By Praveer Purohit
Three years ago in the months of April and May, as the world grappled with COVID, thousands of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers stealthily intruded across a large swathe of Line of Actual Control (LAC) in East Ladakh. Eerily like the Kargil intrusions, we were initially taken by surprise. However, once the scale of the Chinese intrusions was discerned, the Indian reaction was swift and sure. A counter build-up of Indian forces to match the Chinese necessitated a rebalance of our forces from the Western borders into East Ladakh. Amidst the crisis in ensuring a swift, forceful and effective Indian response, arguably the most crucial role of air power has been largely unknown and unsung.
A key metric of handling a crisis is responsiveness. It is this inherent characteristic of air power that came to fore once again. Responding with alacrity, the IAF transport aircraft namely C-17, C-130J, IL-76 and An-32 with their intrepid crew flew men, material and war fighting wherewithal into Leh. These operations were incessant, high risk and yet the IAF persisted. Most roads were still closed. Thanks to the IAF, the speedy counter build-up by India surprised both friends and foe alike. Military history buffs would recall that this was not the first time IAF (and air power) reacted in such a manner. The mobility and responsiveness element of air power over Indian skies was characterized in the Hump Airlift prior to independence. Post independence, air power was the saviour in many wars and war-like situations. These include the airlift into Srinagar in October 1947, establishing an air bridge to Poonch in December 1947&Leh in May 1948, landing AMX-13 tanks at Chushul in 1962, establishing an air bridge to Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) in 1962, the Tangail paradrop drop & heli-lift across Meghna in the 1971 war, heli-lifting more than a Brigade of Indian Army into vantage positions during the Sumdorong Chu crisis, Operation Cactus and Operation Pawan. In most of these situations, tactical air operations resulted in strategic effects. Had it not been for air power, the map of India may well have been different.
Coming back to the present crisis in Ladakh, the rapid induction of troops by air was followed by a swift deployment of myriad assets of IAF ranging from fighters, helicopters, radars, air defence systems to combat enablers. The sustenance of troops was done in a ‘hub and spoke’ model wherein larger C-17 and IL-76 flew material, cargo, ration and ammunition into Leh, from where the Chinooks, Mi-17, Dhruv and Cheetals flew them further towards the ‘hotspots’. Even as these operations continued unabated, the fighter fleet and the newly inducted Apache helicopters kept their powder dry. Extensive work-up in high altitude ensured they were ready to take the air war well into the adversary’s airspace while ensuring integrity of their own. In a tense environment wherein the ground forces were locked in an ‘eyeball to eyeball’ confrontation, the IAF had acquired precise target information thanks to combat enablers and space-based assets. The P-8I of the Indian Navy too had an important role in this endeavour. Fusing the information collated from various sources, refining the ‘sensor to shooter’ process and ensuring appropriate cyber/electronic defences kept IAF planners and operations room personnel extremely busy. It also ensured that IAF was ready to undertake full spectrum operations and that too in quick time. Or as is referred to in aviation, “Before the Chinese could say Jack Robinson” !
Now imagine yourself to be the Chinese Western Theatre Commander. Seeing your adversary (in this case the IAF) so well poised, the initial ‘gung-ho’ attitude would change to one of utter disbelief. One of your staff officers would then inform you that the IAF has a long and chequered history of high-altitude operations. Another officer would add that the IAF deployment indicated it was not an ‘air show’ but purely business. A savvier one would then grimly remark that unacceptable damage would result to PLA if the IAF fired in anger. Basically, a euphemism for Chinese suffering ‘loss of face’. Having realized this, you would then choose the smart option – avoid a conflict and simultaneously build up your own air power. This is precisely what the Chinese did.
Indian air power first averted a setback in the Ladakh crisis. Simultaneously it provided effective kinetic options had the situation deteriorated. Once realization dawned on the Chinese and talks began to defuse the situation, the Indian side could negotiate secure in the confidence of our ability to inflict severe punishment if necessary. At the strategic and political level, the favourable asymmetry of air power gave heft to our diplomatic efforts.
Shaken by the IAF response, the PLAAF has engaged in a frenzied attempt to create and upgrade infrastructure essential for conduct of high tempo air operations. To be sure, the PLAAF also deployed its top-notch fighters including J-20 for varying durations. Open-source satellite imagery has revealed extensive construction of runways, aircraft shelters, heliports, radar and missile sites. Chinese counter-measures include inducting missiles, flying Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and forward deploying its fighters. The favourable asymmetry that IAF enjoyed at the beginning of the crisis has certainly reduced three years hence. This has increased challenges for IAF but also added options for targeting. Smart, systematic and sustained targeting can wreak havoc on the Chinese resulting in ‘loss of fighting ability’ as well as ‘loss of face’. Generating a larger favourable asymmetry thus is sine qua non. Our air power eco-system comprising constituents outside the IAF must rise to the challenge. Bolstering our manufacturing ability, timely delivery by the aviation industry, high quality and reliable supply chain, faster procurement cycles, adequacy of funds and assured support to IAF force structure development are all important.
The Chinese like playing mind games. Increased transgressions since 2013 along the LAC and our land centric fixation gave them the psychological advantage. Our willingness and ability to inflict serious punitive damage through the aerospace domain has altered Chinese calculations. Indian air power manifested through IAF created psychological dominance over the Chinese. There are many lessons in the Ladakh stand-off. The ones that stand out are first, wars are won or lost in the mind. Thus, psychological aspects of war require greater attention. Second, amongst all domains, air power (or aerospace power) has the greatest ability to create devastating psychological paralysis/ dissonance on the adversary. Finally, air power has been and will continue to be the most potent and effective deterrent against China. It should hence be enhanced with adequate funding and its potency preserved according to the IAF doctrine.
About the author: He has recently retired from the IAF as a Group Captain. He has over 5500 hours of flying experience including in combat zones.
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