By P R Kumaraswamy
The Palestinian excitements over President Biden’s reversal of some of the measures of his predecessor Donald Trump are short-lived. The American re-engagement with the Palestine National Authority, resumption of aid to the UNWRA (the UN agency that takes care of the basic needs of the Palestinian refugees) and the return of the American commitments for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are significant. Much to Israeli discomfort, President Biden visited Augusta Victoria Hospital in East Jerusalem this Friday and pledged US$100 million in aid to Palestinian hospitals in the Arab part of Jerusalem. Important as they are, the overall picture is starker for the Palestinians. Towards furthering President Trump’s decision to recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and move the embassy from Tel Aviv, the joint statement of President Biden and Prime Minister Lapid is named ‘Jerusalem Declaration’.
The real challenge to the Palestinians is the changing regional landscape that is increasingly indifferent and even insensitive towards the Palestinians. The process, however, did not begin suddenly or without warnings. The June War, which saw the military defeat of the Arab countries, spurred the Khartoum Resolution of ‘Three NOs; no recognition, no negotiation and no peace with Israel. This was consolidated by the oil crisis of 1973 that catapulted the Palestinian question to the centre stage, and the Palestinian question emerged as the core of the larger Arab-Israeli conflict.
But this was short-lived. President Anwar Sadat broke the Khartoum spirit and Arab solidarity; he travelled to Jerusalem, addressed the Knesset and eventually made peace with Israel. He did this without any resolution to the Palestinian question and thus established a precedent to delink the Palestinian question from the national interests of individual Arab countries.
Contrary to the expectations of the Camp David accords of 1978, other Arab leaders did not follow the footsteps of Sadat, resulting in the prolonged isolation of Egypt in the Arab and Islamic world. But the precedent was established. Using the Madrid conference as the reason, countries like India and China (which championed the Palestinian cause and hence refused to deal with Israel) normalised relations in early 1992. The Oslo accords enabled King Hussein (who had secretly met every Israeli Prime Minister except Ben-Gurion and Menachem Begin) to come out of the closet and sign the peace treaty with Israel in 1994.
Gradually, several Arab and Islamic countries slowly moved closer to Israel. Former Soviet republics in Central Asia, with predominantly Muslim populations, moved closer to Israel. So did several African countries. There were voices in even Pakistan for revisiting the hostility towards Israel, especially in the light of growing Indo-Israeli relations. Formal relations with the PNA enabled Türkiye to consolidate its ties with Israel.
Then came the Trump Peace Plan and Abraham Accords of 2020. If the former was a non-starter due to its complete neglect of the Palestinian redlines, the latter widened the gulf between the Palestinians and the Arab world. While offering perfunctory support for the Palestinian cause, UAE and Bahrain and later on, Morocco and Sudan joined the bandwagon. The Gulf Arab countries could not have moved closer to Israel without the tacit but strong support of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, more widely known as MbS. According to the Israeli media, in November 2020, the then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu flew to the futuristic city of Neom on the Red Sea for a rendezvous with MbS.
As President Biden was leaving for Jeddah from Israel, on Thursday Saudi Arabia opened its airspace to Israeli national carriers (Air India has been using it since March 2018, and Bahraini and Emirati carriers following the Abraham Accords). In addition, there are strong suggestions that the Kingdom might even allow a direct flight to Jeddah for hajj pilgrims by Israeli Arabs.
Meanwhile, some of the hardcore supporters of the Palestinians, especially Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, are bogged in domestic turmoil since the popular Arab uprising began in late 2010. As a result, regime survival and territorial integrity are their primary concern, considerably relegating their concerns for Palestinian statelessness.
Thus, since the late 1970s, the Arab and Islamic countries are slowly moving closer to Israel. While continuing to support the Palestinians—merely a lip-service for several critics—the Arab countries are prioritising their national interest over the Palestinian cause. For example, the Gaza crisis in May 2021 evoked strong reactions from UAE and Saudi Arabia but did not reverse the process. Countries like Türkiye, which were critical of the Abraham Accords, recognised the unstoppable nature of the process and resumed closer ties with Israel.
To a larger extent, the Arab-Israeli conflict has considerably weakened, and the Palestinian question is the main problem facing Israel. The Arab core, which was its earlier concern, has emerged as its close ally in political, economic and strategic terms. Ironically, the Islamic Republic of Iran, which supports the Palestinian statehood in the whole of Mandate Palestine (that is, without Israel), is the midwife of the Abraham Accords; by threatening them, Tehran had made its Arab neighbours moving closer to Israel even without the resolution of the Palestinian statelessness.
Is the Palestinian national movement ready to abandon rhetoric and wishful thinking and recognise the uncomfortable journey of the Arab world since the Camp David accords of 1978?
(The author teaches at Centre for West Asian Studies (CWAS), School of International Studies, JNU. Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position or policy of Financial Express Online. Reproducing this content without permission is prohibited).