How much does ?excess aggregate demand? explain the worsening?
We had written about India?s large and troubling current account deficit (CAD) in early January and how the theories of currencies and finance seem to be failing in India. One would have thought a priori that the massive depreciation of the rupee would have set in motion ?automatic stabilisers? to narrow the deficit, through making exports more competitive and imports costlier. Since then, things have only got worse, although the rupee has stabilised at relatively weak levels. On the face of it, India?s CAD will probably end up being more than 5% of GDP this year, much worse than last year?s 4.2% (although there is an ambiguous element in this statistic, as we will see later).
The bottom line is that the deterioration of the current account seems predominantly to be the effect of a combination of gold and oil, which are probably?at least, directly?not reflective of excess aggregate demand. This is not a puzzle, given that demand elasticities of petroleum consumption had remained suppressed due to subsidised prices, and with gold consumption driven by different dynamics. Also, the situation in the third quarter was an improvement over the first half, although there is little to indicate that this improvement will sustain. The January 2013 trade data points to a deterioration, although initial reports suggest that this was due to a (one-off?) surge in gold imports.
The story doesn?t end here. The discrepancies between the merchandise trade data released by RBI and the ministry of commerce (DGCIS) are known and reconcilable. But this is not the case with data on petroleum imports and exports released by DGCIS and separately by the petroleum ministry (PPAC). Table 3 shows the massive increase in magnitude of the deviation (for the first nine months of FY13) between the two numbers, with the PPAC data showing a $11 billion lower petroleum imports, compared to the commerce ministry. About $5 billion of this was in the October-December quarter alone, a third of the total increase in petroleum imports in April-December 2012 (relative to corresponding nine months of the previous year).
There?s yet another angle?a valuation angle?to CAD, measured in proportion to GDP. The latter needs to be converted into dollar terms using the doller-rupee exchange rate. One of the fears expressed about CAD was the sharp rise in the CAD/GDP ratio from 2.6% in FY11 to 4.2% in FY12, 4.6% in April-September FY13, and now projected to be even higher (maybe close to 5%) in FY13. While not in the slightest downplaying the degree of concern, we do need to point out that some of this is due to the weaker rupee. If we convert the H1 FY13 GDP to dollars using the H1 FY12 dollar-rupee (45.3, instead of 54.6 in H1 FY13), the CAD/GDP ratio drops to 3.9%, down from the reported 4.6%. This is not entire notional jugglery. Although it can be argued that the weaker rupee was, in itself, the result of external and internal weaknesses, the recalibration might be the result of lower capital flows (we have seen the CAD had not deteriorated significantly in dollar terms).
None of the above is meant to downplay the gravity of India?s high CAD. However, targeted correction measures are urgently needed, which the fuel price rationalisation is beginning to address. High inflation is one of the reasons for the surge in gold demand, which has been the focus of monetary policy. Hopefully, these measures will ameliorate one of India?s key macroeconomic imbalances.
The author is senior vice-president, business & economic research, Axis Bank. Views are personal