It can be nobody?s claim that India?s remarkable growth over the last two decades has eradicated all forms of poverty and under-development. It is also difficult to dispute the fact that those parts of the country (mostly in central and eastern India) that are now in the grip of Maoist rebels are the most under-developed. But to then argue, like some sympathisers of the Maoist cause do, that somehow the influence of private capital (and the accompanied ?exploitation?) is responsible for the Maoist uprising, is incorrect. It is equally incorrect to argue that the Maoists, who cling onto a violent and failed ideology, are somehow acting in the interests of uplifting the people (mostly tribals) of the regions they now claim to dominate. Here?s why.
Think back to what perpetuated the under-development in the first place. It wasn?t the presence of massive amounts of private capital (that usually leads to the opposite in development outcomes) but rather the complete absence of it. The famous Left-wing Cambridge economist Joan Robinson once quipped that the only thing worse than being exploited by markets was not being exploited by markets.
The absence of markets in India?s poorest regions was, of course, directly linked to the absence of even a semblance of the authority of the state in these regions. To function at all, markets need institutions of the state that can set and enforce some basic rules of the game. But since the state abdicated its role, markets or private capital never had a chance. It was this combination of complete state failure and complete market failure that created a vacuum both in terms of development and in terms of a structure of governance. The scenario was perfectly laid out for some group or the other to fill the vacuum and the Maoists did so.
India?s experience with this type of insurgency is hardly unique. Hardline Left-wing revolutionaries found similar vacuums and occupied them in a number of countries?Shining Path in Peru and Farc in Colombia are notable examples. The pattern is uncannily similar. The complete absence of state and markets creates pockets of deprivation and under-development. Armed revolutionaries seize power locally, and set up a semblance of a state beginning with a system of justice enforcement (police and courts) and moving on to delivering certain public goods like schools and hospitals. All these activities are funded through a combination of taxes claimed from the local population and illicit activities like kidnapping and extortion.
For the local population, which had no pervious access to even a justice machinery, let alone schools or employment opportunities, the provision of some basic services by these non-state actors is often welcome at the initial stages. So, it is quite likely that Maoists acquired some popular support in India?s tribal belt, at the initial stages of their takeover, just like they developed pockets of support in the most under-developed parts of Peru and Colombia.
But the sheen wears off the revolutionaries as quickly as it does with regular governments. As the Maoists take on the functions of the state, they too would be afflicted with common problems that face a lot of governments, like miscarriage of justice, which often translates into the brutality of justice handed out by a group that adheres to an ideology of violence. Gathering taxes from the local population is never popular. And over the medium term, the Maoists don?t have any strategy to actually bring any semblance of prosperity to the locals. Add to that the fear of being caught in the crossfire between state forces and Maoists, and it is reasonable to assume that the Maoists are not likely to be quite the popular saviours of poor tribals, the Robin Hoodesque avatar in which some urban romantics like to view them.
It?s just that the local population has no means to express their disapproval?no elections and the fear of retribution maintain the silence that is unfortunately seen by some as consent.
For all its many flaws, at least Indian democracy allows its citizens the right to decide who rules them once every five years. And citizens, including many of the poorest, have exercised that right judiciously. And while it is possible to be dissatisfied with outcomes, the state in India does eventually respond to the demands of its citizens, even the most deprived?the UPA government has, for example, spent much political and financial capital on NREG, loan waiver and other social sector programmes directed at the most needy.
The Maoists, on the other hand, are in no position to offer any of this. They are only willing to offer a violent overthrow of the Indian state, something that hardly guarantees tribals more development, or a better life. The only real way to development, for tribals and all others, is to get the right mix of state intervention and access to markets. The erstwhile Maoists of China realised this in the 1970s. The Maoists of India, like their counterparts in Peru and Colombia, are unlikely to see any virtue in the mainstream, not while they maintain what they believe is a superiority of their armed forces over the state?s forces. So in the short run, the state has no option but to get tough. In the longer term, the state must persuade both the tribals and the Maoists who are willing to enter the mainstream that the Indian state, with the help of private capital?the exact policy mix can always be debated?can deliver development to even the most backward parts of the country.
dhiraj.nayyar@expressindia.com