By Gaurav Sen
With the military modernization and expansion programme, China’s continental challenge to India at the Himalayan border has also been complemented by its maritime presence as a stakeholder in the Indian Ocean. As the Galwan Valley clashes revealed last year, the frosty state of bilateral relations due to boundary disputes is likely to remain the case for coming years. To blunt the Chinese continental advantage, a section of opinion-makers has argued in favor of India deploying its leverage in the Indian Ocean targeting vital Chinese interests to deter its continental aggression2. However, this article argues that the Indian strategic leverage in the Indian Ocean region is dissipating faster, and it would not be as effective as envisaged by proponents of horizontal escalation.
India Ocean and Sino-India Relations
India and China both are ancient civilizations that were overly dependent on sea routes for trade since antiquity, the dependence has been carried along to date which generates the overarching demand for sea control in both countries.The Indian Ocean’s rise as a key geopolitical site may be attributed mostly to Chinese vulnerabilities there; the region is still commonly regarded as a non-China-dominated one that is essential to Chinese energy security and is therefore seen as a priority for China. The influence of India, which has tense relations with China and sees Beijing as a geopolitical threat to its national security, is another factor contributing to the region’s importance.Moreover, for the world especially the USA, it has been a pivot point to Asia allowing it to leverage the spread of Indian power in the region as a tool to check China by strengthening security ties with both India and its other democratic partner.Provided India’s limited scope in prevailing in a border conflict along with the Himalayas the Indian Ocean Region is perceived as a significant location that allows India to negotiate with China on equal terms.This balance of power in the region benefits both countries.
Is India equipped for the maritime conflict with China?
The possibility of a limited conflict with China as it seeks to pursue regional hegemony, nibbles on Indian territory in the Himalayas, and encroaches on the Indian sphere of influence in South Asia cannot be ruled out. India has also been wary of Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean in the form of anti-piracy missions, survey ships, or Chinese strategic assets like a submarine. Nevertheless, Indian observers still believe that India possesses the requisite force structure and critical assets and the Indian Navy is well prepared to take on China in the IOR.
Scholars argue about the geostrategic positions that Andaman and Nicobar provide which can be used as the ‘unsinkable aircraft’ performing as a force multiplier and could be considered as a forward outpost and staging post for combat operations. The archipelagoes overlook the 6 and 8-degree channels, two important maritime lanes where a large amount of global traffic, including a lot of Chinese oil and other goods, trespasses. Additionally, India has an extensive network of radio stations in Andaman, on the eastern coast, and at the Information Infusion Center in Gurugram, allwhich aid in India’s ability to gather data regarding the actions and maneuvers of the PLAN in the IOR. Although China is expanding its influence in the Indian Ocean littorals, India has excellent relations with all the developing nations involved in China’s infrastructure project in the Bay of Bengal Littorals, which aids in India’s ability to learn about Chinese activities in these nations. All these factors combined to create a critical “Strategic Leverage” for India, which urges Indian security analysts and commentators to consider blocking Chinese ships, discouraging Chinese deployments in the area, and exploiting China’s Malacca Dilemma.
Withering of the leverage
But the scenario is not as simple as we consider it to be. The PLAN’s military modernization and strategic expansion in terms of far seas deployment would have adverse implications for Indian maritime calculations. Indian Navy documents appear to be ambiguous in stating their wartime strategy but the major strategies visible in these documents are; Far Sea Projection, SLOC interdiction, Sea Control, and Sea Denial.
As far as we know, far sea projection is not an option for the Indian Navy, the strategy demands to deploy the Indian Navy ships and submarines in the far seas to demonstrate its strength to the adversary6, which could be perceived as thoroughly aggressive and unnecessary. In addition, Indian Naval capabilities might be inadequate for undertaking such operations given the budget allocation for the Navy. Three more alternatives are linked together. Sea control is a broader category under which SLOC interdiction and sea denial fall. Sea denial is seen as a subset of sea control even though sea control and sea denial are separate tactics. Sea control, as the Indian Navy defines it, is the denial of access to the enemy while maintaining control over maritime space for its use. In recent years, it has been acknowledged that sea denial tactics are entirely devoid of sea control activities.
The problem attached to the Sea Control is that it is somewhat an aggressive strategy that could irk Indian Ocean Littorals.The presence of the Indian Navy in the main sea Lines of Communication could also prove to be a melting point of Indian strategic leverage in the IOR. On the other hand,sea denial is the strategy that unraveled during the wartime scenario, especially against an invading adversarial navy, which seeks to reinforce a defensive bulwark, could be understood as an act of aggression by the region’s littorals. The SLOC interdiction is part of both strategies, in which denying Chinese ships access to the Indian Ocean is a crucial element. These tactics have not been thoroughly investigated, though, and India needs to factor in its understanding that the Chinese navy is not a pushover considering it is among the most powerful navy in the world and has a remarkable modernization program. The fact that China is sending warships and information-gathering ships to the IOR is demonstrated by the growing naval artillery and soaring defense budget.
However, if China wants to dominate the region, they have the resources to do so.They can send more amphibious ships and submarines.China’s long-term strategy appears to be to increase its presence in the IOR through fishing fleets or survey ships, to gradually weaken Indian influence rather than exerting aggressive sea control in the region, and to establish itself as a stakeholder in the Indian Ocean by working with Indian Ocean Littorals on development projects.
Thus, the calls for taking the Himalayan confrontation into the high seas seem unrealistic, especially when the strategies of Sea control and Sea Denial are designed to unravel explicitly against Chinese aggression in the Indian Ocean which will hurt the potential freedom of navigation of other countries. These doctrines are meant to be confrontational and might be counterproductive in dealing with the gradual Chinese encroachment in the IOR space. The SLOC interdiction strategy is also not without its difficulty. It would require differentiating between the neutrals and rival states’ vessels. Importantly, the fundamental importance of Sea Lines of Communication in the Indian Ocean to global trade means the vital economic interest of other nations would also be impacted by SLOC interdiction. The strategy, thus, comes with its share of costs. Moreover, like sanctions, Naval blockades have also proven ineffective in imposing significant costs on strategic rivals given the workaround mechanisms often devised by interest groups that get affected.
In conclusion, the supposed leverage that India seems to have in the Indian Ocean does not seem so formidable and viable upon critical scrutiny. The range of plausible strategies that could be deployed to counter China in the IOR would come with their costs. Hence, in making decisions about inflicting costs on China in the maritime space, Policymakers need to work on the wider frame of strategies to counterbalance the detrimental effects that are likely to emerge in the aftermath of retaliatory measures, taken by the Indian Navy, against any Chinese offensive action in the Indian Ocean.
The author is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for African Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
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