India’s push towards self-reliance in defence has gathered undeniable momentum over the past decade. Procurement policies have been reoriented, private sector participation is rising, and the defence export pipeline is finally beginning to look credible. Yet, a pointed caution by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) recently serves as a timely reminder: inflated or misleading claims of “indigenisation” by defence manufacturers—public and private—can set back the very mission they claim to advance.
Trust Deficit
At the heart of self-reliance in defence lies a simple expectation: India must genuinely reduce technological dependence, not merely repackage imported components. When companies exaggerate the extent of local content, or pass off assembled systems as indigenous products, it weakens trust between the armed forces, industry, and policymakers. Worse, it distorts procurement decisions, misallocates taxpayer resources, and discourages true technological innovation.
The CDS’s warning signals a growing concern that indigenisation is sometimes turning into a branding exercise rather than an engineering one. When firms tweak designs superficially, replace minor subsystems, or rely on foreign intellectual property (IP) while calling the end product “Made in India”, they may tick policy boxes—but they do little to build national capability.
For India’s defence ecosystem to mature, ethical transparency around what is genuinely indigenous is indispensable. Defence manufacturers must embrace rigorous disclosure standards—clearly stating the origin of components, the depth of local design, and the degree of technological ownership. A culture of honest reporting will enable fair competition, better procurement evaluation, and targeted policy support for companies investing in real R&D rather than cosmetic localisation.
But this is only half the story. The government, too, must recognise that ethical indigenisation ultimately depends on strong domestic research capabilities. India’s defence R&D spending, as a share of GDP and of overall defence expenditure, remains far below global benchmarks. The Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) budget has stagnated in real terms, private-sector R&D remains under-incentivised, and academia-industry-military linkages are still weak. Expecting world-class innovation without robust investment is unrealistic.
Systemic Barriers
India spends only 0.65% of its GDP on R&D, while the US spends 2.83%, China 2.14 %, France 2.19%, and South Korea 4.8%. According to the Foundation for Advancing Science and Technology, private defence firms allocate only 1.2% of their revenue to R&D, markedly lower than the global average of 3.4%. This gap highlights a need for increased investment in innovation to keep pace with global standards. The Indian defence sector also lags in the proportion of PhD-qualified employees, with an average of only 0.1% compared to the global average of 0.3%. And Indian defence firms produce just 7.3 patents per dollar billion revenue, a stark contrast to the global average of 240.
If India seeks to break out of the “importer-to-assembler” cycle, policymakers must treat defence research as a strategic national priority. This means significantly expanding R&D grants for private companies, simplifying processes for technology transfer, encouraging joint research with global partners, and modernising the DRDO’s internal systems. A clear, long-term R&D road map—supported by predictable funding and performance-linked accountability—can transform India from a buyer of technology to a creator of it.
It’s obvious that India cannot demand deeper indigenisation while underfunding the very scientific foundations that make it possible. The DRDO needs more resources and more partnerships and universities need to be integrated into long-term research missions. Without sustained investment in advanced materials, jet engines, electronic warfare, propulsion, and semiconductors, India will remain dependent on foreign suppliers regardless of how its defence platforms are labelled.
The CDS’s message is therefore both a warning and an opportunity. Ethical indigenisation isn’t a bureaucratic requirement; it is the foundation of a credible national defence strategy. At a time when India’s geopolitical environment is fraught with uncertainty, technological self-reliance cannot be achieved through shortcuts. The defence industry must resist the temptation of easy claims, and the government must back genuine innovators with the resources they deserve.
Only then can India build a defence ecosystem that is not only self-reliant, but also truly world-class. Many Indian platforms are “indigenous” largely in final assembly. Aircraft engines, AESA (active electronically scanned array) radars, seekers, stealth coatings, propulsion systems, and advanced composites continue to depend heavily on foreign suppliers. This creates a false sense of self-sufficiency as a platform may be manufactured in India, but the IP, critical subsystems, and supply-control remain abroad. A single foreign bottleneck—as seen repeatedly—can stall the entire line.
It’s also true that while some private companies have shown agility, innovation, and cost-efficiency, they face high entry barriers, limited access to testing facilities, a procurement system that favours established public-sector units, and uncertainty around long-term orders. The lack of a level playing field restricts India’s ability to build a diversified and competitive defence industrial base. Indigenisation cannot advance meaningfully if the tier-II and -III supplier bases remain thin. India needs depth, not just final-platform manufacturers.
The CDS also ignored the fact that the system itself often stands in the way. There are many examples of India’s defence establishment setting unrealistic requirements on qualitative requirements (QRs), which prompted former Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar to once comment that those writing the QRs were perhaps watching “Marvel comic movies”. The defence establishment must be realistic in what they ask for and be consistent in how they evaluate.
DRDO Chairman Samir V Kamat was bang on when he said that there is an aversion to risk and intolerance of failure in India due to which people end up taking less challenging projects. Kamat also said that if there is a failure, you immediately get a Comptroller and Auditor General report saying that you have caused loss to the government. Questions are raised on who is accountable due to which many projects keep getting extended instead of them being closed. The CDS should realise that mere criticism of manufacturers is hardly a solution.
