In the private sector, the age of an organisation is not a problem. Private firms have to constantly pass the market test. If an organisation fails to reinvent itself in an ever changing world, it bleeds capital and labour. The market economy steadily euthanises the old when they fail to change with the times. For each rejuvenated firm like Tata Motors or Tata Steel that we see today, there are hundreds of firms of their vintage that we do not see today, which collapsed when the world changed and the organisation did not.
In government, creative destruction does not happen by itself?it requires a special push called economic reform. Arms of government are monopolies and do not face a market test. The policy process must, hence, exert a continual harsh scrutiny upon each agency and law, asking whether it has reinvented itself adequately to reflect the needs of today?s India. The older an agency is, the more problematic it is likely to be.
The design of the RBI Act is rooted in British government committee reports of 1914 and 1925. As a consequence, there are two fatal flaws: (a) the designers did not intend a central bank for a free India, and, (b) essentially nothing about monetary economics was known at the time. To some extent, the age of RBI is worse than 75 years: in a few years there will be the 100th anniversary of the 1914 committee.
The role and function of RBI was further distorted in the decades of Indian socialism, and put under great stress with bank nationalisation. Far from maturing into a genuine central bank, it became a central planning agency for finance. When central planning died, the rationale for the existence of this central planner ended.
We now do things very differently in India, when compared with the age of colonialism or the age of socialism. Sebi presents a useful comparison of the present ethos of public administration. Sebi regulates a competitive ecosystem of exchanges and depositories?it does not own or run them. RBI has the conflict of interest of owning and running a exchange and depository, thus combining (monopoly PSU) service provision with regulation in the manner of the old DoT.
Sebi does not trade on the markets that it regulates. RBI is a big market manipulator on the very markets where it is supposed to be a regulator.
Sebi?s world is one with rule of law where all orders are public and there is a vigorous appeals mechanism at the SAT. RBI?s world is one where actions are not public, where the same rule is interpreted differently for different supplicants and where financial firms have neither an effective mechanism, nor the courage to appeal.
RBI scores in the bottom decile of the central banks of the world on the question of transparency. The agenda papers of Sebi board meetings are on the Sebi Web site. Sebi has overseen the greatest success in Indian finance?the rise of a world-class equity market. This is the only area where India appears in top 10 rankings in global finance. RBI has overseen the greatest failures of Indian finance?the bond-currency-derivatives nexus and banking.
The fossil from the days of colonialism and socialism, the old lady of Mint Street, hence draws little veneration from the people who understand her work. Some of her siblings?ancient organisations such as Tata Motors and Tata Steel?have reinvented themselves for the age of globalisation. In every aspect of their behaviour and functioning, these firms do the opposite when compared with what they did just 20 years ago. Private firms born in 1934, which did not reinvent themselves, were euthanised by the market economy. But being a government organisation, RBI has faced little threat of euthanasia.
In this picture, the pompous celebrations of RBI?s 75th year are a bit like the May Day parades of Soviet Russia. The showy celebrations symbolise the insecurity of a framework that is hollow inside.
It is now time to reinvent RBI, drawing on what we have learned in recent decades worldwide about central bank reform, and what we have learned in recent decades about law, regulation and public administration through success stories such as Sebi. Such change will, of course, be resisted by the incumbent. DoT did not support telecom reform; the ministry of steel resisted decontrol of steel prices; the EPFO detests pension reform. RBI is no different. It comes up with many different elaborate arguments but always the same predictable conclusion: RBI is always right and nothing should be done by way of reform. The views of RBI staff or loyalists are hence not useful in thinking about RBI reform.
The author is an economist with interests in finance, pensions and macroeconomics