not too different from Communist days. On top of this, Russian ethnic nationalism, mingled with the conservatism of the Russian Orthodox Church, has fuelled a kind of paranoia about the West. How else can one explain Russia?s actions in Ukraine? The annexation of Crimea was not ultimately about real strategic fears, but about bare-chested posturing.
The question for a new NDA government (assuming that is what will come to pass) will be how it positions itself in the world, as well as with respect to its own citizens. The current government has relapsed into a kind of wishy-washy 21st century version of non-alignment, being subtly pushed around by China, playing along with Russia, and suspicious of a United States that is both arrogant and incompetent in its policy towards India. A new foreign policy stance needs to be more focused on India?s long-term economic interests: it is an accumulation of economic clout that will give India some measure of weight in global affairs. This new stance requires a deliberate and diverse build-up of ties with a range of economic powers, especially in Southeast and East Asia. That should not be difficult, if it receives high-level attention.
The greater challenge will be not just to avoid bullying and demonising India?s neighbours, but to engage with them in a positive and constructive manner. The present government has actually not done too badly in this respect. One danger is that India under a new government will become a version of Putin?s Russia, driven by ego and insecurity, and destabilise the region. A slightly better outcome would be to follow the Chinese example, in which aggression is more controlled, but this example, too, is partly driven by desires to recover past glory and dominance.
The best course of action for Indian foreign policy is to build its economic links with Southeast and East Asia. More and more, those economies also have reasonably open societies and democratic political systems.
Countries such as Australia have already made progress in creating more diverse versions of traditionally narrow conceptions of nationality. Others are struggling more with this opening, but may move in that direction as they develop economically, since they, like Australia, need to be open to keep developing.
It would be a shame if India traps itself into mimicking Russia and China, whether in domestic policy or foreign affairs. Adding a belligerent India, driven by an ideology of grievance, to an already uncomfortable geopolitical mix will not do the country or the world any good.
The author is professor of economics, University of California, Santa Cruz