The 15th UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen (COP15) is being followed closely by the entire world. The decisions taken at the COP15 will be known only on December 18. But the run-up to the COP15 has revealed some striking similarities between the climate change deliberations and multilateral trade talks at the WTO.
The first and most obvious similarity is the sharp polarisation between the developed and developing world. Both the climate change debate and the multilateral trade talks have seen the developed and developing countries blaming each other for lack of progress. Passage of time has seen the chasm widening between the two blocs on both issues. The differences have been conspicuous to the extent that trade talks have collapsed on various occasions with neither bloc agreeing to concede positions. The climate change talks have also seen the developed and developing world talking in two different voices. Till now there is little indication of the two blocs agreeing on a common agenda.
The second similarity pertains to both trade and climate talks reflecting the divergent trends in world development and contrasts in capacities and endowments between developed and developing blocs. Trade negotiations in the last 10-12 years have firmly underlined the growing importance of developing countries in world trade. The negotiations have also highlighted the absence of a level playing field between the developed and developing blocs. Developed countries possess advanced standards, regulations and trade infrastructures. Developing countries? exports find it difficult to get greater access in developed markets due to their inability to fulfill standard and certification requirements. Many developed countries can afford to subsidise their exports because of greater financial resources while developing countries can?t. In climate talks as well, the resource gap between the developed and developing world is clearly visible, particularly in the difference that such a gap creates in capacities for adopting growth-oriented environment-friendly measures.
The third resemblance pertains to how both climate and trade negotiations find the developed and developing groups bargaining on quid pro quos with respect to the future course of action. Grant of greater market access by the developing world to non-agricultural products from advanced countries is contingent upon the latter lowering its subsidies on primary product exports. Similar trade-offs are visible in trade-in-services as well as with grant of greater commercial presence getting tied up with better movement of professionals. In climate talks, developed countries? demands for fixing lower carbon emission levels are countered by developing countries? responses to do so only if aid and resource support are forthcoming from high-income countries. This is the bone of contention at COP15.
The fourth similarity relates to the inability of both trade and climate talks to arrive at action-oriented formulae acceptable to all. Working out a formula for tariff cuts that takes into account differentiated tariff profiles of developed and developing countries and yet grants equivalent market access has proved nearly impossible. On the other hand, the climate talks have also been desperately searching for a mutually acceptable formula with opinion sharply divided on whether to announce lower emission targets or fix carbon-intensity goals or other options.
Finally, both trade and climate talks point to a global economic order that is increasingly dominated by emerging market economies such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa. These economies have been collaborating collectively as well as bilaterally for forging alternate opinions in both fora. Such collaborations are encouraged by shared concerns. Trade in agricultural commodities has been a common rallying point for these economies at the WTO, given their large domestic constituencies of farming populations. Difficulties in switching to low-carbon technologies have again bound them together in efforts to provide an alternate action agenda at the COP15. Whether they eventually succeed in doing so is a different issue. But they have succeeded in articulating concerns of the developing world.
Trade and climate talks have other similarities as well: both involve almost the entire club of world nations and elicit considerable provocation from civil society organisations. One wonders whether these similarities will be further augmented by the addition of one more commonality at the end of COP15. During the last decade, world trade talks hardly produced visible gains. The Doha Development Agenda has remained a non-starter despite numerous meetings of trade ministers. Does the COP15 await a similar fate? The sharp differences on issues and methods in the run-up to Copenhagen have already struck a disturbing note. Hopefully COP15 will end up showing that the world thinks and acts differently on trade and climate!
The author is a visiting research fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies in the National University of Singapore. These are his personal views